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Introduction 
 
 
 
What is it that the analyst does in psychoanalysis that makes the process work?   
This question has inspired numerous attempts to describe and understand the analytic 
process, and the various answers formed within different schools of psychoanalytic 
theory have produced divergent clinical practices.  It is an important question, but 
obviously is also one that is not easily answered.  There are many ways to take it up—
following various theoretical and praxis-based paths—in an attempt to describe how 
psychoanalytic work functions, but even the attempt to locate foundational or key aspects 
of the analytic process often proves difficult.  Nevertheless, interpretation, as a key 
ingredient in psychoanalytic work, does seem to provide one way to compare various 
schools of analytic thought around the issue of the therapeutic process.  
Sigmund Freud, with his attempts to understand the talking cure, was the first to 
explore the function of interpretation as an essential component of the psychoanalytic 
endeavor.  With his revolutionary text, The interpretation of dreams (1900/1965), Freud 
provided a whole new method for understanding the mechanisms of the mind.  He 
allowed us to begin to grasp how we might access the powerful unconscious processes at 
work in the psyche; and subsequent analytic thinkers have worked to further our 
understanding of the role of interpretation in working with the unconscious.  
Understanding the psychoanalyst’s role in relation to the material presented in the 
analytic session has been a central concern to those who have followed in Freud’s 
footsteps, yet such work has all too often been the source of insular factionalisms that 
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have alienated various groups working within the psychoanalytic tradition.  The followers 
of Melanie Klein and the followers of Jacques Lacan form two such groups.   
Both Klein and Lacan can be read as working from, yet substantially revising and 
modifying, Freud’s work.  J. Mitchell (1998) writes of the relationship between Freud 
and Klein: 
 
In her first ten years as a psychoanalyst she was anxious to stress that her work 
was a direct and loyal extension of Freud’s thinking.  Gradually she 
acknowledged an occasional, important disagreement.  By the second half of the 
1930’s, her contribution to psychoanalysis, though at least to her and her 
follower’s minds remained within a Freudian framework, was developing into an 
autonomous unit, a growing independent body. (p.13) 
 
Likewise, Hinshelwood (1994) writes, “Melanie Klein’s contributions are so rooted in the 
basic Freudian discoveries that they cannot be comprehended without some 
understanding of Freud” (p. 9).  Of Lacan, S. A. Mitchell and Black (1995) write, “[He] 
anchored his contributions in a reading of Freud (advertised under the banner of a ‘return 
to Freud’).  Lacan shared a common starting point with some other interpreters of Freud 
but ended up moving in a unique direction” (p. 195).  In a similar vein, Letche (1994) 
writes, “Lacan re-read Freud so as to clarify and reinvigorate a whole series of 
concepts—not least of which being the concept of the unconscious” (p. 67).  Their 
significant revisions of Freud’s theories have contributed to each theorist developing 
his/her own school of psychoanalysis.  These schools of psychoanalytic practice have 
3 
 
 
evolved separately, and each branch works within its own post-Freudian, revisionist 
paradigm.  Unfortunately, little dialogue (though with a few notable exceptions which I 
will explore in the final section of this paper) has taken place concerning similarities and 
differences in both theory and practice between the two.  For the most part, these two 
branches of psychoanalysis exist as discrete institutions of theory, practice, and training.   
Kleinians and Lacanians have both come to understand the nature of the analyst’s 
role in the psychoanalytic process in their own highly developed ways, but for the most 
part both groups have either found it difficult, or have not wanted, to exchange ideas and 
compare clinical practices, which has left both sides generally mystified by the analytic 
actions and conceptualizations of the other.  Although there are historico-political forces 
behind this partisanship (ranging from world politics and history to institutional politics 
and history, as well as intellectual politics and history), it might also be considered the 
nature of revisionist ideas to separate, as they seek to rectify, elaborate or even overturn 
predecessors and their conventions.  Nevertheless, the two are similar in their dialectical 
connection to Freud: as revisionists, Klein and Lacan are each interpreters of Freud’s 
work as they form their own constructions of psychoanalytic theory and practice.  
However, the ongoing segregation of these revisionist psychoanalytic schools has meant 
that dialogue and debate rarely take place as each group pursues its own specialized 
project.  Instead, a certain antagonistic alienation, often perpetuated by unsympathetic, 
caricatured critiques of the ideas and traditions of the other, has resulted in overarching 
conflict and discord within the psychoanalytic community (Bernardi, 2002; Burgoyne & 
Sullivan, 1997; Roudinesco, 1986; Turkle, 1978). This impasse has meant that open 
communication and exchange of ideas about the nature of the psychoanalytic endeavor 
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(as various schools understand it) rarely happens, resulting in a lack in the field of 
knowledge. 
My intention is to address one aspect of that lack in this dissertation.  I will 
examine the topic of analytic interpretation by reading next to each other, and through 
Freudian formulations, what both Melanie Klein and Jacques Lacan have written about it.  
My interest is to first better understand what each has said about interpretation and then 
to compare the two, seeing both points of agreement and points of divergence.  To do 
this, I will explore the ways each theorist can be understood to be a revisionist of Freud, 
and, in so doing, I will return to Freud’s work on interpretation to lay the groundwork for 
understanding Klein’s and Lacan’s modifications and revisions of his work. My hope is 
that this rereading of Klein and Lacan via Freud will add to the much-needed exchange of 
ideas around the very core problem of understanding the psychoanalytic process, a 
problem of interest to all psychoanalysts.  Though theoretical in nature, this study is 
written with a focus on psychoanalytic practice and will aim to clarify our understanding 
of interpretation as a clinical practice.       
 
 
 
What Is Interpretation? 
 
Before proceeding, I will attempt an initial—albeit highly provisional—definition 
or explanation of what I mean by “interpretation.”  Of course, clarifying and specifying 
the nature of psychoanalytic interpretation as theorized first by Freud, then as it is revised 
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by Klein and Lacan, will be the work of this dissertation, but before delving into the 
nuances of each theorist’s approach to and understanding of psychoanalytic 
interpretation, a broader definition of the term might help to refine the topic.  Webster’s 
dictionary (1989) defines interpretation as:  
 
1. the act of interpreting; elucidation; explication…2. an elucidation; an explanation 
of the meaning of another’s artistic or creative work…3. an understanding or 
conception of another’s words or deeds…4. a way of interpreting…5. the rendering of 
a dramatic part, music, etc. so as to bring out the meaning, or to indicate one’s 
particular conception of it…6. translation. (p. 744) 
 
From these definitions, we can see that interpretation might be understood as including an 
action or process, aimed toward some originating piece, for the purpose of creating 
meaning.  In exploring the Latin roots of the word as an act of translation, literary theorist 
Mailloux (1990) notes that it “conveys a sense of translation pointed in two directions 
simultaneously: toward a text to be interpreted and for an audience in need of an 
interpretation” (p. 121).   This two-part characteristic is also true of psychoanalytic 
interpretation.  Freud discovered, in the dream, a text to be interpreted, and provided, in 
The interpretation of dreams (1900/1965), a method for working with such material.  
Throughout his later formulations of psychoanalytic theory and technique, Freud 
continued to expand the psychoanalytic conception of the interpretive process.  The 
content produced in sessions, by the subject of psychoanalysis—for example, dreams, 
daydreams, fantasies, parapraxes, symptoms and other traces of the unconscious—calls 
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for an explanation or translation, so that it may be brought into consciousness.  The 
analyst mediates between the material produced by the subject and the rendering or 
creation of new, hitherto unknown, meanings.  Psychoanalysis gives rise to new 
meanings, but it is also something that is done for an audience, in this case the patient or 
analysand,1 with the purpose of addressing his or her suffering.  The for aspect of 
psychoanalytic interpretation is most fully theorized in terms of the transference, a 
phenomenon understood first by Freud, then revised by both Klein and Lacan.  This 
aspect of analytic work requires attending not just to the analytic text, but also working 
with the unfolding relationship between the analyst and patient or analysand (what is 
called transference).  Psychoanalytic interpretations are not simply bits of information 
presented to the patient/analysand (as if a gift being given by the analyst). Instead 
interpretations are linked—in fairly complicated ways, which I will explore in this 
dissertation—to the transference relationship.  
 
 
Research Method 
 
 
 
The method used to create, render, or uncover meaning (what might be termed the 
“research method”) is ideologically tied to the epistemological assumptions of a given 
field.  For example, psychoanalysis is one of the many contexts in which this term 
“interpretation” circulates, and psychoanalytic interpretation can be distinguished from 
                                                 
1 Freud and Klein use the term “patient,” whereas Lacan uses the term “analysand.”  I will use both terms 
throughout this dissertation, applying the term most appropriate in the context (e.g., when discussing Freud 
and Klein I will use “patient,” when discussing Lacan I will use “analysand,” and when exploring in more 
general terms, I will use both terms). 
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the interpretation of data characteristic of empirical research, legal interpretation, 
astrological interpretation of horoscopes, Biblical hermeneutics, and so forth.  For each of 
these different types of interpretation, there is an intersection between form and content, 
topic and method.  Methodologies governing knowledge production in one field are not 
necessarily appropriate for other fields. The question of how best to research 
psychoanalytic concepts has been the subject of much debate.  Eagleton (1983) reports, 
“one American behaviorist psychologist remarked in conversation: ‘The trouble with 
Freud’s work is that it just isn’t testable!’” (p. 162, emphasis in the original). 
Psychoanalysis has a long and troubled relationship to the scientific community from 
which it arose, and Freud himself had a somewhat fraught relationship to the scientific 
community to which he belonged.  In a 1974 Conference on Psychoanalytic Education 
and Research organized by the American Psychoanalytic Association, analysts continued 
to struggle with this same issue.  One conclusion reached in that meeting was that 
psychoanalytic “research is often inappropriately equated with restrictive experimental 
and laboratory models, rather than broadly defined and adapted to the particular 
discipline of psychoanalysis” (Goodman, 1977, p. 123). The nature of the psychoanalytic 
project requires research methodologies suited to the particulars of the field, and not 
necessarily matching the research models of other disciplines. 
Since its inception, one of the primary modes for knowledge production in the 
psychoanalytic field has been written theoretical constructions, often based on clinical 
observation, yet extending beyond—and different from—empirical generalizations 
(Wolman, 1984).  Freud gave us topologies, developmental schemas, and other 
metaphorical structures as theoretical ways to understand the mind and subsequent 
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psychoanalytic theorists have revised and challenged these theoretical constructions, 
resulting in a discipline organized around theory. I will be using psychoanalytic theory, 
as developed by Freud, Klein, and Lacan, to provide a way to understand or think about 
the issue of psychoanalytic interpretation.  As such, their theoretical writings that address 
interpretation will be my “research data.”   
The “research method” used to analyze this “data” will be critical textual analysis.  
By “critical textual analysis” I mean a close reading of the text that attends to both the 
line of reasoning and the words/metaphors used by each theorist to explain his or her 
theory, yet which also allows for a critical perspective that notices gaps, contradictions, 
and weak spots in reasoning, in addition to reading for the ways the texts form a 
meaningful whole. For literary critic Belsey, a critical reading moves beyond the 
generally and “‘obviously’ intelligible” reading, which assumes “the position of a 
transcendent subject addressed by an autonomous an authoritative author,” and seeks 
instead to “liberate the plurality of the text, to reject the ‘obvious,’ and to produce 
meaning” (1980, p. 55). My reading of the texts will aim to produce the kind of 
interpretation that will allow for dialogue and in that way will produce new meaning.  
Therefore, my interest in opening meaningful dialogue on this topic shapes my reading of 
the texts.  I do not suggest it is a literal or determinate reading, nor would I claim to 
provide a rewording that aims at the author’s intent or at a systematic explication of the 
theory.  Instead, I propose to construct an argument based on a close reading or 
interpretation of the texts for the purpose of advancing dialogue between those working 
within the Kleinian and Lacanian psychoanalytic traditions about the interpretive process 
in psychoanalysis.  In seeking a way to allow for an exchange of ideas between these 
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writers who are so often read or experienced as adversaries or rivals, I propose a dialogic 
reading of psychoanalytic theory, in which various theoretical voices are constituted 
through their relationship to other theorists.  
 As such, the method used in this dissertation is inherently interpretive.  I raise 
this issue because there is clearly an intersection between topic and methodology here.     
Methodologically, I see a critical textual analysis as a particularly important, and apt, tool 
for understanding the work of psychoanalysis because psychoanalysts work with (and 
interpret) the material (what we might think of as a text) presented in the analytic session.  
However, the connection between the two is not easy to demarcate.  Some readers have 
attempted to directly adapt the tools of psychoanalysis to textual criticism, and a whole 
subfield of literary criticism, psychoanalytic textual criticism, developed out of this 
attempt.  Psychoanalytic textual criticism often either emphasizes the unconscious 
intentions of a text or author, or uses psychoanalytic theory to analyze the motives and 
actions (conscious and unconscious) of characters (Hilman & Harmon, 1992).  Theory 
can be read with the same focus, such that the process can quite easily become lost in or 
overtaken by formulaic content.  When psychoanalytic theory is read for its 
systems/conceptual structures, or when it is read for authorial intent and subjective 
presence in the text, psychoanalytic content runs the danger of eclipsing the 
psychoanalytic process. That is not the type of reading I propose here.  Instead, the 
interpretation I have in mind will aim toward understanding and participating in the 
analytic process.  I intend to draw on critical, analytic skills that seek to have a meaning 
effect—skills that are similar to the skills used by psychoanalysts as they listen to their 
patients, but instead of explicating psychoanalytic concepts as they are found in the texts, 
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I will be constructing an argument or interpretation of the texts that will move outside or 
beyond the texts. In the building of this argument, I will be doing as analysts do: 
interpreting (based on the texts of Freud, Klein, and Lacan)—that is constructing a 
reading for my readers (as audience).  The critical textual analysis I have proposed above 
might be understood to be an attempt to implement the interpretive process that is the 
subject of this dissertation.  This type of connection between textual analysis and 
psychoanalytic work is one Lacan directly addresses when he writes, “commenting on a 
text is like doing an analysis” (1975/1988a, p. 73).  Fink explores this in terms of Lacan 
as a reader of/commentator on Freud, writing that for Lacan, “Freud’s work must be 
grasped at the level of its twists and turns, reformulations, and new topographies” and 
elaborates that “Lacan even goes so far as to claim that the unconscious is those very 
‘twists and turns’” (2004, p. 67 and footnote 9, p. 177, emphasis in the original).  This is 
juxtaposed to a reading that seeks either philosophic, “internally consistent arguments” or 
provable hypotheses (Fink, 2004, p. 67).  Both of these types of reading involve claiming 
authority over the material, so that the truth-value is secured and can be mastered either 
through logic or the scientific method.  But as I understand it, psychoanalytic work does 
not fit an authority-driven model because the analyst is unable to achieve (and therefore 
is unwise to claim) such mastery over the unconscious, and must instead approach the 
analytic process in search of meaning rather than claiming possession of it.  Freud’s 
important contribution lies not in the theoretical constructs or topographies themselves so 
much as “how he invents [and abandons or substantially revises] successive topographies 
to deal with specific theoretical and clinical problems” that are before him (Fink, 2004, p. 
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67).  The importance of psychoanalytic interpretations is found in the analytic process 
from which they arise, not so much in the specific formulations given. 
One issue that emerges from this way of thinking about interpretation—both 
within the psychoanalytic session and for my interpretive work here—relates to 
evaluation.  If the value of a psychoanalytic interpretation (clinical or theoretical) lies 
neither in systematic, internal consistency, nor in empirical validation, on what grounds 
might it be assessed?  Of course, this issue is addressed within psychoanalytic theory, 
because the criterion by which to judge the success or failure of a clinical interpretation is 
of interest both theoretically and at the level of practice.  Freud takes up this issue 
through his interest in the process of creating clinically useful meanings or 
interpretations: for example, for him a dream interpretation seeks to put together, rather 
than distort and hide meaning (1940/1964a).  In the interpretation, the analyst may give 
his conjecture about how to understand the material presented, but it is the use the patient 
makes of the material (the way in which it might further the associative process) that 
ultimately supports or challenges its significance.  The success or failure of a particular 
analytic interpretation is retroactive, meaning its value can only be judged in relation to 
the new material that is produced after the interpretation is given.  And because the 
matter of evaluation is of issue to my readers, I will briefly address the process of 
evaluation of a critical textual analysis.  As I understand it, a good or successful critical 
textual analysis is one that makes sense to—or constructs meaning for—a reader. This 
view of significance is obviously very different from a scientific effort to find statistically 
significant results. It does not claim to provide the definitive reading, yet in placing its 
value in the audience’s response, a critical textual analysis provides a way to evaluate 
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one’s findings that I believe fits, given the nature of the object of study.  I will take up 
this study as an opportunity to create for my readers an interpretation of these texts, with 
the goal of providing a meaningful contribution to the discussion and dialogue about the 
nature of clinical, psychoanalytic interpretation.   The audience, for whom this 
interpretation is given, will ultimately decide if this interpretation “works” as such.   
 
 
 
 
 
Framing the Project 
 
In this dissertation I plan to first introduce interpretation as the focus of this 
dissertation by looking at Freud’s writing on the subject in Chapter One.  Then, Chapters 
Two and Three on Klein and Lacan, respectively, will seek to structure a coherent 
account of the nature of interpretation as presented by each theorist by looking at the 
ways each theorist draws upon and revises Freudian concepts as they each elaborate their 
own theoretical systems.  I will focus on the following issues: interpretation as a 
methodology, construction, fantasy, and transference, as they are formulated by each 
theorist.  In Chapter Four, I will compare Klein and Lacan, looking at points of 
agreement and divergence, and looking for ways to allow for dialogue between the two 
different schools of thought to take place.   As a part of this comparison, I will engage 
Lacan’s critique of Klein.  The theory I will explore in this dissertation will deal with 
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psychoanalytic interpretation as a general phenomenon and will not engage the nuances 
of how diagnostic issues impact interpretation.2   
My attempts to create a dialogue between these theories will require translating or 
interpreting the theory out of the terms of its original, self-referential logic and into terms 
that will allow for an exchange of ideas.  My hope is that reading Klein and Lacan as 
each revising Freudian concepts will provide a way to ground a theoretical discussion of 
otherwise incongruent theories. Klein and Lacan differ both in terminology and in style 
of theorizing.  Klein engages a great deal with clinical examples (from her work with 
children, as well as adults); for it is through her own case material that Klein formulates 
much of her theory.  “Theory building was never an end in itself for Klein” (Spillius, 
1988, Vol. 1, p. 2).  Nevertheless, within her writings, Klein has developed her own 
understanding of psychoanalysis, which includes a theory of interpretation.  Klein’s 
writings are quite unlike Lacan’s writings, which seem to work in an opposite direction, 
presenting mainly theory, with few clinical examples. For Lacan, multivalent theory (in 
which ideas are ambiguous and have several possible meanings or values) is a means for 
teaching technique; therefore he invites the reader to adopt a position in relation to his 
texts very much like the place from which psychoanalysts seek to engage clinical 
material (Fink, 2004, pp. 63-75). He asks the reader to be an interpreter of his texts and 
resists setting up a totalizing system, though many readers strain to read him that way 
(Fink, 2004, pp. 63-75). Lacan remains famous (perhaps infamous?) for the difficulty of 
his texts, and he purposefully presents his ideas in ways that often deter his readers 
(Gallop, 1985). These differences in style complicate the attempt to create dialogue.  It is 
                                                 
2 Roughly speaking, Lacan’s approach to interpretation is very different in neurosis and psychosis; the 
same is far less true for Klein.  
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as though each theorist has written in a language that is foreign to the other.  By returning 
to Freud’s work as a common link, an originating language if you will, I seek to translate 
or interpret the writings of these two very different theorists into a more general 
language, based on Freudian conceptualizations of interpretation, in a way that will allow 
for communication and dialogue.  In rereading Klein and Lacan in terms of the way each 
takes up and modifies aspects of Freud’s understanding of interpretation, I will create a 
point of reference to ground the comparison of these two disparate theoretical structures 
that in many ways (both in form and in content) seem unrelated at the outset.  
 
  15
 
Chapter One 
Freud and Interpretation 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Through his work with the meaning and process of dreaming in The interpretation 
of dreams (1900/1965), Freud founded a methodology for psychoanalytic interpretation, 
offering not just a new-praxis based process for working with dream material, but also—
more radically—formulating a new epistemology for understanding the mind.  Freud’s 
initial work in this text about dreams forms the basis of his broader psychoanalytic 
project, which seeks to understand and account for psychological phenomena that are 
significant both from a therapeutic standpoint (such as childhood development, 
personality structure, sexuality, psychopathology, and therapeutic intervention) and from 
a broader, cultural perspective (for example, the role of the psyche in the formation of 
society, religion, and art) by providing an interpretive structure or method for making 
sense of and accounting for such phenomena.   
Psychoanalytic interpretation, as theorized by Freud, requires a stance of 
persistently seeking unknown and unconscious meanings.  Segal (2000), in a defense of 
the ongoing importance of Freud’s work, writes: “I would put it that Freud introduced us 
to the understanding of more meaning.”  The Freudian search for more meaning involves 
looking beyond surface, obvious, and literal meanings because it assumes the existence of 
underlying, unknown, and unconscious significance in mental phenomena.  Due to the 
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phenomenon that Freud discovered and termed “the unconscious,” there are always more 
psychic meanings to be discovered in psychic life.  As that which lies outside 
consciousness, the unknown unconscious drives meaning production.  For Freud, the 
unconscious functions as a new “trope”3 for describing the nature of the mind.  Freud 
revised his explication of the unconscious over the years he was writing, never 
formulating one ultimate and definitive description but reworking and even deeply 
modifying earlier formulations.  As a result, the Freudian unconscious has a metaphoric, 
“as if,” quality: as if it were spatial (the topographic unconscious) or as if it were 
energetic (the instinctual forces of the id characteristic of the structural model).  In its 
various manifestations, the unconscious as theoretical construct or metaphor sparked a 
vast epistemological shift.  Although the radical nature of this insight may be less 
obvious in a world that has in many ways (though certainly not wholly) come to 
incorporate and naturalize the concept of the unconscious, at the time it was revolutionary 
to posit the presence of and provide a way to make sense of an unknown, unconscious 
facet of the human mind that is active in dreams, fantasies, symptoms, relationships, 
speech, and deeds.   
Accessing the unconscious requires unraveling or interpreting otherwise 
perplexing, even mystifying, phenomena. Nonsensical dream narratives that provoke 
what seem to be random thoughts, feelings, and recollections; bewildering or missing 
memories from early childhood; unrealistic yet intensely stimulating fantasies; and 
                                                 
3 “Trope,” a literary term, is defined as a figure of speech which involves a turn in the meaning of a word in 
a way that changes it from its usual meaning (Holman & Harmon, 1992, p. 485).  Metaphors are a type of 
trope.  “The unconscious,” as one such metaphorical trope, points to that which is not conscious as 
constitutive of what is known and experienced (thereby defining it through a negation that is filled in by 
conjecture).  
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typecast relational patterns are all crucial areas for analytic interpretation.  The 
psychoanalyst employs specific interpretive methods (the tools of psychoanalytic 
methodology) to collaborate with the patient in describing and creating psychic 
meanings, in bringing into consciousness that which feels foreign or unknown.  At times 
this means making hypothetical guesses in the form of constructions that seek to 
imaginatively fill in information that is unavailable or inaccessible to consciousness.  At 
other times, it might involve searching out the idiosyncratic fantasy system(s) motivating 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors or identifying (and pointing out) feelings associated 
with past relationships that are being transferred onto the person of the analyst. But 
despite these complicated (and at times highly technical or theoretical) issues, 
psychoanalytic interpretation has a relatively simple core meaning: to facilitate and 
intervene in the process of making the unconscious conscious.  Loewenstein (1951) 
writes: 
 
What defines interpretation and distinguishes it from other interventions?  In 
psychoanalysis, this term is applied to those explanations, given to patients by the 
analyst, which add to their knowledge about themselves.  Such knowledge is 
drawn by the analyst from ideas contained and expressed in the patient’s own 
thoughts, feelings, words and behavior. (pp. 3-4)   
 
The intent of psychoanalytic interpretation is to acquaint the patient with that which has 
hitherto been unconscious, thus making the unconscious conscious. By constructing 
narrative explanations, exploring fantasies, and uncovering transference reactions—all of 
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which are based on the thoughts, feelings, words, and behavior expressed by the patient 
in the analytic work—the analyst engages with and intervenes in the patient’s 
unconscious processes. 
In this chapter, after first exploring the epistemology and methodology of 
psychoanalytic interpretation (section 1), I will examine construction (section 2), fantasy 
(section 3), and transference (section 4) as key constituents of the psychoanalytic 
interpretive project.    
 
 
Section One 
Psychoanalytic Epistemology 
 
 
Freud, a medical physician who specialized in neurology by training, frequently 
located psychoanalysis within the domain of science.  As a “child of the Enlightenment,” 
he often presented his work in “rationalistic, empiricist, objectivist” terms: terms which 
were “the prevailing axioms and conventions of discourse of the natural sciences of his 
time” (Schafer, 1992, p. 148).  But this historical embeddedness in 19th century science is 
not the only—or even most salient—feature of Freudian theory.  Freud’s innovative, even 
revolutionary, analysis or interpretation of what constitutes human experience marked a 
new ontology, and with this new ontology came a new epistemology.  Within the 
Freudian ontology, instead of being autonomous, rational agents, humans are understood 
to be subjects shaped by unconscious forces.  This new ontology has far-reaching 
consequences.  Due to Freud’s discovery, phenomena that had been largely discounted or 
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overlooked, particularly by the scientific community, came to have considerable 
meaning, specifically for treating psychological complaints. Symptoms without any 
apparent or organic cause were made intelligible and treatable within the psychoanalytic 
paradigm.  
The epistemological basis of psychoanalysis has been an ongoing point of debate 
and contention within the history and philosophy of psychoanalysis.  Despite Freud’s 
desire to locate his work within the positivistic epistemology of natural science, 
developments in the philosophy and science of the mind allow for readings of Freud’s 
work that find a different epistemology grounding psychoanalytic theory (Bruner in 
“Foreward” to Spence, 1987).  As the reigning philosophical paradigms have shifted, new 
ways of reading Freud have evolved.  Some philosophers, for example Ricoeur (1970), 
Habermas (1971), and Foucault (1998), situate Freud within hermeneutics and therefore 
locate his methodology, epistemology, and ontology outside the natural sciences (as they 
are most restrictedly defined).  A hermeneutic reading of Freud conceives of 
psychoanalysis as an interpretive discipline, in which narrative or descriptive truths and 
an interest in the function of symbolic forms are favored over the search for causal and 
essential truth(s) (Spence, 1987).  Within hermeneutics, reality is not an empirically 
secure fact and therefore knowledge is not contingent on discovering causally valid 
claims to explain such a reality.  Rather, truth and knowledge are inherently interpretive, 
hermeneutic constructs that are always open to additional interpretations.  Behind Freud’s 
explicit claim that his work fits the scientific paradigm, a radically different hermeneutic 
epistemology that implicitly structures psychoanalysis can be recognized.  
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Others, for example Grünbaum, a critic of psychoanalysis, see this as a 
misreading of Freud (1984).  Grünbaum situates Freud firmly within the natural sciences 
and critiques hermeneutic readings of Freud for failing to accept basic Freudian 
hypotheses (1984). Reading Freud within a natural science epistemology, Grünbaum 
contends “that all of Freud’s clinical arguments for his cornerstone theory of repression 
should be deemed to be fundamentally flawed” (Grünbaum, 1984, p. xii). At issue in this 
debate are claims regarding the nature of human reality and knowledge: ontology and 
epistemology.  Freud’s new conceptualization of the human psyche—which drives his 
new ontology—continually resists the very rationalistic, empiricist, and objectivist terms 
that characterize the knowledge—ultimately, the epistemology—of natural science.  
Responding to Grünbaum’s methodological critique of psychoanalysis, Strenger (1991) 
attempts to negotiate a middle ground between hermeneutics and the methods of natural 
science, arguing for “the crucial role of background knowledge in the epistemic 
assessment of psychoanalysis” (p. 5).  Strenger (1991) suggests that “the coherence of 
psychoanalytic theory with accepted knowledge from outside psychoanalysis” (p. 185) 
provides essential validation for the psychoanalytic project.  Rather than research meant 
to provide direct, empirical confirmation of basic psychoanalytic principles, Strenger 
proposes that there is an existing body of “extraclinical” (p. 197) controlled research, 
which also “draws on knowledge external to psychoanalysis in order to increase the 
plausibility of [its] hypotheses” (p. 198), and argues that this research provides sufficient 
evidence to support the validity of psychoanalytic knowledge.  For Strenger, the universal 
laws discovered and verified through controlled, scientific research offer validation and 
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justification for the clinical insights that are uncovered and created through the 
hermeneutic processes that characterize analytic practice. 
Spence (1987), defending the hermeneutic reading of Freud, understands Freud’s 
appeal to science to be a rhetorical performance that functions to legitimize his project.  
Spence writes, “it should be clear that the claim to science is, in Freud…, a partly 
rhetorical move and should not be taken as a necessary description of the product being 
described” (1987, p. 73).  Despite Freud’s linking of psychoanalysis to science, 
psychoanalysis proves to be a poor candidate for the method of inquiry—the scientific 
method—associated with this epistemology because the unconscious as construct is not 
empirically available for hypothesis testing.4  Although (as Grünbaum reminds us) a 
hermeneutic assessment of psychoanalysis is not the only way to read Freud, such a 
reading provides an account of the relationship between knowledge and evidence that 
engages Freud’s most basic or fundamental insights about meaning formation and human 
experience without holding him to the standards of an epistemology that in many ways is 
unable to integrate Freudian theory.  In leaving behind the need to fit psychoanalysis into 
the epistemological model of the natural sciences, a reading of Freud that focuses on 
interpretation as the methodological means by which knowledge is formulated is in 
accordance with Freud’s implicit epistemology.  
 
 
                                                 
4 The nature, limitations, and core definition of science have been debated in the philosophy of science.  
The definition of science I am using here (science as that which uses the scientific method of hypothesis 
testing to search for universal truths or axioms) is the one generally agreed upon within the American 
academy, though in many ways it is a highly restrictive definition of science.  The limits of this version of a 
scientific epistemology have been challenged by work done within traditional realms of science and by 
philosophers of science such as Feyerabend (1975). 
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The interpretation of dreams:  
The Unconscious as More than Method  
 
Interpretation is more than a technique or method for gathering data; it is the 
essential, defining characteristic of the psychoanalytic project.   In The interpretation of 
dreams (1900/1965), Freud presents his initial theory of psychoanalytic interpretation and 
formulates a methodology for seeking, encountering, and understanding unconscious 
meanings.  This search for more meaning in seemingly meaningless or nonsensical 
mental phenomena (dreams, slips of the tongue, bungled actions, symptoms) is at the 
heart of the Freudian discovery.  I will begin my exploration of Freud’s formulation of 
psychoanalytic interpretation by returning to this landmark text in which Freud put 
forward not just a method for working with dreams, but also a general theory about the 
structure of the mind and how psychological phenomena might be interpreted.  Behind 
the nonsensical, Freud inferred what he termed “the unconscious.”  Freud was well aware 
of the revolutionary status of the formulation of the unconscious he presented in The 
interpretation of dreams and the far-reaching consequences of this theoretical inference.  
In a preface to the third English edition, written in 1931, he writes, “[this book] contains, 
even according to my present-day judgment, the most valuable of all discoveries it has 
been my good fortune to make.  Insight such as this falls to one’s lot but once in a 
lifetime” (1900/1965, p. xxxii).   Because the Freudian analytic is more than an 
innovation at the level of technique, a discussion of psychoanalytic interpretation ought 
to also address the epistemic basis for new clinical procedures, seeing Freud’s work as 
resulting in not just a new treatment method, but a new methodology.   
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Although imprecisely distinguished (and oftentimes interchangeable) in current 
usage, the terms “method” and “methodology” have different meanings.  Whereas 
“method” refers to the level of procedure or technique, “methodology” signifies the 
principles behind such technique (Webster’s dictionary, 1989, p. 902), including the 
epistemology that drives procedures.  Methodology can be understood as the systematic 
application of various methods (tools of inquiry) within a given epistemology.  This 
distinction is crucial for how one reads The interpretation of dreams.  If read as a text 
about a method for interpreting dreams, then technique—for example, free association—
as it applies to dream analysis is seen to be the primary focus of this work.  However, if 
read as a text about psychoanalysis as an epistemology that structures a methodology, 
then the primary importance of this text lies in the relationship Freud formulates between 
knowledge (an understanding of the relationship between consciousness and the 
unconscious) and a system for accessing such knowledge (interpretation).  Of course, The 
interpretation of dreams is both: method and methodology.  But Freud’s theory of 
interpretation addresses the status of knowledge formation beyond the dream as a 
particular phenomenon. The particular tools that comprise the method of dream 
interpretation are an instance of, but can also be distinguished from, Freud’s 
epistemological innovation. Freud’s epistemological innovation was located in his 
inferences about the nature of the unconscious, which in turn prompted a methodology 
that addresses the mode by which traces of the unconscious are interpreted and analyzed.  
The theory of interpretation Freud presents in The interpretation of dreams extends 
beyond the particular application of technique in psychoanalytic work with dreams (the 
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level of method) by addressing a broad-based methodology for interpretation in relation 
to multiple forms of clinical phenomena.   
Freud begins The interpretation of dreams by telling the reader that in this text he 
will prove that there is a technique or method for interpreting dreams; he will show that 
dreams are organized according to certain structural characteristics that are meaningful 
for waking life; and, perhaps most radically, he will “deduce” from this explanation an 
account of “the nature of the psychological forces” at work in dreams (1900/1965, p. 35).  
What Freud ultimately deduces from his exploration of dreams and how they relate to 
consciousness is the influence of what he terms “the unconscious,” and with this 
explanation Freud posits a new understanding of the mind.   
Freud was not the first to explore an unconscious aspect of mental functioning.  
Following logically from the split Descartes theorized between the aware, conscious 
mind and the independent and separate, physical matter we term the body, subsequent 
thinkers were led to question and explore the possibility of mental activity that takes 
place outside of conscious awareness.  Because describing unconscious mental processes 
was a longstanding, fundamental and challenging philosophical problem, “the discovery 
of the unconscious by self-conscious man occupied some two centuries, roughly from 
1700 to 1900” (Whyte, 1978, p. 63).  From Rousseau’s romantic introspection about 
human emotions, to Nietzsche’s skeptical assessment of the limitations and dangers of 
consciousness, to Marx’s radical theorizing about the material factors that impact 
consciousness and the unconscious factors operative in class history, to Dostoevsky’s 
fictional account of the unconscious drives and passions that structure his characters: 
numerous explorations of the nature of unconsciousness predated the Freudian discovery 
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(Whyte, 1978).5   Despite Freud’s many notable predecessors, his contribution to an 
understanding of the unconscious was nothing less than revolutionary.  Whyte (1978) 
concludes: 
 
Freud’s supreme achievement was to force the attention of the Western world to 
the fact that the unconscious mind is of importance in every one of us, by giving 
dramatic illustrations of the way in which it works, particularly when its 
spontaneous formative processes are deformed by inhibition.  He was the first 
systematically to connect the general idea with a wide range of particular 
distortions of behavior in a way that is manifestly valid to unprejudiced minds.  
Freud changed, perhaps irrevocably, man’s image of himself. (p. 177) 
 
In linking particular mental phenomena such as dreams, symptoms, and slips of the 
tongue to a complex explanatory structure for how such unconscious traces surface, 
Freud outlined a new model of the mind.  In conjunction with this model of mental 
functioning, Freud also provided a methodology for accessing and working with such 
phenomena.  
To access unconscious knowledge, Freud structures a new methodology based on 
interpretation.  He writes, “‘interpreting’ a dream implies assigning ‘meaning’ to it—that 
is, replacing it by something which fits into the chain of our mental acts as having a 
validity and importance equal to the rest” (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 128).  He goes on to 
                                                 
5 This is a very partial list of the various thinkers (ranging from philosophers to poets to scientists) who 
addressed the issue of the unconscious prior to Freud.  See The unconscious before Freud (1978) by L.L. 
Whyte for a more complete history of the idea of the unconscious prior to 1900. 
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specify that by “assigning meaning” he does not mean either symbolic interpretation or 
decoding, two common, lay strategies for dream interpretation.  The symbolic method 
“considers the content of the dream as a whole and seeks to replace it by another 
content,” usually by “hitting on a clever idea, of direct intuition” (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 
129).  Freud rejects such symbolic interpretations as unscientific exercises in creativity.  
The decoding method, on the other hand, “treats the dream as a kind of cryptography in 
which each sign can be translated into another sign having a known meaning, in 
accordance with a fixed key” (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 130). According to Freud, both 
methods are flawed: the first “is restricted in its application and incapable of being laid 
down on general lines,” while the second “depends on the trustworthiness of the ‘key’—
the dream-book, and of this we have no guarantee” (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 132).   In 
addition, because “the same piece of content may conceal a different meaning when it 
occurs in various people or in various contexts,” there can be no general code or schema 
for psychoanalytic interpretation  (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 137). Freud highlights the 
contingent, very personal and “egoistic” (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 358) nature of the dream; 
dreams are not universal and therefore the interpretation of dreams is a highly 
idiosyncratic, individual process.6   
Instead of the symbolic or decoding methods of dream interpretation, Freud 
revealed a method of “treating the dream like a symptom and applying to dreams the 
methods of interpretation that had been worked out for symptoms” through his earlier 
                                                 
6 Despite the overarching individual or personal nature of dreams, Freud did theorize a limited number of 
dream symbols that are common to all dreamers.  These universal symbols usually allude to sexual matters, 
such that the sexual idea becomes displaced onto the symbol.  However, Freud warns that most dream 
symbols (aside from the few he catalogues in The interpretation of dreams) are idiosyncratic and are not 
universal. Although these few exceptional dream symbols do seem to function universally, they do not 
provide enough material to interpret an entire dream (Fancher, 1973).  In fact, they are usually based on 
German idiomatic expressions at Freud’s time.   
27 
 
 
collaboration with Breuer (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 133).  This method, free association, 
involves increasing the patient’s “attention” to “his [or her] own psychical perceptions” 
and eliminating “the criticism” that normally hinders the patient from attending to his or 
her thoughts (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 133).  The critical faculty that represses or censors 
“involuntary thoughts” is understood to be a form of “resistance” which must be 
overcome so that each aspect of the dream can be attended to fully (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 
135).  Dream interpretation involves working backwards from what is conscious by 
means of free association to access unconscious thoughts. As opposed to interpreting the 
dream as a whole, each piece of the dream is the focus of attention in free association.  
The psychoanalytic interpretive method for working with dreams involves using free 
association in relation to each piece of the dream to find additional, latent (as opposed to 
manifest or apparent) meaning.  This focus on the fragmentary as opposed to unified 
meaning liberates the interpretive process from being determined by conscious meanings.   
Meaning is distorted—Freud explores how such distortions take place in 
dreams—because the dream contains unacceptable material that we critically reject: 
namely, a wish-fulfilling fantasy.  Freud tells us that on a structural level, every dream 
contains a disguised wish.  However, the wish-fulfillment in the dream is “constructed by 
a highly complicated activity of the mind” which obscures its expression (Freud, 
1900/1965, p. 155). The structural framework of the dream is related to its function but 
does not assign meaning to the content.  It is through associations to the manifest content 
that the dream analysis arrives at latent meanings, which have been obscured.  In moving 
from the manifest to the latent content, Freud recognized both the presence of unknown 
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meaning in need of interpretation and a dynamic force that disrupts the dreamer’s 
understanding by translating the latent into the disguised or manifest content. 
Dreams, as they surface in sleep, already arrive as a form of interpretation that 
calls for additional interpretation.  Dream-thoughts, Freud says, have undergone an 
alteration when they are “changed into the manifest dream which we remember when we 
wake up” (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 156).  In what Freud terms a “primary process,” latent 
(unconscious) dream-thoughts are converted into “another mode of expression” in the 
manifest dream-content.  Freud terms the transformation by which the dream-thoughts 
are translated into another “language,” the language of the manifest dream-content, as the 
“dream work” (Freud, 1900/1965).  In chapter 6 of The interpretation of dreams, which 
focuses on the dream work, Freud presents a kind of logic training for his readers in the 
ways that meanings are represented in dreams, exploring condensation, displacement, and 
other aspects of representation in dreams.  “Dream work is made up of all the processes 
contributing to the transformation of the unconscious wish fantasy into the manifest 
dream” (Olsen & Koppe, 1988, p. 162).  Freud is describing an encryption process in the 
formation of the dream itself, a process that must be deciphered through the process of 
seeking meaning in the dream.  The dream is the distortion of a consciously objectionable 
wish fulfillment into disguised, and therefore acceptable terms.  Due to its selfish or 
egoistic nature, the underlying dream wish, which is the locus of the dream, is blocked 
from conscious recognition.  Therefore, the unconscious wish is exhibited to 
consciousness only in a disguised form in the material of the manifest dream.  Added to 
the dream work level of camouflage is yet another layer of distortion or “secondary 
revision,” which takes place as the dream is remembered after waking and recounted, 
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certain elements perhaps being added or omitted (based on an preconscious censorship by 
the dreamer as the dream is recounted).    
Because dreams are a construction of multiple layers of disguised meanings and 
distortions, the analytic response is an interpretation or deciphering aimed at unraveling 
the twists and turns that are forced on the unconscious wish by the censorship.  Dream 
analysis, therefore, adds another layer of meaning to the interaction the dreamer is having 
with his or her unconscious by undoing the disguise.  This open and ongoing interpretive 
or hermeneutic process in psychoanalysis is described by Foucault as “the always-
incomplete character of the regressive and analytic process in Freud” (1986/1998, p. 
274). There is never a final interpretation that can completely decipher or definitively 
uncover the unconscious meaning of the dream.  Instead, within the process of 
psychoanalytic interpretation the analyst and patient or analysand together seek 
significance and understanding within material (the dream, for example) that continually 
resists such insight and awareness. The dream experience, the recounting of the dream, 
the dream analysis: all are characterized by a tension between active misrepresentation 
and the attempt to interpret that suggests an inherently hermeneutic process of obscuring 
and uncovering meaning.  
Methodologically, the psychoanalytic interpretive process involves searching for 
this altered, hidden meaning that is actively filtered out of conscious experience because 
it is deemed unacceptable.  Freud’s methodology, which applies more generally to all 
unconscious phenomena, involves following the associations, fitting them into an egoistic 
chain of meaning, until arriving at a place of understanding.  The dream is “a process 
with a meaning” that “can be inserted into the chain of the dreamer’s psychical 
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experiences” (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 548).  The same is true of other traces of the 
unconscious, such as symptoms, actions, and words.  Psychoanalytic interpretation 
happens via a linking together of unconscious meanings brought out by the subject’s free 
associations, not by means of inserting meaning either through cleverness on the part of 
the analyst or through reliance on some predetermined code of meaning.   
But Freud goes further in his investigation by asking and answering an even 
deeper question: why do we dream what we dream?  He explores the purpose of the 
dream, as a meaningful but distorted psychical experience, and from this he infers a new 
way to understand human experience. The answer he formulates about why we dream 
what we dream has ramifications on both an epistemological and an ontological level. 
Freud specifies that dream analysis does not explain the dreaming process—“since to 
explain a thing means to trace it back to something already known”  (so to explain would 
therefore be impossible)—but instead the process of psychoanalyzing dreams allows him 
to “infer” the “structure of the apparatus of the mind” (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 549).  Freud 
knows he is in new territory with this inference and notes, “the easy and agreeable 
portion of our journey lies behind us” (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 549).  From this point 
forward in his theoretical journey, he is entering the darkness of unknown regions as he 
makes assumptions and draws conclusions about the unconscious (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 
549).  Freud bumps up against the conventional wisdom of the time, noting, “there is at 
the present time no established psychological knowledge under which we could subsume 
what the psychological examination of dreams enables us to infer” (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 
549).  The inferential process that leads Freud to speculate about the workings of the 
mind can be recognized as a part of Freud’s interpretive process.  He writes: 
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No conclusions upon the construction and working methods of the mental 
instrument can be arrived at or at least fully proved from even the most 
painstaking investigation of dreams or of any other mental function taken in 
isolation.  To achieve this result, it will be necessary to correlate all the 
established implications derived from a comparative study of a whole series of 
such functions.  Thus the psychological hypotheses to which we are led by an 
analysis of the process of dreaming must be left, as it were, in suspense, until they 
can be related to the findings of other enquiries which seek to approach the kernel 
of the problem from another angle. (Freud, 1900/1965, pp. 549-550)   
 
Freud’s theory-making involves a generalization derived from particular mental 
phenomena but is not necessarily able to hit some essential kernel of truth due to its 
speculative nature.  Freud turns to his scientific roots to chart a course for proceeding, 
while at the same time making clear that he is proceeding beyond a point that is 
intelligible within this paradigm. Freud the scientist hopes that future research will 
substantiate his findings, but he proceeds, without such empirical validation, nonetheless.  
With this speculation, Freud moves outside the epistemology of the sciences and begins 
to formulate a new, psychoanalytic ontology.  Freud provides hypotheses regarding 
mental functioning that are inspired by but which nevertheless generalize beyond the 
evidence at hand, culminating in an innovative account of mental functioning that marks 
a radical departure from the established beliefs and research protocols of the day.   
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 In the 7th chapter of The interpretation of dreams Freud outlines some 
foundational aspects of psychoanalytic metapsychology, moving beyond the particular 
problem of dreaming to explore the relationship between consciousness and unconscious 
processes.  The topographic or spatial model of the mind presented in this chapter reflects 
Freud’s attempt to grasp the unconscious aspect of psychic life, and although he would 
later reformulate his description of the mechanisms and nature of conscious and 
unconscious mental processes and provide additional models for understanding mental 
processes, this chapter maintains its foundational importance. Of particular importance 
for this exploration of Freud’s understanding of psychoanalytic interpretation is an 
appreciation of the role of the unconscious in mental functioning.  
According to Freud, primary, irrational, and unconscious thought processes are 
operative alongside conscious thought processes in human beings.  Such unconscious 
thoughts are “dominated by the goal of attaining the immediate gratification of wishes” 
(Fancher, 1973, p. 127).  Primary processes are governed by a pleasure principle that 
seeks the fulfillment of wishful fantasies.  Freud writes, “as a result of the unpleasure 
principle, then, the first Ψ-system is totally incapable of bringing anything disagreeable 
into the context of its thought.  It is unable to do anything but wish” (1900/1965, p. 639).7  
The unconscious is termed primary because it “is the true psychical reality” even though 
it is “as much unknown to us as the reality of the external world” (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 
651).  These unconscious primary processes are different and separated from the 
thoughts, feelings, and memories we are able to know consciously because our conscious 
                                                 
7 “Ψ-system” is Freud’s shorthand for psychical systems, by which he means the “systems” or “agencies” 
that make up the “mental apparatus” that he is describing in his topographical model (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 
575).  
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thoughts, feelings, and memories have been subjected to a critical agency which filters 
out material deemed to be unacceptable.  The unconscious impacts all of consciousness 
because a secondary process, which takes place in what Freud termed the “preconscious” 
system, translates or makes logical for consciousness the inherently illogical unconscious 
impulses that are primary in human experience. The secondary process transforms the 
wishful impulse into an acceptable thought which is then available to consciousness. In 
the preconscious system, unconscious feelings or affects are transformed “to inhibit any 
development of unpleasure” (1900/1965, p. 640). The logical processes so central to 
consciousness are of secondary importance to the wish fulfilling, pleasure seeking 
unconscious realm in Freud’s system. 
Freud’s revolutionary idea that “everything conscious has an unconscious 
preliminary stage,” which is transformed through repressive filtering (censorship) and 
logical ordering in the preconscious, is important on both epistemological and ontological 
grounds because it (re)defines not just the nature of knowledge, but also the nature of 
what it is to be human (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 651). With his formulation of the 
topographical model of the mind in Chapter 7 of The interpretation of dreams, Freud 
proposes a new ontology that breaks with the ontology of the scientific understanding of 
what it is to be human.   For Freud, consciousness and its associated reality-oriented 
logical thought processes are not the chief organizing features of the human mind.  The 
unconscious is primary.  For this crucial reason, the ontology of the natural sciences 
cannot assimilate Freud’s theory of the mind as governed by a self-gratifying, pleasure-
seeking unconscious.  Owing to this new ontology, a new epistemology, which 
incorporates the existence of the unconscious, informs the interpretive methodology by 
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which mental life is understood: both in the particular and on a more universal or 
theoretical level.   
Freud moves beyond what the science of his day was able to integrate, journeying 
outside the epistemology of the sciences into a new epistemological (and therefore 
methodological) ground.  This theory-building move is a part of Freud’s interpretative 
practice and therefore might also inform an understanding of his interpretive 
methodology.  With the inference of the unconscious, Freud is demonstrating how to 
make sense of—interpret—clinical data, including data that do not conform to existing 
scientific knowledge.  Freud is not cavalier about his process of understanding via 
conjecture or inference.  He cautions, “we must be careful, however, not to pursue these 
hypotheses too far beyond their first logical links, or their value will be lost in 
uncertainties” (Freud, 1900/1965, p. 549).  We can read Freud as describing for his 
readers the interpretive process, both as it is at work in his own theorizing and as it might 
be understood as a methodology.  For Freud, interpretation is not simply decoding the 
material, nor is it restricted to observing and encouraging the patient’s free-associations; 
interpretation also includes a logical process of cautiously exploring, uncovering, and 
inferring meaning.  In seeking a way to understand both the how and the why of the 
dream process, Freud provides his own incredibly far-reaching interpretation of the 
mechanisms of the mind that puts forward both a structural way to understand (the 
unconscious as a structurally integral feature of the mind) and a method for continuing 
the process of interpreting. 
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Freud’s Epistemological Revisions:  
An Evolving Analytic Methodology 
 
 
 
The vital inference Freud makes in The interpretation of dreams concerning 
mental functioning is his conjecture regarding the unconscious.  The first model for the 
mind (based on the trio: the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious), is often referred 
to as Freud’s topographical model.  The model itself (as an object) is not Freud’s 
essential innovation; he later substantially revises his account of the structure the 
unconscious.  The unconscious, as first formulated in the topographical model, provides 
an initial interpretation or explanatory construction in the form of a trope.  Beginning 
with this foundation, Freud added to, elaborated, and even altered his account of mental 
functioning as he formulated additional interpretive tropes.  Freud supplements his 
theoretical formulation of the unconscious in various subsequent works, providing 
interpretation upon interpretation as he explores and seeks to decipher the nature of the 
mind.  These revisions result in an expanded epistemology and methodology.  This 
process of revising and expanding his explanation of the unconscious is not an incidental 
aspect of Freud’s work: the formulation and reformulation of models for understanding 
mental life is in itself a fundamental aspect of psychoanalytic methodology.  
Freud’s metapsychology developed beyond the formulation presented in The 
interpretation of dreams as he explored the role of sexuality in human experience.  
Freud’s first and most fundamental interpretive trope, the unconscious, gave rise to 
additional interpretive tropes, such as the Oedipus complex, as Freud worked to make 
sense of the relationship between wish-fulfillment and human sexuality.  Through his free 
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association method (particularly in work with the dreams and slips of the tongue of the 
hysteric), Freud was led to consider and include the role of sexual fantasies in psychic 
experience, a process which sparked his theory of the Oedipus complex. Freud began to 
interpret certain sexual ideas and feelings that he witnessed in his clinical work and in his 
own childhood experience “as wishes rather than memories,” noticing that these wishes 
followed the pattern of Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex (Fancher, 1973, p. 142).  Sophocles’ play 
becomes an additional interpretive trope—an explanatory metaphor or device—for 
Freud’s theory making.  Freud’s Oedipus complex is another theoretical inference or 
interpretation of the structure of human experience, this time with a developmental focus.  
Freud attributed the feelings and fantasies at play in the Oedipal conflicts of childhood to 
instincts or drives.  Nevertheless, “even while he was formulating new and different 
theories about sexuality and the instincts, he still regarded the most important structural 
components of the mind to be the unconscious and preconscious systems” that he 
introduced in The interpretation of dreams (Fancher, 1973, p. 196, italics in the original).  
The Oedipus complex influences analytic methodology by providing an additional 
interpretive trope, one particularly suited to explaining neurotic suffering.  Freud calls the 
Oedipus complex “the nucleus of the neuroses” (1917/1963, p. 419) because as an 
interpretive trope it carries great explanatory potential for understanding the nature of 
neurotic conflict.  He alleges that the perverse drives that characterize childhood Oedipal 
wishes carry on into adulthood in the unconscious, where they surface in the dreams of 
both neurotic and “normal” people (Freud terms people who have developed and resolved 
past Oedipal conflicts “normal”; he explains, “neurotics merely exhibit to us in a 
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magnified and coarsened form what the analysis of dreams reveal to us in healthy people 
as well” (Freud, 1917/1963, p. 420). 
However, with the Ego and the Id (1923/1961), Freud provided a new model of 
the mind that deeply altered the theory of the unconscious and preconscious he had 
introduced in The interpretation of dreams.  In this new model, “the major new psychic 
system…was a moral agency, referred to as the super-ego” (Fancher, 1973, p. 205).  
Often identified as “the structural model,” this formulation of the mind separates 
psychical agency into three parts: id, ego, and superego. This alteration does not 
necessarily invalidate his earlier epistemology; but it does significantly modify it by 
positing three competing, constituent agencies of the self.  As a result of this revision to 
the topographic model, Freud’s epistemic insight formulated in the structural model of 
the mind sparked an additional method for psychoanalytic interpretation: interpretation of 
the defenses.  Freud locates numerous defense mechanisms (e.g., displacement, denial, 
rationalization, projection, identification, and reaction formation) used creatively by the 
ego to allow “instinctual expression while at the same time modifying the instinct to 
accommodate the demands of reality and the forces of conscience” (Fancher, 1973, p. 
222).  The interpretation of defenses (which includes recognizing the instinctual drives 
connected to such defenses) is a crucial addition to the interpretive methods of 
psychoanalysis, an addition made possible by Freud’s epistemological formulation of a 
structural model of the mind, which in turn impacts methodology.  With the structural 
model, Freud theorizes the psyche as inherently riddled with conflict (due to the 
competing forces of the id, ego, and superego).  Analytic interpretation does not aim to 
remove such intrapsychic conflict because unconscious conflict is ontological 
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(fundamentally constitutive of human experience) for Freud, but it does seek to affect 
manifestations of psychic conflict that have become symptomatic for the patient.  In other 
words, although it is not possible to completely remove psychic conflict, there is the 
potential for better understanding and even influencing or changing the particular 
configurations of such conflict via analytic work.  The structural model of the mind (id, 
ego, superego) can be understood to be an additional interpretive trope in Freudian 
psychoanalysis that functions as a revision to the unconscious/preconscious/conscious 
trope formulated in The interpretation of dreams.  With this new structural description, 
Freud provided a model for conceptualizing the interaction between unconscious 
morality, which includes internalized cultural norms (the superego), sexual and 
aggressive drives (the id), and a conscious, defense driven adaptation to these 
unconscious processes (the ego).  The epistemological grounding for a psychoanalytic 
interpretive methodology shifts with this revision, resulting in an interpretive method 
directed at uncovering the particular configuration of and affects associated with the 
various agencies, which includes a process of working with the defensive strategies that 
guard against conscious awareness of the forces of the id and superego.  
For Freud, the interpretive methods tied to an amended epistemology do not 
replace the earlier interpretive method of free association presented in The interpretation 
of dreams; instead, revisions on the epistemological level result in an expansion of the 
psychoanalytic methodology and therefore of interpretive methods.  Freud was aware of 
and even seems to appreciate the shifts and expansions in his explanatory structures, 
seeing new psychoanalytic formulas as additions to, rather than corrections of, previously 
articulated ways of understanding.  He writes, “we can express the aim of our efforts in a 
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variety of formulas: making conscious what is unconscious, lifting repressions, filling in 
gaps in the memory—all these amount to the same thing” (1917/1963, p. 541).   Freud 
continues to elaborate and expand upon his theory of psychoanalysis in subsequent 
writings, offering case studies of ways he himself uses this interpretive method, providing 
further structural models to make sense of or make meaningful perplexing psychical 
material, and giving technical suggestions for performing such work.  These revisions are 
significant in that they point to a process at work in analytic understanding.  Freud’s own 
interpretive work included continually revising and modifying his theory as his ideas 
evolved and his understanding deepened.  Psychoanalytic interpretation as described by 
Freud does not ever hit a definitive core explanation that concludes or resolves the 
interpretive process (despite Freud’s positivistic claims to the contrary).  
 
 
 
Section Two 
Constructing Meaning 
 
  
Toward the end of his career Freud returns to the issue of interpretive 
methodology as he explores the role of constructing memories in analytic work.  The core 
methodological issue Freud addresses in “Constructions in analysis” (1937/1964b) 
concerns the link between external reality (specifically, memories of historically factual 
experience) and narrative truth, which at times calls for strategic, imaginative conjecture 
on the part of the analyst about historical events that are not available to the patient’s 
memory.  This issue is of particular importance because it reaches to the heart of the 
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interpretive process, examining the source of meaning production in the analytic process.  
In this paper, Freud looks at the analyst’s role in the process of constructing memories 
from the traces or fragments that linger.  He writes, 
 
The analyst has neither experienced nor repressed any of the material under 
consideration; his task cannot be to remember anything.  What then is his task? 
His task is to make out what has been forgotten from the traces which it has left 
behind or, more correctly, to construct it. (Freud, 1937/1964b, pp. 258-259) 
 
Constructing is not the same thing as actually remembering (the analyst’s task is not to 
remember for the patient); instead, constructing is the analyst’s guess at or proposal of a 
forgotten history formulated on the basis of both clinical traces of that past and 
psychoanalytic theory, which serves as a guide for filling-in missing information.  At 
issue in the process of clinical construction is the inference of memories that are not 
present in the patient’s memory but are assumed to exist due to certain theoretical 
presuppositions on the analyst’s part.  Freud explores those times in psychoanalytic work 
when a “real” memory fails to surface in the clinical material, and proposes that in such 
instances the analyst constructs (or reconstructs8) the missing memory based on the 
clinical material at hand. Construction, as an interpretive gesture, requires the analyst to 
                                                 
8 Freud uses the terms “construction” and “reconstruction” interchangeably. A more precise distinction 
might specify reconstruction as the use of a newly constructed structure (in this case a memory) that is 
designed to mimic an original (in this case the forgotten event from childhood).  Rubovitz-Seitz (2001) 
makes a distinction between reconstructions, which deal “specifically with formulations of repressed 
experiences from the patient’s early life,” and constructions, which involve a more general, interpretive 
process in which “the interpreter attempts to formulate a tentative overall or ‘whole’ (thematic) meaning of 
the current data being studied” (p. 130). 
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participate in the task of creating meanings that surpass but nevertheless remain faithful 
to the evidence.   
The distinction Freud makes between interpretation and construction in this paper 
is unclear.  Is construction a type of interpretation, or is interpretation a type of 
construction?  Freud’s classification is imprecise.  He writes: 
 
If, in accounts of analytic technique, so little is said about “constructions,” that is 
because “interpretations” and their effects are spoken of instead.  But I think 
“construction” is by far the more appropriate description. “Interpretation” applies 
to something that one does to some single element of the material, such as an 
association or a parapraxis.  But it is a “construction” when one lays before the 
subject of the analysis a piece of his early history that he has forgotten. 
(1937/1964b, p. 261) 
 
Here Freud seems to suggest that construction may be a more general and better term to 
describe analytic work, whereas interpretation is a more restrictive method.  It is as if 
interpretation as an instance of psychoanalytic method (as something one does with 
associations or parapraxes, for example) might be differentiated from a more general 
psychoanalytic process that aims at something deeper having to do with the whole 
structure of the person.  Whether or not the term “construction” applies to other types of 
interpretation that move beyond “a single element of the material” but not necessarily via 
a focus on early life history has been a point of debate amongst various readers of Freud.  
Geha (1988) writes, “Our literature on technique often grants to construction a role 
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ancillary to interpretation,” as if it were a type of or secondary to interpretation, but 
continues that he finds, “instead, it is the quintessence of the analytic enterprise from 
whichever angle we choose to appraise it” (p. 104).  For Geha, “construction and 
interpretation fuse in a hermeneutic circle; we never find one without the other” (p. 104).9  
Geha shifts the focus of interpretive work from empirical fact to narrative value, calling 
Freud a “thoroughgoing constructionist, [who was] inventing and interpreting fictional 
worlds whose reality resides only in their fictionality” (p. 117). In this way of thinking 
about construction, the key feature of the construction is not that it addresses or puts in 
place historical fact.  Rather, constructions in psychoanalytic work are seen to be fictions 
or narratives that are fabricated for the purpose of furthering the analytic work.  
Constructions are an explanatory (and therefore interpretive) means of gaining access to 
the unconscious by way of hypothetical formulations.   
There is an important theory of knowledge underlying the distinction between 
interpretation and construction.  Freud first presents interpretation as a process or method 
for seeking truth, then revises this with the notion of construction, which is presented as a 
process of conjecture aimed not so much at the truth per se, but at imagined or narrative 
knowledge.  Here we have two types of knowledge: one based on empirical truth, the 
other on something else. For Freud, the something else was the metapsychology he 
proposed.  As an example of construction he writes: 
 
                                                 
9 The term “hermeneutic circle” refers to a dialectic between “guess and validation” that is essential to the 
interpretive process (Ricoeur, 1979, p. 91).  A construction, like a guess, posits an interpretation, but that 
interpretation remains open to future revisions in the form of new interpretations (given the validation or 
lack thereof for the guess). 
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But it is a ‘construction’ when one lays before the subject of the analysis a piece 
of his early history that he has forgotten, in some way such as this: ‘Up to your 
nth year you regarded yourself as the sole and unlimited possessor of your 
mother; then came another baby and brought you grave disillusionment.  Your 
mother left you for some time, and even after her reappearance she was never 
again devoted to you exclusively.  Your feelings toward your mother became 
ambivalent, your father gained a new importance to you,’ … and so on. 
(1937/1964b, p. 261) 
 
This construction sounds formulaic for a reason: it is.  Here Freud proposes a type of 
interpretation based on material present not in the patient’s associations but in 
psychoanalytic metapsychology.  It is an explanation that addresses a fantasy, in this 
case, a narrative about the effects of the Oedipal fantasy (e.g., sibling rivalry and ensuing 
ambivalence toward the mother and identification with the father). “Freud defended the 
use of hypothetical constructions as being in principle a fully acceptable means of 
gaining access to the unconscious by stating that fantasies, which were fictive traumatic 
experiences, were the most important structures of the unconscious” (Olsen & Koppe, 
1988, p. 265). Construction, as a part of the analytic process, is the insertion of an 
explanatory narrative in place of memories. Constructions can be understood to be 
explanations that are fabricated by the analyst for an analytic (or therapeutic) purpose.  
Freud tells us that the knowledge created in the construction is meant to access the 
repressed material, which the unconscious dynamically defends against remembering, 
and in that way it is meant to fill in.  However, Freud also points out that the construction 
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will not necessarily lead to recovering memories, and suggests that other mechanisms of 
confirmation will surface (negation, transference reactions, associations with analogous 
but indirectly connected material, and parapraxes).  The value then is in the function the 
construction plays, not so much in hitting some core historical truth that is taken to be 
reality.  Constructions supply a connection between past and present to further the 
analytic process; they are a type of interpretation in which the analyst, rather than the 
patient, introduces hypothetical, explanatory material. Loewenstein (1951) reports that 
Freud also used a method of “reconstruction upwards,” in which the interpretation moves 
from regressive, historical material to “reconstructing a relatively recent pathogenic 
conflict, when the regression started” (p. 10).  
The fundamental problem Freud deals with as he explores construction concerns 
the nature (narrative or empirical) of the truth which psychoanalysis is meant to impact. 
Freud presents archaeology as an extended analogy for analytic construction that directly 
addresses this issue.  Freud (1937/1964b) tells us that construction in psychoanalysis is 
“identical” to 
 
an archaeologist’s excavation of some dwelling-place that has been destroyed and 
buried or some ancient edifice…except that the analyst works under better 
conditions and has more material at his command to assist him, since what he is 
dealing with is not something destroyed but something that is still alive. (p. 259) 
 
And like the archeologist, the analyst has “an undisputed right to reconstruct by means of 
supplementing and combining the surviving remains” (p. 259).  One of the interesting 
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things about this metaphor is that it opens the space for a type of interpretive action that 
is based on conjecture. The analyst is engaged in the process of formulating meaning on 
the basis of the historical traces that live in the patient without his or her conscious 
memory of them.  Freud maintained his belief in the presence of such unconscious 
memories—“even things that seem completely forgotten are present somehow, 
somewhere, and have merely been buried and made inaccessible to the subject” 
(1937/1964b, p. 260)—but also suggests that recovering such memories is not the true 
aim of psychoanalysis.  Instead, unlike the archaeologist, the psychoanalyst’s 
reconstructions are “only a preliminary labor”; the rightful purpose of the construction 
lies in its function of furthering the analytic process (1937/1964b, p. 260).  A good 
construction produces more analytic material.  The value of psychoanalytic constructions 
is not that they hit or uncover an empirical truth, but instead that they advance analytic 
work by allowing the associative process to move on. 
Freud had a longstanding interest in archaeology (Schnapp, Shanks, & Tiews, 
2004) that influenced his use of this metaphor for the psychoanalytic project.  Gay 
(1988), in his biography of Freud, reports,  
 
[Freud] told the Wolf Man that “the psychoanalyst, like the archeologist in his 
excavations, must uncover layer after layer of the patient’s psyche, before coming 
to the deepest, most valuable treasures.” (p. 171)   
 
Gay goes on to write that Freud’s lifelong fascination with the processes and objects of 
archeological excavation allowed archeology to become “a master metaphor for his life’s 
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work” (p. 172).  However, the significance of the archeological metaphor for Freudian 
psychoanalysis is unclear.  Just as the epistemological basis for psychoanalysis has been 
questioned and reformulated in the context of shifting philosophic paradigms, so too have 
the epistemological foundations operative within the field of archaeology been 
challenged and rearticulated over the past century.  Both fields have cast doubt on the 
applied validity of knowledge acquisition focused exclusively on empirical data and 
analyzed solely within the procedures prescribed by the scientific method (the mode of 
thought characteristic of the epistemology of the natural sciences).  Within the field of 
archeology, questions related to the interpretation, and even the nature, of data have 
motivated an ongoing critique of research and knowledge formation (Renfrew & Bahn, 
2000, p. 39).  An interpretive “postprocessual” archeology looks to the hermeneutic 
tradition to discover procedures for inferring internal meanings, with the goal of creating 
meaning (Renfrew & Bahn, 2000).  Interpretation, writes one archeologist working 
within this tradition, “releases the past into public debate. It forces us to translate the past 
into a story we can understand” (Hodder, 1991, pp. 14-15).  As archeologists such as 
Hodder illustrate, the hermeneutic revolution has opened a debate about both the practical 
and the theoretical nature of archeological knowledge.  And just as psychologists and 
psychoanalysts continue to struggle to define the epistemological basis of their work, so 
too are other areas of the social sciences, including archeology, asking foundational 
questions about the nature of meaning/knowledge formation and the nature of data. 
If an epistemological shift from scientific method to a hermeneutic methodology 
is incorporated into an understanding of construction, it is possible to read Freud’s 
archaeological metaphor as being in keeping with his larger epistemological project.  In 
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linking psychoanalysis to archaeology as another and kindred realm of knowledge that 
requires working with inferred truths, Freud points to the importance of creative 
imagination as an integral part of problem solving within a psychoanalytic epistemology.  
Methodologically, Freud suggests the analyst use imaginative inferences to make these 
linking conjectures or constructions about events that are not empirically present.   
However, this is not the only way to read Freud’s use of the archaeological 
metaphor.  For Spence (1987), Freud’s use of the archeological metaphor points to a 
search for empirical evidence (as truth)—the sort of data that might fit into an algebraic 
formula—but for Spence “no signs of this algebra exist” and therefore “there are no 
clinical specimens which convincingly support the archaeological metaphor” (1987, pp. 
78-79).  Freud’s comparison of psychoanalysis and archaeology, Spence writes, “may be 
a substantially misleading analogy” (1984, p. 35).  If archaeology is understood to be a 
field that deals only with empirical evidence, then this critique holds.  But if, as I have 
suggested, there is an epistemology operative within archaeology that allows for a 
creative process of meaning formation inferred from, yet extending beyond evidence, 
then Spence’s critique may miss the point.  Unlike Spence, Brooks sanctions Freud’s 
archaeology metaphor, seeing it as an “invaluable” model (1984, p. 321).  For Brooks, 
Freud’s archaeological metaphor points to a dialogic, dynamic process of meaning 
production in narrative form (Brooks, 1984).  He writes: 
 
Freud…is not only a man of great literary culture and a highly perceptive reader, 
he is also—in a sense that may legitimate the somewhat pretentious word—a 
semiotician, intent to read all the signs produced by humans, as individual and as 
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a culture, and attentive to all behavior as semiotic, as coded text that can be 
deciphered, as ultimately charged with meaning. (Brooks, 1984, p. 322) 
 
Spence and Brooks are both interested proponents of the narrative, interpretive, and 
hermeneutic aspect of psychoanalytic work, yet each responds differently to Freud’s use 
of the archeological metaphor to explain the nature of analytic construction.   Perhaps this 
divergence most aptly points to the ways in which interpretation (in this case, the 
interpretation of Freud’s archeological metaphor in relation to psychoanalytic 
construction) is a process that cannot claim empirical validity—neither Spence nor 
Brooks is able to turn to the text as a definitive source of theory validation, but instead 
each uses Freud’s text to create a possible explanation—yet which is nevertheless able to 
uncover important issues of meaning.  Despite their different assessments of Freud’s use 
of the archeological metaphor, both authors agree that Freudian psychoanalysis is an 
inherently interpretive discipline, in which narrative or descriptive truths and an interest 
in the function of symbolic forms are favored over the search for causal and essential 
truth(s) (Spence, 1987; Brooks, 1984).   
 Construction, as a key aspect of the interpretive process, can be understood to be a 
hermeneutic, meaning-making intervention on the part of the analyst that involves 
moving beyond the information or data formally supplied by the patient to piece together 
a guess or conjecture that is informed by theory about underlying, unconscious meanings.  
Such constructive guesses or conjectures of meaning are structured by abductive logic,10 
                                                 
10 Pragmatist C.S. Peirce first formulated abduction as a logical or thought process involving inferences for 
generating explanatory structures (Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, 2005).  Eco (1990) later expanded 
this concept, formulating additional levels of abduction involved in interpretation as a semiotic process.   
49 
 
 
in which “the principles of inference to the best explanation” combine with “imagination, 
abstraction, intuition, and both inductive and deductive inferences” in the process of 
formulating new knowledge (Rubovitz-Seitz, 2001, p. 164).  Rubovitz-Seitz goes on to 
note, “the process of abduction” (which “applies to all scientific fields”) “cannot be 
formalized…because there is no consistent logic of guessing in the discovery process” 
(2001, p. 164).  For Rubovitz-Seitz (2001), such lack of formalization points to the 
importance of narrative coherence or continuity, which requires that the analyst draw on 
the parts (data formally supplied by the patient) to construct a meaningful whole (the 
interpretation).   “Coherence,” he writes, “means that the parts of a whole constructed 
meaning are not only connected but cohere in a self-consistent way that omits nothing 
relevant” (Rubovitz-Seitz, 2001, p. 165).  Psychoanalytic theory provides the structure 
for such coherence.   
Psychoanalytic constructions are meant to provide a lucid, well-integrated account 
or interpretation of clinical material that extends beyond both empirical “data” and 
general psychoanalytic theory, to imaginatively incorporate personal and idiosyncratic 
manifestations of the unconscious.  Freud’s metapsychology makes available theoretical 
metaphors—the unconscious, the Oedipus complex, and the superego are examples of 
such Freudian tropes—that guide the interpretive process and supply a framework to the 
analyst as he or she constructs clinical suppositions.  But constructions are also specific 
to the individual, and in that way psychoanalytic constructions move beyond a 
straightforward application of theory because they incorporate and develop a uniquely 
personal explanatory narrative.  Including psychoanalytic constructions as an integral 
factor in clinical interpretations highlights an epistemological shift in the psychoanalytic 
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project away from a scientific methodology to a hermeneutic methodology, which 
provides a means of accounting for the nature of such imaginative guesses or conjectures 
in the meaning making process of analytic work.  The important aspect of analytic 
constructions is not that they hit an underlying, empirical reality, but that they produce 
new meanings that are intended to further the analytic process.  
 
 
 
 
Section Three 
Fantasy and Interpretation 
 
 
The account of Freudian psychoanalytic interpretation I have been exploring in 
this chapter raises key issues about the nature of reality in relation to clinical intervention.  
By locating analytic work within the hermeneutic tradition, I have described both a 
methodology and an epistemology driving the psychoanalytic project that are organized 
around narrative, as opposed to empirical, truths.  In this reading of Freud, narrative 
constructions regarding psychic functioning on both the individual level (construction as 
a clinical interpretive method) and the theoretical level (theoretical constructs as 
imaginative explanations of that which cannot be seen and measured) play an essential 
role in understanding the psyche.  But the analyst is not the only one to introduce such 
non-empirical material into analytic work.  The patient’s fantasies, which surface both 
consciously and in unconscious material, are also a central aspect of psychoanalysis and 
an understanding of clinical interpretation must include an appreciation for the role of 
fantasy in the formation of “psychical reality.” Psychical reality is a “hybrid concept” 
(Rand & Torok, 1993, p. 589) used by Freud to denote a personalized reality that is based 
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on an idiosyncratic dialectic between material (or empirical) reality and a fantasy reality; 
this dialectic is shaped by the individual’s unique unconscious mental processes.  In 
Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis (1917/1963), Freud writes: “phantasies possess 
psychical as contrasted with material reality, and we gradually learn to understand that in 
the world of the neuroses it is the psychical reality which is the decisive kind” (p. 368).11  
Likewise, in The interpretation of dreams (1900/1965) Freud asserts that “nothing but a 
wish can set our mental apparatus to work”(p. 637).  Because phantasy plays such a 
crucial role in formulating psychic reality within the psychoanalytic paradigm, I will first 
address the theoretical importance of this concept within the Freudian psychoanalytic 
epistemology and then I will explore the role of clinical interpretations of fantasy on a 
methodological or technical level.  
The issue of material or empirical reality versus psychical reality is at the heart of 
Freudian interpretive theory.  Through his work with hysterics, Freud confronted the very 
challenging issue of childhood sexual trauma as he formulated his theory of neurosis.  
The central question Freud faced was: were the memories of sexual trauma from 
childhood (for example, sexual seduction/abuse, witnessing intercourse/sexual contact, or 
castration threats) that surfaced in clinical material empirically “real” or were they 
phantasies? At first, Freud believed such memories of sexual trauma indicated abuse or 
mistreatment that was materially real (and could be factually verified) and he believed 
this childhood trauma accounted for psychological symptoms in adulthood.  This 
                                                 
11 Generally, fantasy as an unconscious process is spelled with a “ph” in the Standard Edition of Freud and 
in Klein’s work.  However, in neither theory nor practice is the distinction between conscious fantasy and 
unconscious phantasy unambiguous.  Although some authors use the spelling differences (“ph” or “f”-
antasy) to indicate theoretical differences, I will address such differences explicitly, rather than on the basis 
of spelling.  Unless otherwise stated, fantasy and phantasy are transposable terms in this paper. 
52 
 
 
explanation is referred to as Freud’s “seduction hypothesis.”  But as Freud explored the 
nature of such “trauma memories” further, the relationship between empirical reality and 
narrative, fantasized reality became less clear. Freud abandoned his seduction hypothesis 
in 1897.12  Instead of pursuing the empirical reality of such memories, Freud shifted his 
attention to the relationship between neurotic fantasies and unconscious forces (such as 
the repressive censorship of sexual desires/drives).   
Freud was more interested in finding a narrative explanation that worked 
clinically to further the analytic process, than he was in issues of factuality and liability. 
In Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis (1917/1963) Freud explains: 
 
the position can be shown to be that the childhood experiences constructed or 
remembered in analysis are sometimes indisputably false and sometimes equally 
certainly correct, and in most cases compounded of truth and falsehood. (p. 367)   
 
Therefore, “we should equate phantasy and reality, and not bother to begin with whether 
the childhood experiences under examination are the one or the other” (Freud, 
                                                 
12 Although 1897 is commonly accepted to be the year Freud rejected the seduction hypothesis, Rand and 
Torok (1993) contend that Freud continued to vacillate between a belief in the fictionality and a belief in 
the reality of such seduction scenes throughout his life.  They take this vacillation to be a “perilous” and 
“core contradiction” (Rand & Torok, 1993, p. 592) in psychoanalytic theory.  According to Rand and 
Torok (1993), the danger of the psychoanalytic theory and practice regarding fantasy and memory is the 
potential for misinterpreting real trauma as fantasy.  The debate concerning the reality of such trauma 
memories continues to this day. For example, the documentary film Capturing the Friedmans (Jarecki, 
2003) explores the legal, ethical, philosophical, and psychological challenges that memories and allegations 
of childhood sexual (in this case pedophilic) trauma raise. The film presents two equally persuasive and 
compelling but factually conflicting and contradictory narrative accounts of reality.  These competing 
narrative truths confront the viewer with the difficulty (or even the impossibility) of definitively 
discriminating between true (materially verifiable) versus false (fictionalized or fantasy) trauma memories.  
Given that determining the factual veracity of such memories often proves to be difficult (if not 
impossible), Rand and Torok’s (1993) censure of psychoanalysis for refusing to be the arbiter of this issue 
appears to be somewhat misguided. 
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1917/1963, p. 368).  The effects of such memories—be the memories real or imagined—
were what concerned Freud.  Freud shifted the project of psychoanalysis away from a 
pursuit of material truth, and aimed it instead toward understanding and exploring the 
patient’s psychical experience.   
Beneath the “conspicuous symptoms” of neurotic suffering, Freud uncovered 
“hidden unconscious phantasies” shaped by wish-fulfilling desire (1908/1959, p. 162).  
He explains: 
 
Every desire takes before long the form of picturing its own fulfillment; there is 
no doubt that dwelling upon imaginary wish-fulfillments brings satisfaction with 
it…thus in the activity of phantasy human beings continue to enjoy the freedom 
from external compulsion which they have long since renounced in reality. 
(Freud, 1917/1963, p. 372) 
 
Wish-fulfilling phantasies free humans from the constraints of external reality and 
thereby provide a process for gaining satisfactions that would otherwise be prohibited.  
Likewise, in “Creative writers and day-dreaming” (1908/1959), Freud writes, “the motive 
forces of phantasies are unsatisfied wishes, and every single phantasy is the fulfillment of 
a wish, a correction of unsatisfying reality” (p. 146).  What is important for Freud is that 
in this imaginary sphere of fantasized satisfaction, wish-fulfilling desire reigns supreme 
(trumping external reality).  With this turn from external reality to the individual’s 
psychic reality, Freud opened a space for understanding the importance of phantasy 
without focusing on the issue of resolving questions related to material fact. Because 
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psychoanalysis, as both a discipline and a practice, “is an inquiry upon the particular 
subject’s psychic reality” (Barratt, 1984, p. 7), external, empirical reality takes a back 
seat to the particular, idiosyncratic, and fantastic nature of psychic life.  Freud discovered 
that for some people (particularly those with neurotic symptoms), phantasy becomes 
disruptive by taking on too great a role, such that the person loses the capacity to function 
in external reality.  Freud discovered that “it was possible to account for otherwise 
inexplicable disturbances of conscious experience in terms of the intrusion of an 
unconscious fantasy” (Arlow, 1969a, p. 1).  “Out of the ruins of the seduction theory 
soon emerged a general theory of neurosis, which held that neurosis was not caused by 
genuine repressed traumatic memories, but by unconscious wish fantasies” (Olsen & 
Koppe, 1988, p. 128). In abandoning the seduction hypothesis, Freud set aside the issue 
of empirical truth in favor of a narrative truth that might account for neurotic suffering. 
Because fantasies are a constant feature of mental life, the role of fantasy in 
psychic life is complex.  Conscious fantasies are only a small part of the fantasy structure 
that organizes psychic reality.  In psychoanalytic theory, the term “fantasy” refers to 
something more intricate than daydreaming or the flight of the imagination that is 
associated with a general, non-specialized definition of the term. Unconscious (primary 
process) fantasies, which lie outside of awareness, are distinct from conscious (secondary 
process) fantasies, such as daydreams.  Fantasies orchestrate the intersection between 
internal and external reality, such that there is  
 
a mutual and reciprocal effect of the pressure of unconscious fantasy formations 
and sensory stimuli, especially stimuli emanating from the external world.  
55 
 
 
Unconscious fantasy activity provides the “mental set” in which sensory stimuli 
are perceived and integrated. External events, on the other hand, stimulate and 
organize the re-emergence of unconscious fantasies (Arlow, 1969a, p. 8).   
 
Unconscious fantasies make their presence known through symptomatic intrusions upon 
ordinary conscious experience (p. 8). Such intrusions structure dreams, symptoms, slips 
of the tongue, bungled actions, character style, and feelings.   
Unconscious fantasies are narratives that dynamically organize human 
experience. Edelson (1992) characterizes the psychoanalytic account of unconscious 
fantasy in hermeneutic terms, writing:  
 
An analysand’s unconscious fantasy might be called his master story.  Or course, 
he may have more than one master story or unconscious fantasy.  Revisions or 
variants of a particular master story, evolving through a lifetime, constitute a 
fantasy system. (p. 104)  
 
The idiosyncratic fantasy system characteristic of each individual psyche functions as a 
master story that structures individual psychic reality. Psychoanalysis involves engaging 
with these fantasy systems in an effort to explore the ways that such master narratives 
influence experience.  The rules that govern unconscious mental processes are very 
unlike the organizing directives of consciousness. Secondary, conscious mental processes 
are characterized by “organized, purposeful thought [that] makes use of representational 
rule-governed language,” whereas primary, unconscious thought is characterized “by an 
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active suspension of concern about the truth” (Edelson, 1992, p. 110).  Unconscious 
fantasies, therefore, are of particular importance to psychoanalysis because they organize 
psychic experience according to a highly personal and unique logic that defies the rules 
of “rationality.”  The narrative aspect of this unique logic suggests a consistency to the 
fantasy.  A particular portrayal of desire or story about wish fulfillment is replayed in the 
unconscious fantasy, and though it may vary in form as it makes its intrusions on 
consciousness (just as details of a story change with each retelling), there is a reiteration 
of a basic plot line in the fantasy that structures individual experience. 
This view of fantasy has important implications not just for Freud’s 
metapsychology (as theory), but also on the level of technique or practice.  Interpretation 
in psychoanalysis aims to catch sight of the particular unconscious fantasy system that 
organizes psychic life for the individual and explore the way that fantasy system impacts 
the individual experience of external reality.  “It is not only the contents of an 
unconscious fantasy that become conscious in psychoanalysis but also the particulars of 
that fantasy’s relation to [so-called] external reality” (Edelson, 1992, p. 113). The analyst 
engages unconscious fantasies though a focus on primary, unconscious mental processes.  
When primary, unconscious mental processes become “ascendant” (as happens in free 
association, dreaming and symptom formation), the unconscious fantasy “increasingly 
dominates [a person’s] interpretation of what he experiences” (p. 111). The 
psychoanalytic focus on the unconscious fantasy system of the patient or analysand 
facilitates a process in which such unconscious material moves to the surface of 
consciousness.  In making the unconscious conscious, psychic material that would 
otherwise be obscured and hidden becomes knowable.  According to Freud, it is through 
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gaining insight into the ways that the patient’s fantasy system (as a relatively fixed 
internal structure that makes its appearance in numerous specific manifestations) interacts 
with what is termed external, or empirical, reality, that the hold that the fantasy system 
has on the patient’s life is relaxed.   
Achieving a productive familiarity with the particular nature of a patient’s 
unconscious fantasy system is one aim of psychoanalysis.  Edelson (1992) writes, “A 
goal of psychoanalysis is to loosen the grip of a particular master story on the analysand 
and therefore to reduce the effort allocated to realizing it on the screen of imagination or 
in relations with external reality” (p. 113).  Edelson continues: 
 
Ideally, the psychoanalyst’s repeated interventions make it possible for the 
analysand increasingly to achieve access in consciousness to his own mental 
states.  He thereby achieves insight: insight into the workings of his own mind; 
insight into the ways he forges links—and the kind of links he forges—between 
unconscious fantasy and external reality; insight into how such linkages cause 
him to confuse what belongs to him and what belongs to others, to distort what he 
is like and what objects and persons in external reality are like, and to mistake just 
what he is doing when he carries out some particular psychological function; and 
insight into how such linkages and their effects produce the symptoms from 
which he now suffers. (p. 113) 
 
Edelson’s focus here is on the importance of gaining insight through psychoanalytic 
treatment, and he eloquently describes the ways such insight can be a useful and curative 
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force, but the psychoanalytic interpretive approach to fantasy material involves more than 
acquiring and communicating knowledge regarding the nature of the patient’s unique 
fantasy system.  Understanding alone is insufficient.  Freud, addressing the issue of 
interpretive technique, denounces “any line of behavior which would lead us to give the 
patient a translation of his symptoms as soon as we have guessed it ourselves,” even 
though “it is not difficult for a skilled analyst to read the patient’s secret wishes plainly 
between the lines of his complaints and the story of his illness” (1913/1958b, p. 140). 
Interpreting, directly to the patient, his or her fantasy system is inadequate because such 
insight will inevitably lead to increased resistance to the treatment process.  The patient’s 
conscious knowledge or “intellectual interest and understanding” are a “helpful factor” in 
psychoanalytic treatment, “but this alone hardly comes into consideration in comparison 
with the other forces that are engaged in the struggle” (1913/1958b, p. 143).  Because 
these “other forces” complicate the relationship between fantasy and insight, the 
psychoanalyst must grasp not only the function of the fantasy system or psychic reality in 
the patient’s (analysand’s) relationship to external reality, but also both the mechanisms 
of and the motivation for resisting such knowledge.    
 
 
 
 
Section Four 
Transference and Interpretation 
 
 
Psychoanalytic interpretive practice involves negotiating not just the content or 
knowledge that comprises the interpretation, but also the specific nature of the 
relationship between analyst and patient.  Freud noticed that the ever shifting and 
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evolving relationship between the analyst and patient influences the patient’s capacity to 
take in and make use of interpretations.  Indeed, the effectiveness of psychoanalytic 
instruction—which includes interpretations of dreams, fantasies, memories, associations, 
and other unconscious material—is ultimately dependent upon the particulars of the 
transference relationship.  “The patient,” writes Freud, “makes use of the instruction in so 
far as he is induced to do so by the transference” (Freud, 1913/1958b p. 143-4).  
Transference refers to the assigning of attributes and characteristics of other significant 
relationships (especially important past relationships) to the present relationship between 
therapist and patient.  Transference brings the past alive in the present analytic 
relationship.  This transfer of a relational history onto a current relationship happens 
unconsciously; it “is a sort of acting out, and as such is in contrast to remembering” 
(Olsen & Koppe, 1988, p. 264).   
 
Freud realized that the unconscious makes its appearance not only in the content 
that the patient brings to the analysis (symptoms, slips of the tongue, dreams, et cetera), 
but also in the evolving relationship between patient and analyst in the present.  Freud 
presents his first major encounter with and formulation of transference in the case of 
Dora (1905/1953).  The failure of this treatment (Dora’s transference reaction to Freud 
prompted her to terminate her analysis prematurely) forced Freud to address the relational 
aspect of the unconscious. He writes 
 
What are transferences?  They are new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and 
phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of the 
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analysis; but they have this peculiarity, which is characteristic for their species, 
that they replace some earlier person by the person of the physician.  To put it 
another way: a whole series of psychological experiences are revived, not as 
belonging to the past, but as applying to the person of the physician at the present 
moment. (p. 116) 
 
The impulses and fantasies stirred by past relationships live in the present through the 
transference relationship the patient has with the analyst, such that the analyst becomes 
the living stand-in or embodiment of some psychologically important person in the 
patient’s past.  Although Freud did not “succeed in mastering the transference in good 
time” (p. 118) in this case, he retrospectively analyzes the “cruel impulses and revengeful 
motives” (p. 120) characteristic of Dora’s transference that symptomatically disrupted the 
treatment and generalizes from this case to present a theoretical account of transference.  
Freud notes that some transferences are structured as substitutions or “reprints” of the 
past, while others “are more ingeniously constructed” by modifying “some real 
peculiarity in the physician’s person or circumstance” and thereby forming “revised 
editions” of the original, past relationship (p. 116).  As either reprint or revision, the 
transference is the intrusion in the present of a symptomatic relational pattern originating 
in the past. 
In his essay “The dynamics of transference” (1912/1958a), Freud explores the 
ways in which a “stereotype plate” that is “constantly repeated—constantly printed 
afresh—in the course of a person’s life” (p. 100) makes its appearance in the present in 
response to current circumstances and relationships. This stereotyped imprint is shaped 
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by a series of early (childhood) erotic experiences and occurs both in more conscious, 
reality-oriented forms and in unconscious, phantasy-driven forms (Freud, 1912/1958a).  
Because these early erotic experiences are most often associated with powerful, 
affectively positive or negative experiences, often relating to the mother and/or the father, 
the historically-based stereotype that is transferred or imprinted onto present relationships 
is accordingly marked by strong, though often unconscious, affects that are regularly 
associated with the parents (Freud, 1912/1958a). Present relationships become the stage 
on which to replay formative, past experiences.  Positive transference, or transference 
shaped by feelings of love, appears consciously as affection and admiration, but 
unconsciously such transference stirs sexual or erotic excitation (Freud, 1912/1958a).  
Negative transference, on the other hand, is marked by hostile feelings tied to childhood 
erotic experiences and also manifests itself in both conscious and unconscious forms 
(Freud, 1912/1958a).   
“Transference is an inevitable necessity” that must be dealt with in the analysis, 
writes Freud (1905/1953, p. 116).  It is the source of “all the obstacles that make the 
[analytic] material inaccessible to treatment” (p. 116), and as such is a “dangerous 
weapon” (1940/1964a, p. 177) that is powerful enough to undermine, or even destroy, the 
course of treatment, as happened in Freud’s work with Dora.  Freud goes so far as to call 
transference “the most powerful resistance” and “the strongest weapon of the resistance” 
(Freud, 1912/1958a, pp. 101 & 104). Transference plays such a powerful role in resisting 
treatment because in its negative form (negative transference), it produces a hostile 
rejection of the analyst and analytic work, while in its positive form (positive 
transference) it unconsciously eroticizes or sexualizes the analytic encounter (p. 105).  In 
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both cases, the analyst has been transformed into something other than what reality or 
consciousness might validate (something that is determined by the particularities of the 
patient’s unconscious).  Transference to “the doctor is suitable for resistance to the 
treatment only in so far as it is a negative transference or a positive transference of 
repressed erotic impulses” (p. 105).  Such manifestations of transference feelings erect a 
barrier to the progress of the treatment, and as such are understood to be forms of 
resistance, used by the unconscious, to ward off change (progress through treatment). 
But at the same time the transference is also the “most powerful ally” in the 
treatment “if its presence can be detected each time and explained to the patient” (Freud, 
1905/1953, p. 117).  It allows the patient to arrive “at a sense of conviction of the validity 
of the connections which have been constructed during the analysis” (p. 117).  The 
transference does “the inestimable service of making the patient’s hidden and forgotten 
erotic impulses immediate and manifest” (Freud, 1912/1958a, p. 108).  If interpreted, 
transference can also be a valuable tool for gaining insight. “It is the analyst’s task 
constantly to tear the patient out of his menacing illusion and to show him again and 
again that what he takes to be new real life is a reflection of the past” (Freud, 
1940/1964a, p. 177).  The analyst uses the transference to gauge the patient’s capacity to 
tolerate and take in interpretations. “In certain cases and at certain moments of analysis,” 
when a patient’s “withdrawal from reality becomes too intense” (as happens when 
“displacement and projective processes gain too much over objective perception”), “the 
management of transference becomes difficult or impossible” and therefore Lowenstein 
(1951) advises against interpretation at such times (p. 2).  But at those times when an 
interpretation of transference phenomena is appropriate in the analytic work, the 
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transferred unconscious feelings are interpreted to the patient.  Transference 
interpretations facilitate the movement of unconscious relational mechanisms into 
consciousness via a focus on the present relationship between analyst and patient.  
“Interpretations of transference are so effective” because transference “reactualizes the 
past” (p. 6), thereby making unconscious historical material accessible for inspection and 
analysis in the present.   
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Chapter Two 
Klein and Interpretation 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
“Psychoanalysis starts but does not end with Freud” (J. Mitchell, 1998, p. 12).  
Later psychoanalysts have revised and expanded Freud’s work, developing new ways of 
conceptualizing and practicing psychoanalysis, as well as elaborating Freud’s basic 
conceptual and praxis oriented theories. Melanie Klein is one such Freudian revisionist.  
Klein can be read as working from, yet substantially revising and modifying, Freud’s 
work.  As a revisionist, Klein developed a reading of Freud that is firmly grounded in 
basic Freudian theoretical assumptions yet which also introduces innovative concepts and 
practices to the field of psychoanalysis.  Like all revisionists, Klein’s innovations 
challenge the field to consider and make sense of new ways of thinking that differ from 
tradition.  
The nature of the relationship between Freudian and Kleinian psychoanalysis has 
been and continues to be debated.  Some critics assess Klein as having fundamentally 
deviated from the Freudian project, while others chart a clear lineage between the two 
theorists.  “[Klein’s] intent, which she continually reaffirmed throughout her long and 
productive career, was to merely validate and extend Freud’s hypotheses through direct 
observation and clinical work with children,” write S. A. Mitchell and Black (1995, p. 
85).  But as Klein’s work developed, J. Mitchell (1998) charts an evolving deviation from 
Freud’s work, wherein she moved from initially expanding Freud’s work to really 
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developing her own autonomous body of work by the second half of the 1930’s (p.13).  J. 
Mitchell notes, “it is for the new territories she explored and started to chart, not for the 
failure or successes of orthodoxy, that Melanie Klein should be acclaimed” (1998, p. 13).  
Klein’s “discoveries led to a vision of mind that is strikingly different from Freud’s in 
many basic respects” (S. A. Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 85).    
Anna Freud (Freud’s youngest daughter, and founder of the American ego-
psychology branch of psychoanalysis) was a particularly outspoken critic of Klein.  She 
rejected Klein’s work as heterodoxy.  “Whereas Anna’s efforts were to adhere to her 
father’s ideas precisely, without change,” write Hinshelwood, Robinson, and Zarate 
(1998), “Melanie [Klein] strove to develop her work from a basis of Freud’s ideas” but 
was also creative and unconventional in her theorizing (p. 65).  Differences in their 
viewpoints on psychoanalytic interpretation, particularly in analytic work with children, 
became a leading source of conflict between Klein and Anna Freud.  “All through her 
lectures, Anna [Freud] explicitly or implicitly argued against Melanie Klein’s view that 
full analytic interpretations could be made, just as in adult analyses” (p. 63).  But the 
primary discrepancy between their two versions of psychoanalysis (psychoanalysis as 
formulated by Anna Freud versus psychoanalysis as formulated by Melanie Klein) 
stretches beyond the level of technique: their diverging approaches to clinical 
interpretation are the result of fundamental disagreement about key theoretical issues.  
Stonebridge writes: 
 
Anna Freud’s own concern in The ego and the mechanisms of defense was with 
‘objective anxiety’; for her the task for the analyst was to show the child that there 
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was really nothing to be anxious about.  Klein, on the contrary, insisted that there 
was something to be anxious about—oneself, and one’s own primary rage (in 
Phillips & Stonebridge, 1998, p. 195).   
 
Whereas Klein actively sought out the anxieties that the patient violently projects onto 
the outside world, Anna Freud encouraged supporting the development of an autonomous 
ego (an ego able to defend against anxiety) through the curative interpersonal contact 
made possible by positive feelings toward the analyst (Elliot, 2002, p. 27).  For Anna 
Freud such positive feelings in analytic work with children were not the repetition or 
projection of feelings onto the analyst that is characteristic of transference, but were 
instead a form of “original” love; Anna Freud did not believe children younger than three 
were able to form transference feelings, while Klein found transference feelings projected 
onto those outside the self from the earliest moments in the infant’s development 
(Hinshelwood, Robinson & Zarate, 1998, p. 62).  The disparaging assessment of Klein’s 
work presented by Anna Freud’s ego psychology remains the principal critique of Klein’s 
legitimacy as a leading figure in psychoanalytic theory.  But despite Anna Freud’s 
critique of Klein in defense of her own work (which she believed properly extended her 
father’s ideas), Melanie Klein can be and is often read as a follower of Freud, whose 
revisions to psychoanalytic theory seek to add to his account of the nature of unconscious 
experience.   
In this chapter I will explore Kleinian theory as both working within yet 
substantially revising the Freudian tradition.  I will concentrate on the epistemology and 
methodology of Kleinian psychoanalytic interpretation (section one), construction 
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(section two), the role of phantasy (section three), and transference (section four) in 
Kleinian theory.  By drawing connections between Freudian interpretive theory (as 
presented in Chapter One) and Klein’s formulation of psychoanalytic interpretation, I 
locate Klein decisively within the Freudian tradition; yet by highlighting her revisions of 
Freud and her new formulations, I will also be drawing attention to Klein as an innovator 
who introduces novel and original theories and practices to the field of psychoanalysis.  
Rather than seeking to resolve issues of orthodoxy, my goal is to facilitate meaningful 
dialogue between different perspectives or psychoanalytic schools on the key issue of 
interpretation in psychoanalysis.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section One 
Psychoanalytic Epistemology 
 
 
In Chapter One, I explored the philosophical foundations of Freudian 
interpretation, locating an interpretive or hermeneutic epistemology based on the 
unconscious within Freud’s new ontology.  I also contend, in Chapter One, that Freud’s 
formulation of the unconscious functions as a trope, or a descriptive metaphor, for 
describing the nature of being (ontology) and of knowledge (epistemology). The 
unconscious is a crucial and indispensable psychoanalytic concept or theoretical 
construct.  Yet for Freud the unconscious is a fluid concept, which provides the starting 
point for numerous, at times contradictory, explanatory models or metaphors for 
describing human experience.  This results in an evolving psychoanalytic epistemology 
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within Freud’s writings.  One way to understand the revisionist work of subsequent 
psychoanalytic theorists is in terms of this evolving epistemology.  As Freudian 
psychoanalytic epistemology developed (through revisions to Freud’s metapsychology), 
the particular methods and methodological principles for accessing unconscious 
knowledge have also been revised and elaborated.  Klein’s contribution to this evolving 
psychoanalytic epistemology develops out of her novel inferences about the nature of the 
unconscious. 
Just as Freud encountered certain clinical phenomena that motivated his 
construction of psychoanalytic theoretical concepts (this included a process of suggesting 
multiple theoretical models as Freud added to and revised his own hypotheses), Klein too 
presented additional theoretical structures or systems based on her own clinical 
experiences that were intended to further the psychoanalytic project of understanding the 
mind.  These theoretical constructions (that go beyond empirical observation) add to the 
psychoanalytic understanding of the mechanisms of the mind on a structural level, by 
introducing new concepts to the framework of (or system of tropes that is) 
psychoanalysis.  For Klein, as for Freud, the presence of the unconscious “as unknown, 
but nevertheless a dominating influence on the life of the person” is an absolute truth (a 
foundational concept) (Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 467).  Klein accepts Freud’s radical theory 
that human being and knowledge are both fundamentally constituted by the unconscious, 
and therefore works within Freud’s requisite psychoanalytic ontology and epistemology.  
However, just as Freud continued to expand upon his own epistemological framework 
throughout his career, developing new tropes as explanatory structures, Klein too 
introduced new inferences about the nature of the unconscious.  Klein’s new theoretical 
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inferences do not defy or undo Freudian suppositions; instead her conjectures about key 
psychoanalytic issues (for example: childhood experience, the Oedipus complex, and the 
nature of fantasy) are meant to build on and enrich the theoretical tools that comprise the 
Freudian hermeneutic.  
Klein’s formulation of infantile experience can be understood to be a key 
psychoanalytic metaphor or trope that opens a new way to interpret the nature of the 
mind, thereby revising Freudian theory.  Infancy, as described by Klein, is fraught with 
conflicts that give rise to particular psychic defenses.  These defenses remain active 
throughout life, influencing adult experience, as well as structuring the developmental 
tasks of childhood.  Infantile experiences comprise the core of psychic experience, 
according to Klein and her focus on describing and treating “the infant in the patient” is a 
key feature of the Kleinian psychoanalytic framework (Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 239).   
Klein put into words or language that which prior to her work was impenetrable, even 
unthinkable: she saw in the infant very deep levels of aggression and anxiety and 
described defense mechanisms used by the infant as he or she struggles to manage these 
powerful affects.  Klein’s theoretical formulation of the nature and temporality of 
infantile experiences provides the foundation for Kleinian interpretive methodology.  
Much of Klein’s theory developed out of her work with children and reflects 
differences in technique or method specific to that work; but her work with children also 
served a more general function in relation to psychoanalytic theory.  The nature of 
childhood experience, extending back to pre-linguistic, infantile states, provides Klein 
with a new trope for describing the subject of psychoanalysis.  Klein’s work with 
children opened for her new descriptive metaphors to explain various aspects of human 
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experience, thereby facilitating the development of new psychoanalytic theory.  “Klein 
came to regard the adult mind in the same way she understood the child’s—as beset with 
deep, psychotic-like terrors, as unstable, dynamic, and fluid, and as always responsive to 
‘deep’ analytic interpretations” (S. A. Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 88).  
Through working with children, Klein discovered a link between their play and 
the free association method Freud had developed for working with adults.  According to 
Klein, children’s play is a form of free association.  She writes: 
 
The child expresses its phantasies, its wishes and its actual experiences in a 
symbolic way through play and games.  It makes use of the same archaic and 
phylogenetically-acquired mode of expression, the same language, as it were, that 
we are already familiar with in dreams; and we can only fully understand this 
language if we approach it in the way Freud has taught us to approach the 
language of dreams. Symbolism is only a part of it.  If we wish to understand the 
child’s play correctly in relation to its whole behavior during the analytic session 
we must not be content to pick out the meaning of the separate symbols in the 
play, striking as they often are, but must take into consideration all the 
mechanisms and methods of representation employed by the dream-work, never 
losing sight of the relations of each factor to the situation as a whole.  (Klein, Vol. 
2, 1932/1975, p. 7-8) 
 
Children’s play, like adult’s free associations, provides the analytic material by which the 
unknown unconscious is made conscious or knowable.  In what was for Klein a 
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prototypical play therapy, Freud (1920/1955) analyzed and interpreted the psychic 
meaning involved in his grandson’s game of fort-da (in which the infant cast away then 
reeled in a small bobbin, while declaring “fort—da” or “gone—here,” as a way to cope 
with feelings related to the fluctuating presence and absence of his mother).  
Hinshelwood (1989) writes, “Klein took as her model Freud’s interpretations of an infant 
of eighteen months playing with a cotton reel” (p. 12).   In transforming children’s play 
activities—through interpretation—into conscious and therefore knowable feelings, Klein 
sought to help the child contain otherwise unconscious anxieties.13  Following Freud, 
Klein characterizes psychoanalytic interpretive activity as distinct from a clear-cut or 
simple process of assigning predetermined meanings to play scenarios.  And although it 
is something that she has been accused of, “Klein denied making wild interpretations of 
the symbols in play and claimed she always had evidence of the link between the figure 
in the play and the primary object before interpreting, though in her papers she frequently 
does not give the actual links that come out in the session” (Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 27).  
Just as Freud identifies the pitfalls of both the symbolic method of interpretation (in 
which one sign or symbol replaces another) and the decoding method of interpretation (in 
which signs or symbols are translated according to a fixed key), Klein too points to the 
importance of the “wider connections and the whole analytic situation” in interpreting the 
unconscious associations in play activities (Klein, 1932/1975, Vol. 2, p. 8).  For Klein, 
the psychoanalytic interpretative method for clinical work with children entails eliciting 
unconscious, associative material in play activities for the purpose of uncovering the 
unique chain of distorted, latent meanings that lie behind the manifest meanings in the 
                                                 
13 For Freud the child did not yet have an unconscious at this age, whereas Klein proposed unconscious 
processes were present from birth on.  
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play.  This unconscious material is then named—through the analytic interpretation—
thereby undoing the distortions of unconscious censorship and bringing the unconscious 
into consciousness.  
Klein’s focus, in analytic work with children, is on interpreting play activities, but 
she also stresses the importance of language.  She believes that interpretation of play 
opens the way to “making speech…an instrument of analysis” and that “no analysis of a 
child, whatever its age, can be said to be really terminated unless the child has employed 
speech in analysis to its full capacity, for language constitutes the bridge to reality” 
(Klein, 1932/1975, Vol. 2, p. 14).  Play, like dreams, opens the realm of the unconscious, 
providing access to aspects of the mind not available to consciousness, while language 
opens the possibility of connecting the conscious and unconscious aspects of the mind. 
In addition to this correspondence between free association and play, Klein also 
identified forces at work in children’s play that were not accounted for in Freudian 
theory.  From these observations, Klein developed a radical new understanding of 
infantile experience. This new understanding is a theoretical construction: it is based on 
traces evident in children’s play, but is nevertheless a conjecture.   Klein’s theoretical 
construction of infantile experience provides the basis for a type of psychoanalytic 
interpretation that moves beyond the associative material that is present in children’s play 
(the manifest material).  In her work with children, Klein develops a method of 
interpreting anxiety, such as it is noticeable in the child’s play, for the purpose of 
allowing the child to move ahead or progress in analytic play.  Based on her 
understanding of infantile states, Klein’s interpretations were directed toward the 
(unconscious) anxieties produced in play and free association.  Hinshelwood (1994) 
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terms this the “anxiety-interpretation-response” sequence in Klein’s work, and identifies 
this process occurring repeatedly in her case studies (p. 38).  Hinshelwood reads Klein as 
attempting “to put into conscious words those ideas, emotions (especially anxiety) and 
relationships that are hidden, or part-hidden; in effect to speak the unspoken to the child” 
(p. 39). In The psycho-analysis of children (1932/1974) Klein argues for immediate and 
“deep-going interpretations” (which seek to address resistances and therefore “open the 
door to the unconscious” and “diminish the anxiety”) (Vol. 2, p. 24).   For Klein, 
interpretations are meant to modify anxiety by directly addressing both disturbing (for 
example, aggressive) and hostile (negative transference) mental contents. Her concern is 
“not only the representational content but also the anxiety and sense of guilt associated 
with it” (Klein, 1932/1975, Vol. 2, p. 25).  This stress on affects—anxiety and guilt, in 
particular—associated with the material presented in analytic work, not just the symbolic 
content of the material, is characteristic of Klein’s interpretive stance toward all patients, 
regardless of age.   The anxieties Klein noticed in children’s play allowed her to 
reconceptualize free association (in work with adults) as containing the same affects.  
Kleinian interpretations attempt to bring the child’s unconscious ideas and 
emotions into consciousness by speaking them or putting them into words (Hinshelwood, 
1994, p. 39). This is in keeping with Freud’s interpretive methodology.  However, there 
are differences at the level of method between how Freud and Klein make their 
interpretations.  At least in part, these differences can be understood to be a result of 
Klein’s clinical work with children.  Hinshelwood (1994) writes, 
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With children there is much more a sense of doing something together with the 
patient (or even to him or her); this contrasts with adult psychoanalysis, where 
there is a tendency to speak about things.  It should be noted, however, [that] 
there has been a realization that adult psychoanalysis is also a “doing something” 
together with the patient. (p. 39) 
 
Klein’s interpretations to children were particularly graphic, in ways that can offend adult 
sensibilities.  She spoke to children about sex, bodily functions, body parts, death, fears, 
aggression, hatred, envy, and other such topics that are normally censored from 
interactions with children.  Her “brisk, overtly sexualized discourse” (Kristeva, 2001, p. 
55) and focus on “psychic negativity” (Rose, 1998) can be disturbing.  As a result of this 
interest in anxiety and guilt, Klein is sometimes charged with single-mindedly 
concentrating her interpretations on negative affect.  This indictment, however, is 
countered by the Kleinian claim that it is precisely those psychic junctures where anxiety 
and guilt dominate that block access to the unconscious.  Such affects are obstacles to be 
overcome, via interpretation, for the purpose of making the unconscious conscious. Klein 
focused “on the preverbal and on deeply repressed material and felt that interpreting at 
this level was where the analyst’s work made a difference” (Young, 2000).  Kristeva 
(2001) writes: “Klein’s play technique proves to be inseparable from her style of 
interpretation, one in which a fantasy enacted into play, turned into a fantasy narrated by 
two people, leads to an awareness of reality” (p. 52).  For Klein, the interpretive 
methodology that developed through her play technique applies not just to work with 
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children, but also to interpretive practice in psychoanalysis with adult analysands 
because, for Klein, the conflicts of childhood remain active throughout adulthood.  
Behind the infantile affects of anxiety and guilt, Klein theorized a destructive, 
aggressive drive that draws from but also extends Freud’s formulation of the death drive 
(Elliot, 2002, pp.79-80).  Klein’s focus on the death instinct is a key aspect of her 
revisions of Freud’s theoretical tropes.  Klein draws from Freud’s work, but also 
articulates a new metaphor by which to understand the death drive.  According to Klein, 
even before libidinal conflicts surface, the infant is entwined in psychic, oedipal conflict 
(conflict that gives rise to first anxiety and later feelings of guilt) stemming from 
unconscious aggression and violent feelings. Klein was interested in the pre-genital (the 
oral and anal) aspects of oedipal phantasies and explored the very early stages of the 
Oedipus complex in her clinical work with children (Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 57).  These 
pre-genital, oedipal phantasies predate, but also prefigure, the Oedipus complex Freud 
theorized.  Klein writes, 
 
If we are right in supposing that the child’s Oedipus trends set in when the sadism 
is at its height, we are led to the conclusion that it is chiefly impulses of hate 
which initiate the Oedipus conflict and the formation of the super-ego and which 
govern the earliest and most decisive stages of both.  (Klein, 1932/1974, Vol. 2, p. 
135)  
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Sadistic, pre-genital phantasies, driven by anxiety, are directed towards the parents 
(according to Klein this includes the parents’ sexual relationship) in ways that impact 
both identifications and prohibitions.  Hinshelwood (1989) writes, 
 
The aggression that is evoked in these pregential phases of the complex creates 
already complicated relations with the primary figures even before genital 
impulses take over.  These complex, ambiguous and terrifying figures, when 
introjected,14 become internal persecutors.  Klein argued that internalized versions 
of parents which attack the ego are clearly phenomena in the same category as the 
superego described by Freud. (p. 61) 
 
According to Klein, the instinctual aggression of the infant creates complicated, conflict-
laden relations with parental figures before sexual (libido driven) impulses surface.  “The 
infant, says Klein, experiences fantasies of attacking and destroying the maternal body, 
and in turn suffers paranoid anxieties that it too will be destroyed” (Elliot, 2002, p. 80).  
These aggressive feelings are directed both internally (as an unconscious fear of self-
destruction) and outward, resulting in both a paranoid fear of, and feelings of rage 
against, the infant’s earliest object: the mother.   
Although “the notion of an object comes directly from Freud’s scientific theories” 
(Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 362), Klein significantly develops the definition and stresses the 
importance of psychological objects in her approach to psychoanalysis.  In Freud’s work, 
                                                 
14 Introjection is a psychoanalytic term that describes the process wherein an object that had once been 
experienced as external (for example, another person) is incorporated within (internalized as a part of) the 
self.  This defense mechanism will be explored more fully later in this chapter. 
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“object” is a term used to denote “something upon which impulses of energy [instincts] 
were discharged, recognized only for the purposes of the subject’s pleasure-seeking, 
satisfaction and relief” (Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 362).  However, Klein (1952/1975) 
expands this definition by including “the infant’s emotions, phantasies, anxieties, and 
defenses,” in addition to instincts, as a necessary part of the relationship to the object 
(Vol. 3, p. 51).  According to Klein, it makes no sense to conceive of instincts without 
also addressing how such instincts are related to psychological objects.   She writes: 
 
The analysis of very young children has taught me that there is no instinctual 
urge, no anxiety situation, no mental process which does not involve objects, 
external or internal; in other words, object-relations are the centre of emotional 
life. Furthermore, love and hatred, phantasies, anxieties and defences are also 
operative from the beginning of life and are ab initio indivisibly linked with 
object-relations. (Vol. 3, p. 53)  
 
Emotional life—indeed all of psychic life—is bound up in object relations according to 
Klein.  “For Klein the basic units of mental processes are not packets of objectless energy 
[e.g. drive], but relational units ab initio” (Greenberg & S. A. Mitchell, 1983, p. 137). 
This emphasis on the relational and affective—rather than solely on the instinctual—
quality of psychic object relations is one of Klein’s key innovations in psychoanalytic 
theory and “represents a fundamental shift in vision concerning human motivation and 
mental processes in general” (p. 137).  Klein shifts the focus away from an instinct-based 
drive to a complex set of relationships with real and imagined/internalized others. For 
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her, “the organization and content of object relations, particularly relations with the fluid 
and complex world of internal objects, are the central determinants of experience and 
behavior” (p. 145).  
The mother15 is the first and primary external object experienced by the infant.  
As a result, the mother, as object, is the first to become the focus of the child’s 
destructive, instinctual impulses and related affects.  Klein (1932/1974) writes: 
 
The anxiety evoked in the child by his destructive instinctual impulses makes 
itself felt in the ego, I think, in two directions.  In the first place it implies the 
annihilation of his own body by his destructive impulses, which is a fear of an 
internal instinctual danger; but in the second place it focuses his fears on his 
external object, against whom his sadistic feelings are directed, as a source of 
danger.  The onset of the development of its ego which is accompanied by the 
growing ability to test reality leads the child to experience his mother as someone 
who can give or withhold satisfaction and in this way it acquires the knowledge of 
the power of his object in relation to the satisfaction his needs—a knowledge 
which seems to be the earliest basis in external reality for his fears of the object.  
In this connection it would appear that he reacts to his intolerable fear of 
instinctual dangers by shifting the full impact of the instinctual dangers on to his 
object, thus transforming internal dangers into external ones.  Against these 
                                                 
15 The mother as object could also be a surrogate care giving and therefore maternal-type personage, if not 
a biological mother. One of the primary distinguishing features of motherhood, and consequently the 
mother figure/object, is feeding (either via the breast or feeding by some breast substitute such as a bottle). 
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external dangers his immature ego then seeks to defend itself by destroying his 
object. (Vol. 2, p. 128) 
 
Klein describes the child’s attempt to negotiate, or manage, the anxiety stirred by 
aggressive impulses via an internal representation of the mother (the mother as object).  
Klein theorized that the internal conflicts, and resulting object relations that are sparked 
by aggressive impulses, eventually lead the child to feelings of guilt, and ultimately a 
desire to compensate.  “Feelings of guilt give rise to the tendency to make reparation to 
the injured object” (Vol. 2, p. xiii).  According to Klein, distress in the form of remorse 
and alarm about internal aggression stirs feelings of love and a desire to restore good in 
the object.    
Klein describes this internal psychic process unfolding in two main phases or 
positions in the first six to eight months of life, which she terms: the “paranoid-schizoid 
position” and the “depressive position.”  These positions describe infantile states of 
development that occur prior to the developmental stages proposed by Freud.  Her 
formulation of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions addresses what she sees to 
be a shortcoming in Freudian theory.  For Klein, Freud’s “concept of stages of 
development through which a child passes in a well-defined order was too limiting” 
(Segal, 2004, p. 33).  Her choice of the term “position,” as opposed to “stages” of 
development, intentionally highlights the overlapping, repetitive, and fluctuating nature 
of certain constellations of anxieties, defenses, object relations, and impulses 
(Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 393).  “Like Freud, she did think that children’s primary interest 
shifted from oral, to anal and then genital concerns, but she found that there was constant 
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movement from one to the other and back again” (Segal, 2004, p. 33).  Klein’s 
developmental positions designate “certain constellations of attitudes and [defense] 
mechanisms” (p. 33).   
S. A. Mitchell and Black (1995) observe, “Klein’s most important and abiding 
contribution to the development of psychoanalytic thought was her depiction of what she 
termed the ‘paranoid-schizoid’ and ‘depressive’ positions” (p. 88).  The paranoid-
schizoid position refers to an early state of mind in which destructive, instinctual 
impulses are externalized by being cast onto an outside object, resulting in paranoid 
anxiety about retaliation or persecution by the “bad” object with which such impulses are 
associated.  At the same time, the infant attempts to draw in, and therefore “rob,” the 
object of its good contents (for example, by devouring and ingesting the good contents 
that come from the mother’s breast) (Klein, 1946/1975, Vol. 3, p. 2).  In this bifurcated 
process of consuming and assimilating the good, gratifying parts of the object and 
expelling the aggressive parts of the self, the ego’s coherence is threatened, resulting in 
“a tendency toward disintegration, a falling into bits” that is characteristic of psychosis 
(1946/1975, Vol. 3, p. 4).16  Working through both the terror of internal fragmentation, in 
which the ego’s coherence is jeopardized, and the fearful mistrust of harm from outside, 
according to Klein, is an integral part of normal development. “Klein stresses that the 
paranoid-schizoid mechanisms are a normal defense against early, primitive anxieties” 
(Elliot, 2002, p. 85).   
                                                 
16 This infantile psychotic “falling to bits” is related to, but is not identical with, the fragmentation 
characteristic of adult schizophrenia.  For more on the relationship between infantile states and adult 
psychosis in Kleinian theory see W.R. Bion, (1957) “The differentiation of the psychotic from the non-
psychotic personalities.”  In “normal” development, the child will come to work through and better contain 
these instincts and anxieties, leading to a more consolidated ego. 
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Typically, as the child matures, the persecutory anxiety stirred in the paranoid-
schizoid position develops into a persecutory guilt that is characteristic of the depressive 
position. Hinshelwood (1989) writes: 
 
In the paranoid-schizoid position the conflict is more over the survival of the ego, 
which feels under threat of death.  In the depressive position this threat passes 
more toward the loved objects, and the subject regrets their suffering with an 
intense remorse that is felt as guilt and responsibility. (p. 314) 
 
“States of integration” (both of the self and of the object) become “more frequent and 
lasting as development goes on” and the “synthesis” between good and bad “gives rise to 
depressive anxiety, guilt and the desire to make reparation to the injured loved object” 
(Klein, 1948/1975, Vol. 3, p. 34-5).  “From this tendency toward integration, the small 
infant is led in the second half of its first year to perceive other people as whole objects” 
(Elliot, 2002, p. 86).  The shift from part to whole object relations is a defining element 
of the depressive position.  As the infant comes to perceive both self and others as more 
complete/whole and stable, feelings of love and an awareness of the origin of aggressive 
impulses triggers depressive feelings of guilt and sorrow.  These feelings eventually 
produce a more mature desire to make reparations for harm done.  The “feelings of guilt, 
loss and reparation” that are characteristic of the depressive position “are connected to 
the interplay of destruction and reintegration which underpins mature self-organization” 
(p. 87).  According to Klein, the conflicts underlying these developmental positions are 
never entirely resolved, and even those who have successfully reached the depressive 
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position will nevertheless regress into the paranoid-schizoid position at particular key 
moments throughout life.  Adults can retreat or regress into the paranoid-schizoid 
position during stressful periods when more mature defenses break down and give way to 
infantile defenses.  For those unable to come to terms with integrated, whole objects (and 
thereby move past the conflicts and defensive strategies of the paranoid-schizoid 
position), severe psychotic pathologies dominate.  
In addition to initiating a new form of child psychoanalysis, revising Freud’s 
developmental theory, and offering a new conceptualization of psychoanalytic objects, 
Klein also alters Freud’s model for several of the defense mechanisms.  Klein includes in 
her developmental theory an account of how children manage anxiety as they move 
between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions through the use of key primitive, 
infantile defense mechanisms: in particular, splitting, introjection, projection, and 
projective identification. According to Klein, these infantile defense mechanisms come 
into being prior to the more mature, neurotic defense mechanisms Freud focused on 
(repression, above all).  She draws from but also expands Freud’s work on these more 
primitive defense mechanisms.  In “splitting,” either the object or the ego is divided—in a 
process that can be characterized as either differentiation or fragmentation—into good 
and bad aspects or bits.  For example, the mother has the potential to be both split into a 
good object, who is able to provide satisfaction and relief from internal impulses, or a bad 
object, whose capacity to frustrate and withhold satisfaction provokes fear and retaliatory 
rage.  Likewise, a phantasy of the self as containing only good or bad parts or as falling to 
pieces in the face of its own badness can develop.   
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As well as this parsing of the object or self via splitting, there is also an impulse 
driven movement of the object either into or outside of the self.   Oral impulses stir a 
fantasized taking in or internalization of the object, in a process termed “introjection.” 
Introjection serves as one defensive way of dealing with anxiety-provoking experiences.  
The child internally establishes or “introjects [unrealistic] imagos, both phantasized good 
imagos and phantasized bad ones” of the object (Klein, 1932/1975, Vol. 2, p. 137).17  
Each external object is liable to become at times good, and at other times bad, resulting in 
both idealized (good) and persecutory (bad) objects.  External objects become introjected 
as unrealistic imagos or internal objects. However, “as his adaptation to reality and the 
formation of his super-ego go forward [gradually], those imagos approximate more and 
more closely to the real objects they represent” (p. 137).   Likewise, through the 
discharge or expulsion of anal impulses onto the object—via “projection”—the object, 
which in Klein’s theory is again prototypically the infant’s internal representation of the 
mother, is transformed into a source of either goodness or badness: the mother as good or 
bad object.  “Projection” describes a process wherein a person “attribute[s] certain states 
of mind to someone else,” such that “something of the ego is perceived in someone else” 
(Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 397).  States of mind are projected outside the self and into the 
object.  Although introjection and projection both include the repositioning of either 
positive or negative feelings, projection is a particularly necessary defense mechanism for 
dealing with sadistic or aggressive feelings and provides a source of relief from the 
anxiety that accompanies the death drive.  “Deflecting anxiety in this manner is soothing 
                                                 
17  “Imago” is a psychoanalytic term first used by Freud to denote the unconscious representation of an 
external object, but more specifically the term has come to designate an idealized image of a person (e.g., a 
parent) that is formed in childhood. 
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for the infant, as aggression is no longer experienced on the inside and bad feelings are 
projected and installed outward” (Elliot, 2002, p. 83).  Klein highlights the way in which 
projections carry not just impulses, but parts of the ego.   
Alongside the projective process, a related process, termed “projective 
identification,”18 also takes place in which there is a “splitting off [of] parts of the self 
and projecting them into objects,” resulting in a “weakening and impoverishing of the 
ego” in “abnormal object-relations” (Klein, 1946/1975, Vol. 3, p. 8-9).  Spillius (1988) 
writes: 
 
[Klein] thought of projective identification as a phantasy in which bad parts of the 
self were split off from the rest of the self and, together with bad excrements, 
were projected into the mother or her breast to control and take possession of her 
in such a fashion that she was felt to become the bad self. (Vol. 1, p. 81)   
 
One of Klein’s contributions to an understanding of primitive defense mechanisms is that 
she noticed that “impulses do not just vanish when projected; they go into an object, and 
they distort the perception of the object” (Spillius, 1983, p. 322).  Klein’s formulation of 
projective identification can be understood to “add depth to Freud’s concept of 
                                                 
18 “Considerable controversy has developed over the definition and use of this concept” (Spillius, 1988, p. 
81).  According to some readers of Klein it is neither “useful” (Spillius, 1983, p. 322) nor “clear” 
(Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 182) to draw a distinction between projection and projective identification, while 
for others it is one of her most popular concepts. Young (1994) writes, “projective identification is the most 
fruitful psychoanalytic concept since the discovery of the unconscious” (Young, 1994).  However, this 
debate is beyond the scope of this work.  I include projective identification here because this difficult 
concept “has come more and more to centre stage in Kleinian psychoanalysis” (Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 
180). But I exclude from my discussion more contemporary formulations, most of which took “place after 
Klein’s death in 1960,” (p. 180), and many of which see projective identification as a defining feature of 
Kleinian psychoanalytic interpretation.   
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projection” (p. 322), but in its originality, it also adds a new metaphor to psychoanalytic 
theory for understanding the way in which the unconscious is manifest in lived 
experience. 
 These Kleinian innovations on the level of theory expand psychoanalytic 
interpretive methodology in new directions.  Kleinian interpretive methodology is based 
on a bold, new way of conceptualizing the psychoanalytic mind; Klein’s innovations 
regarding psychoanalytic epistemology resulted in new interpretive practices.  “Klein 
made deep, even militant interpretations of the anxieties about breasts and other body 
parts, about hate, tearing, scooping out, biting and murderousness which shocked non-
Kleinians” (Young, 2000).  Klein formulated her interpretations on the basis her 
developmental theory, unraveling and revealing the aggression, anxiety, psychic 
disintegration, and various other responses to reality that are stirred by the patient’s 
shifting object-relations.  Her theoretical formulations were not separate from her clinical 
work.  “In a clinical setting all these defenses and positions that Klein describes are 
discoverable in the present relationship between patient and analyst; they are primitive, 
preverbal or extra-verbal ways of communicating an experience, and they can be 
understood and put into words in an interpretation which can bring clarity and relief” (J. 
Mitchell, 1998, p. 22).  Klein’s interpretive methodology is structurally akin to Freud’s, 
but Klein significantly revises and expands the metaphors and tropes that comprise the 
epistemology, which results in a changed method of interpreting.  
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Section Two 
Constructing Meaning 
 
 
 
Klein’s interpretations of infantile experience, like the reconstructions Freud 
explored in his paper on “Construction in analysis” (1937/1964b), are guesses or 
conjectures on the analyst’s part about infantile, preverbal experience.  Klein bases her 
hypotheses about this preverbal, infantile experience on her observations of children: She 
studied both infant behavior and children’s play activities, which she took to be a 
communication of unconscious material.  From her observations, she developed her 
theory of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions and described the defense 
mechanisms characteristic of both positions.  But this description of infantile 
development is also an interpretation of the child’s preverbal past that is based on 
inferences and speculations that are guided by psychoanalytic theory. Klein’s theory 
moves away from a more narrow interpretive process of observing and accounting for 
facts, to include a far-reaching process of constructing meaning by narrating experiences 
that would otherwise remain outside of language.  As an interpretation that moves beyond 
empirical fact, Klein’s theoretical assumptions about infantile experience can be 
understood to be a construction in the Freudian sense.  Working from clinical traces and 
guided by psychoanalytic theory, Klein constructs fictitious memory narratives that are 
an interpretation of infant experience. Because they address a time in human 
development prior to language (in which thoughts and feelings are neither experienced in 
words nor expressed in words), her interpretations cannot be checked against empirical 
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reality.  In this way, Klein’s theoretical constructions of infantile psychic positions 
correspond methodologically to Freud’s theoretical constructions of an early forgotten, 
past.  Rose (1998) writes of Klein: “In the tradition of Freud, she saw her task as one of 
excavation, as the retrieval of something which even Freud, she argues, had barely been 
able to approach” (p. 128).  
However, despite the way Klein’s theoretical hypotheses about—or construction 
of—childhood fit Freud’s general interpretive methodology (in particular the constructive 
process in psychoanalysis), Klein’s specific approach to the role of history and the 
clinical use of memory in the analytic process differs from Freud’s.  Like Freud, Klein 
maintains that historical factors play an important role in current life conditions.  
Highlighting the link between her view of the past and Freud’s, Klein (1927/1975) writes, 
“one of the bases of psychoanalysis is Freud’s discovery that we find in the adult all the 
stages of his early childish development” (Vol. 1, p. 170).  But unlike Freud, Klein sees 
the past, not as a remote relic to be unearthed, or even imaginatively constructed, but as 
alive and operative in the present.  Despite a Freudian inspired excavation of the past in 
Klein’s theoretical work, Freud’s archeological metaphor does not fit Klein’s praxis-
based technique for working with issues of the past (or personal history) in 
psychoanalysis.  For Klein, there is no static, repressed past to be retrieved and brought 
into the present via the analytic reconstruction; instead, the past is alive and active in the 
patient’s way of being in the present (which is made manifest through the transference 
relationship).  “Where in Freud repression is a defense that creates a past and a symptom 
is a return of that past, Klein is more interested in the defenses which have no such 
dimension of time past and with atemporal inhibitions of the ego, not with symptoms” (J. 
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Mitchell, 1998, p. 27). On the level of theory-making, Freud and Klein are engaged in 
similar constructive processes, but when it comes to interpretive technique in the analytic 
session, their understanding of the analyst’s interpretive role in relation to historical 
issues differs.   
There is not the Freudian reconstruction of missing early memories in Kleinian 
analytic practice because what is seen to be of historical importance is that which is 
discernible in the present.  Klein’s constructions intervene or create meaning by putting 
into words or constructing infantile experiences that are beyond language: 
 
All this is felt by the infant in much more primitive ways than language can 
express.  When these pre-verbal emotions and phantasies are revived in the 
transference situation, they appear as ‘memories in feelings’, as I would call them, 
and are reconstructed and put into words with the help of the analyst.  In the same 
way, words have to be used when we are reconstructing and describing 
phenomena belonging to the early stages of development.  In fact we cannot 
translate the language of the unconscious into consciousness without lending it 
words from our conscious realm. (Klein, 1957/1975, Vol. 3, p. 180n) 
 
Klein deliberately named or put into language preverbal experiences and phantasies, 
seeking to bring the infant’s unconscious into consciousness by drawing upon the 
constructive, meaning-making, linguistic capacities of the adult.  Klein justifies such 
interpretations by noting that the past is not buried away as an inert relic, but instead lives 
89 
 
 
in the feelings that are made evident by the present-day transference relationship.19 
Hinshelwood (1994) describes the importance of the simultaneity of past and present for 
interpretation: 
 
It is no good, therefore, making interpretations of the type ‘You see me as your 
father’.  What is transferred from the past is not just the father, nor just the 
defense…, nor just a relationship…What is transferred is a particular way of 
using the object that serves a function right now—the function it served 
then…The means are borrowed from the past, resemble the past, but are in service 
to the present. (p. 227)   
 
The interpretive emphasis is placed on the current object relationship; this relationship is 
assumed to carry a past, to have a history, but is important precisely because it is 
operative in the present.  “Freud’s theory revolves around the question of the past,” 
whereas for Klein, “infancy is perpetually present” (J. Mitchell, 1998, pp. 25 & 26, 
respectively).  J. Mitchell (1998) writes, “Freud’s historical imagination examines the 
present (the adult illness) and from it reconstructs a hypothetical past determinant.  For 
Klein the past and the present are one” (p. 26).   
Unlike Freud, who describes stages of conflict structuring a temporal trajectory in 
development, Klein sees childhood conflicts as constitutive of, and active in, present day 
experience.  Whereas Freud described a developmental process driven by the resolution 
of conflicts, Kleinian psychoanalysis focuses on an infancy that is never really left 
                                                 
19 See section four of this chapter, which addresses Klein’s formulation of transference. 
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behind.  Commenting on this vital alteration of Freudian theory, J. Mitchell (1998) 
writes,  
 
From her observation of normal children she is led to an analysis of infantile 
development that finds the points of psychosis which at the present time, or 
repeated in the future because they are always current, will be echoed in a 
psychotic illness.  At first, it looks as though we have here a parallel with Freud’s 
work.  It is often claimed that, where Freud found the child was father to the man, 
Klein found the infant gave birth to the child and adult.  The resemblance between 
the notions is illusory.  (J. Mitchell p. 27) 
 
For Klein, there is no static past to be retrieved and brought into the present via analytic 
reconstruction; instead, the past is alive in the patient’s way of being in the present.  This 
understanding of the nature of time in personal history impacts Klein’s use of positions in 
her developmental theory.  For Klein, developmental conflicts are never fully resolved.  
Instead, they continue to appear throughout life, such that the historical dimension of the 
unconscious exists in the present as shifts between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive 
positions occur.  Where developmental stages provide, for Freud, an interpretive or 
hermeneutic framework for building clinical constructions of a remote, inaccessible past, 
for Klein, because the past is never really relegated to the past, the reconstructive process 
in psychoanalysis carries a different significance.  Kleinian clinical interpretations draw 
upon a theoretical understanding of infantile experience that is reconstructed via adult 
language.  Klein’s formulations of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions are an 
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effort to provide narrative truths that reach beyond what is empirically knowable.  In this 
way Kleinian interpretations are like the reconstructions Freud formulated that draw upon 
theoretical metaphors or tropes such as the unconscious, the Oedipus complex, and the 
super-ego. However, because the focus of the Kleinian analytic remains in the present, 
rather than on a forgotten historical dimension, Kleinian interpretations do not include a 
process of reconstructing specific missing memories and the historical focus evident in 
Freud’s work is left out of the Kleinian hermeneutic.   
Schafer (1997b) censures the contemporary Kleinians because they “deemphasize 
reconstruction” and instead “remain intent on developing explicitly the phenomenology 
of the internal world and the way it is played out in relations with the external world” (pp. 
20-21).  Favoring the more traditional Freudian stance that allows for “thinking causally 
and retrospectively,” he “believe[s] that this restricted emphasis [amongst the Kleinians] 
on the present, technically and interpretively, pushes other aspects of the analytic context 
out of sight” (Schafer, 1997b, p. 21).  Although Klein does work with such causal and 
retrospective or reconstructive explanations on a theoretical level, Kleinian clinical 
interpretive technique is more closely focused on phenomena that are empirically 
observable in the present, perhaps at the cost of a consideration of historical causality on 
the individual or personal level. 
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Section Three 
Fantasy and Interpretation 
 
 
 
Klein’s focus on the interpretation of clinical material that is manifest in the 
observable present, as opposed to historical material, might be mistakenly understood to 
imply a positivistic epistemology centered on knowing and explaining empirical reality.  
This would be a misreading of Klein.  Instead, Kleinian interpretation is structured by a 
keen appreciation for the role of unconscious fantasy in psychic life, an appreciation that 
developed from her observations of infant and childhood experience, but which looks 
beyond the observable to infer and name, or reconstruct, early mental processes.  Isaacs, a 
leading Kleinian analyst and theorist, (1948) writes: “Unconscious phantasies are always 
inferred, not observed as such; indeed, the technique of psycho-analysis as a whole is 
largely based upon inferred knowledge” (p. 74).  In psychoanalysis, including Kleinian 
analysis, fantasy is understood to be situated outside the realm of empirical reality; it 
follows a uniquely individual logic that is not subject to the rules of an external and 
objective reality.  Like Freud’s hybrid concept of psychical reality, in which memories 
and fantasies work together to produce what is experienced as reality, Klein’s 
formulation of the role of fantasy in relation to empirical reality focuses on the seminal 
role of the individual’s unconscious processes in shaping reality.  Indeed, for Klein (as 
for Freud), that which is termed “reality” is fundamentally constituted by fantasy.  As a 
result, Klein can be understood to be following Freud’s lead by working within a 
hermeneutic epistemology, in which reality and knowledge are inherently interpretive 
constructs that are shaped by unconscious fantasies.   
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Much has been written about Klein’s notion of phantasy, including the ways it 
revises, and/or deviates from, Freudian theory, but the bulk of this scholarship is based on 
Isaacs’ essay, “The nature and function of phantasy” (1948).  This seminal paper “was a 
landmark in trying to define and catalogue the characteristics of unconscious phantasy” 
within Kleinian psychoanalysis (Hinshelwood, 1994, p. 33) and Isaacs “provides a 
detailed exposition of the Kleinian theory which is lacking in the work of Klein herself” 
(Leader, 1997, p. 85).  However, because my intent is to focus specifically on Klein’s 
own formulations, I will limit my discussion of unconscious phantasy to Klein’s writings 
on the topic and to commentary that deals with primary texts by Klein.  This means 
presenting a view of unconscious phantasy that is different from the one Isaacs presents, 
and to which most of Klein’s followers adhere.20  But despite the lack of an explicit 
formulation of the nature of phantasy in Klein’s writing, “the idea of phantasy as an 
unconscious activity was present for Klein from the beginning of her work” and the 
“basic clinical importance of unconscious phantasy has remained unchanged all through 
Kleinian thought” (Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 32-33).  
Phantasy, according to Klein, is “a basic mental activity present in rudimentary 
form from birth onwards and essential for mental growth, though it can also be used 
defensively” (Spillius, 2001, p. 363).  The infant develops internal images or imagos of 
the objects he or she encounters in the external world (for example, the infant develops 
and incorporates his or her unique, imaginative mental representation of the mother, 
                                                 
20 I do this primarily for pragmatic reasons.  Just as others, such as Isaacs, have expanded Klein’s work, so 
too with Freud and Lacan, and such an overview of the history of psychoanalytic thought is both beyond 
me and beyond the scope of this dissertation. I aim in this dissertation to take the texts of these writers as 
my subject, and for Klein that means making sense of her understanding of phantasy such as it is present in 
her own writings.  This results in a rather piecemeal approach to explicating the Kleinian formulation of 
phantasy, for there is no central work in which Klein lays out her theory on this topic.   
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which often includes the infant’s first experience of the mother in the form of the breast 
as object).  Such phantasies are connected with affective experiences of frustration and 
satisfaction, which therefore endow the phantasy with a sense of goodness and/or badness 
that is unique to the individual. Klein (1932/1975) writes, 
 
As far as can be seen, there exists in the quite small child, side by side with its 
relations to real objects, a relationship to unreal imagos which are experienced 
both as excessively good and as excessively bad, but on a different plane.  
Ordinarily these two kinds of object-relations intermingle and colour each other to 
an ever increasing extent…But in the mind of the quite small child its real objects 
and its imaginary ones are still widely separated. (Vol. 2, p. 151)  
 
Human development involves a process of coming to terms with the conflicts that arise 
when internal phantasies are challenged by external reality.  Through this process, the 
relationship between external reality and the imaginary realm of phantasy is clarified and 
consequently managed, although the influence of phantasy remains always active.  “This 
matching of inner phantasies against external reality takes place throughout life” (Segal, 
1997, p. 97).  Elsewhere, Segal (1973/1988) writes: 
 
Unconscious phantasies are ubiquitous and always active in every individual.  
That is to say, their presence is no more indicative of illness or lack of reality-
sense than is the presence of the Oedipus complex.  What will determine the 
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character of the individual’s psychology is the nature of these unconscious 
phantasies and how they are related to external reality. (p. 12)   
 
For Klein, phantasies are used both to give meaning to the external world and to 
incorporate and interpret external reality, so that the internal realm and the external world 
are mutually, interactively permeated with phantasy.  However, when adequate reality-
testing fails to develop and infantile phantasy remains omnipotent, the desire that gives 
rise to the phantasy is replaced by a  “compulsive and repetitive” delusion (Segal, 1997, 
pp. 91-92).  In Kleinian thought, the failure to acquire a capacity to negotiate between 
external reality and infantile, omnipotent phantasy is a developmental aberration that 
results in psychosis (Segal, 1997, p. 91).  In normal development, as phantasy becomes 
increasingly “adapted to reality,” phantasies become much less easily recognizable 
(Klein, 1932/1975, Vol. 2, p. 81), but the influence of phantasy, as constitutive of 
psychical reality, remains active throughout life.  In Kleinian psychoanalysis, “what 
matters” is how an event is “experienced in unconscious fantasy or psychic reality, and it 
is that experience that should be the focus of the interpretation” (Schafer, 1997b, p. 7).  
Klein called “early infantile thought…phantasy and assumed that it was closely 
linked to bodily experience” (Spillius, 2001, p. 365).  Phantasy is both the process and 
the product of a uniquely human mental process that is set in motion by the instincts or 
drives; it is the mental and emotional experience that accompanies somatic sensation 
(Hinshelwood, 1989, pp. 34-35). Phantasies exist “on the borderline between the somatic 
and the psychical” (Segal, 1973/1988, p. 13).  For example, Klein’s (1932/1975) case 
work with Trude (aged three years and nine months) illustrates how “aggressive trends 
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connected with the Oedipus conflict,” which surfaced when Trude was not yet two years 
old, provoked “very severe night terrors” which caused the girl to “run into her parent’s 
bedroom again and again at night without being able to say what it was she wanted” (Vol. 
2, p. 5).  Klein writes, 
 
Trude…repeatedly played ‘make-believe’ in her analysis that it was night-time 
and that we were both asleep.  She then used to come softly over to me from the 
opposite corner of the room (which was supposed to be her own bedroom) and 
threaten me in various ways, such as that she was going to stab me in the throat, 
throw me out of the window, burn me, take me to the police, etc.  She would want 
to tie up my hands and feet, or she would lift up the rug on the sofa and say she 
was doing ‘Po-Kaki-Kuki’.  This, it turned out, meant that she wanted to look 
inside her mother’s bottom for the “Kakis’ (faeces), which signified children to 
her…By analyzing her wetting and dirtying herself which stood for attacks upon 
her parents copulating with each other, these symptoms were removed.  Trude had 
wanted to rob her pregnant mother of her children, to kill her and to take her place 
in coitus with her father.  She was two years old when her sister was born.  It was 
those impulses of hatred and aggression which, in her second year, had given rise 
to an increasingly strong fixation upon her mother and to a severe anxiety and 
sense of guilt which found expression, among other things, in her night terrors. 
(Vol. 2, p. 4-5) 
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Via the play scenario in her analysis with Klein, we can see how Trude’s symptoms—
night terrors, bed-wetting and dirtying herself—are connected to the underlying drive. 
Aggressive instincts are manifested as impulses of hatred and violence, which give rise to 
Trude’s early Oedipal phantasy of attacking her rivals (her mother and, as a result, her 
siblings, signified by the feces inside her mother) so that she might possess her father.  
The phantasy is rich with somatic significations, but it also has its origins in somatic 
experiences.  Trude’s phantasy ideas represent anal aggressive instincts that surface in 
response to Oedipal frustration (jealousy sparked by her mother’s copulation with her 
father).  “Klein held that the child’s play expresses its preoccupations, conflicts and 
phantasies, and her technique consisted in analysing the play exactly as one analyses 
dreams and free associations, interpreting phantasies, conflicts and the defenses” (Segal, 
1973/1988, p. 42). 
Klein understood “the child’s play as the symbolization of his phantasies” (Segal, 
1973/1988, p. 9). “Phantasy emanates from within and imagines what is without, it offers 
an unconscious commentary on instinctual life and links feelings to objects and creates a 
new amalgam: the world of imagination” (J. Mitchell, 1986, p. 23).  J. Mitchell 
continues: “phantasy is both the activity and its products” (p. 23).  The child’s 
imaginative world is communicated via the symbolic activity of play. Through the 
process of creating and symbolically enacting phantasies, the child develops an ability to 
imaginatively equate objects.  This equation forms the basis of the capacity for symbol 
formation.  In Kleinian theory, unconscious symbolism provides the “essential link 
between primitive phantasy and…reality” (Segal, 1979/1989, p. 72).  Klein writes, “not 
only does symbolism come to be the foundation of all phantasy and sublimation but, 
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more than that, it is the basis of the subject’s relation to the outside world and to reality in 
general” (1932/1975, Vol. 1, p. 221). “A certain amount of anxiety is necessary to spur 
this development.  If the anxiety is excessive, however, the whole process of symbol-
formation comes to a stop” (Segal, 1973/1988, p. 5).  Addressing the anxiety connected 
to phantasy is a crucial objective of Kleinian psychoanalysis.  Klein (1932/1975) writes: 
“Once the child’s phantasy has become more free as a consequence of its lessened 
anxiety, we have not only gained access to its unconscious but have also mobilized in an 
ever greater degree, the means at its command for expressing its phantasies” (1932/1975, 
Vol. 2, p. 14). The means, as she explains in a footnote to this sentence, is speech, and 
she concludes her footnote by commenting, “I believe that no analysis of a child, 
whatever its age, can said to be really terminated unless the child has employed speech in 
analysis to its full capacity, for language constitutes the bridge to reality” (Vol. 2, p. 14, 
n. 1).   
In her case study of Dick, Klein (1930/1975) describes an example of such 
inability to tolerate anxiety and the resulting symptom of an inhibited capacity for symbol 
formation.  Profound anxiety stirred by internal aggression results in Dick’s rejection of 
language: 
 
In Dick’s phantasy faeces, urine and penis stood for objects with which to attack 
the mother’s body, and were therefore felt to be a source of injury to himself as 
well…Dick cut himself off from reality and brought his phantasy-life to a 
standstill by taking refuge in the phantasies of the dark, empty mother’s body.  He 
had thus succeeded in withdrawing his attention also from the different objects in 
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the outside world which represented the contents of the mother’s body—the 
father’s penis, faeces, children.  His own penis, as the organ of sadism, and his 
own excreta were to be got rid of (or denied) as being dangerous and aggressive. 
(Vol. 1, pp. 226-227)   
 
Dick dreaded his own aggression, which he linked to both the penis (his own and his 
father’s) and his excreta; likewise, he was terrified of the contents of his mother’s body 
(he fantasized that his father’s penis was inside his mother’s womb).  This anxiety caused 
him to empty the world (including his mother’s body) of its symbolic significance, a 
move that resulted in his profoundly underdeveloped capacity to partake in language.  
“Dick’s further development had come to grief because he could not bring into phantasy 
the sadistic relation to the mother’s body” (Vol. 1, pp. 224).   
Klein’s intervention with Dick went to the heart of the symbolic process: she 
named his fantasies for him by drawing him into symbolic play and then providing 
languaged accounts of the anxieties that gripped him.  She explains: 
 
I took a big train and put it beside a smaller one and called them “Daddy-train” 
and “Dick-train.”  Thereupon he picked up the train I called “Dick” and made it 
roll to the window and said “Station.” I explained: “The station is mummy; Dick 
is going into mummy.” He left the train, ran into the space between the outer and 
inner doors of the room, shut himself in, saying “dark” and ran out again directly.  
He went through this performance several times.  I explained to him, “It is dark 
inside mummy.  Dick is inside dark mummy.” (Vol. 1, p. 224-225) 
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Her interpretations constructed an account of his internal experience that Dick was not 
able to symbolize himself.  Klein writes, 
 
In general I do not interpret the material until it has found expression in various 
representations.  In this case, however, where the capacity to represent it was 
almost entirely lacking, I found myself obliged to make my interpretations on the 
basis of my general knowledge. (Vol. 1, pp. 228-229) 
 
Through interpreting the unconscious phantasy, Klein opens a space for Dick to tolerate 
his own feelings so that he might enter the shared reality of linguistic experience. Klein 
writes, “as his interests developed he at the same time enlarged his vocabulary” (p. 228).  
Klein’s work with Dick provides a specific clinical example of a Kleinian 
interpretation of phantasy, but it also demonstrates why she places such significance on 
interpreting the phantasy.  We see not only what Klein did, but also why: as a result of 
Klein’s interpretations, Dick’s anxiety is contained enough to allow him to enter the field 
of symbolic relations, which in turn provides the basis for continued psychic 
development.  Through Klein’s interpretation of the conflict at the center of Dick’s 
unconscious phantasies, his latent anxieties became manifest enough to allow him to 
continue to develop and engage with reality (“the working-over of this anxiety was 
beginning by way of the establishment of a symbolic relationship to things and objects” 
Vol. 1, p. 227).  Such intervention at the level of the unconscious phantasy is vital in 
Kleinian analysis: “In the course of development, and also in the course of a successful 
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analysis, a shift must be achieved from an archaic phantasy organization, which distorts 
perception and leads to compulsive action, to one allowing a greater capacity for reality 
testing” (Segal, 1997, p. 93).  Dick’s inhibition and delayed development was a defense 
against the phantasies that were a source of anxiety; making those phantasies symbolic, 
through interpretation, opened a path to reality. 
Understanding the role of phantasies in relation to the defenses is a key aspect of 
Kleinian theory and interpretive practice.  In addition to the possibility of retreat into 
phantasy, as was demonstrated by Dick’s rejection of symbolism and language, Klein 
also describes several standard or prototype phantasy structures operative in particular 
psychic defenses. “Certain phantasies…can function, as it were, as a defense” 
(Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 35).  Defense mechanisms, in Kleinian theory, are the enactment 
of particular infantile patterns of unconscious phantasies; they describe ways of relating 
to the object.  However, “what an observer can describe as a mechanism is experienced 
and described by the person himself as a detailed phantasy” (Segal, 1973/1988, p. 17).   
The atemporality of the phantasy accounts for this difference; unlike a repetition, which 
implies a pattern with a historical trajectory, the phantasy driving the defense is 
experienced as being fully of the present, despite its roots in infancy.  Kleinian defenses 
are “atemporal inhibitions of the ego,” unlike the Freudian defenses, which deal with the 
past, via “a return of that past” in the form of a symptom (J. Mitchell, 1998, p. 27).  Such 
“inhibitions of the ego,” or infantile states, correspond to certain phantasy structures that 
are characteristic of the primitive psychic positions: the paranoid-schizoid and the 
depressive positions.  “The externalization of the ‘bad’ object [projection] and the 
internalization of the ‘good’ object [introjection] are the prototype defense mechanisms” 
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(Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 36).  Exploring the relationship between introjection, projection, 
and phantasy, Klein (1959/1975, Vol. 3) writes, 
 
introjection and projection, though they are rooted in infancy, are not only 
infantile processes.  They are part of the infant’s phantasies, which in my view 
also operate from the beginning and help to mould his impression of his 
surroundings; and by introjection this changed picture of the external world 
influences what goes on in his mind.  Thus an inner world is built up which is 
partly a reflection of the external one.  That is to say, the double process of 
introjection and projection contributes to the interaction between external and 
internal factors.  This interaction continues throughout every stage of life….The 
processes of projection and introjection…have to be considered as unconscious 
phantasies. (p. 250)  
 
The phantasy that structures introjection as a defense is an infantile “impulse to suck dry, 
bite up, scoop out and rob the mother’s body of its good contents,” while projection 
“implies expelling dangerous substances (excrements) out of the self and into the mother” 
(Klein, 1946/1975, Vol. 3, p. 8).  Although these defenses form early, in infantile 
experience, they remain operative throughout life, particularly during moments of high 
stress or anxiety, when reality testing breaks down.   
The interface between the internal and external, via the defense mechanisms of 
introjection and projection, is both an unconscious phantasy-formation action and is 
comprised of an unconscious phantasy, on the level of content.  “A given individual’s use 
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of” the defense mechanisms “is expressed through a particular phantasy” (Spillius, 2001, 
p. 367).  Commenting on this relationship, Schafer (1997a) writes, “In Kleinian thought 
defensive operations are viewed as both expressions of unconscious phantasies and as 
mechanisms” (p. 73).  According to Schafer, this “two-pronged approach” in Kleinian 
psychoanalysis, which focuses on both the operation (or method) of the defense 
mechanisms and the content of the phantasy behind the defense mechanisms, marks a 
difference from Freudian theory, which deals only with the function and structure (the 
method) of the defense mechanisms (p. 73).  The theoretical principle that phantasy 
imparts the motivation for the defense leads to an emphasis, in Kleinian analytic 
technique, on interpreting the defenses. Schafer (1997b) states, “Kleinians are centrally 
oriented to the analysis of defense” (p. 17).  For Klein, the interpretation of defense 
mechanisms in analysis is also an interpretation of the unconscious fantasies that 
motivate such defenses. 
 
 
 
Section Four 
Transference and Interpretation 
 
 
Although it is true that Kleinians place a great emphasis on the interpretation of 
phantasy (including phantasy as it is manifest in the defenses), the nature of such 
interpretations—what exactly is interpreted in an interpretation of phantasy or an 
interpretation of the defense?—remains unclear without an understanding of the 
importance of transference in Kleinian psychoanalysis.  Just as Freud sought to 
understand and explain the evolving and highly charged relationship between patient and 
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analyst, Klein too paid particular attention to the transference relationship and theorized 
an essential link between the content of, or knowledge behind, interpretation and the 
transference relationship in the course of treatment. Even more so than Freud, Klein 
works with transference as a guide to both the timing and the content of psychoanalytic 
interpretations.  In fact, an “emphasis on the importance of transference interpretations is 
one of the distinctive features of the Kleinian approach” (Segal, 2004, p. 69).  Klein sees 
in analytic material, particularly in transference content, the same infantile states that she 
inferred (or constructed) based on the conflicts displayed in children’s play.  
Klein, unlike Freud, did not emphasize the transference as a past relationship to 
be reconstructed in the analysis.  Instead, she was interested in phantasies, primitive 
defense mechanisms, anxieties, and so forth that are currently lived out via transference 
in the relationship between analyst and analysand.  Transference is one of the primary 
vehicles for accessing and exploring the unconscious.  The transference, for her, is “an 
externalization of unconscious phantasy here and now in the analysis” (Bronstein, 1997, 
p. 38).  “Klein’s technique gives more weight to the transference than does classical 
Freudian technique.  The evolution of the transference in the psychoanalytic process, 
rather than the reconstruction of the past, became the centre of attention” (Segal, 
1979/1989, p. 163).  Kleinians mark their approach to transference as one of the major 
ways in which they have moved away from Freud’s original formulations.  “[Klein’s] 
emphasis is not, as in Freud’s work, on the reconstruction of a past relationship which is 
transferred onto the analyst, but rather on the development within the analytic setting of a 
relationship which displays all the mechanisms, anxieties, love, guilt, and phantasies 
which characterize the analysand’s way of dealing with life in the world outside” 
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(Mitchell 1986, in introduction to Origins of Transference, p. 201).  Transference is “not 
simply a repeat of some past event which can be reconstructed” (Hinshelwood, 1994, p. 
233-234).  In her theoretical work, Klein expanded the nature and importance of 
transference beyond Freud’s formulations of it, and shifted the emphasis away from 
transference as a repetition of the past to transference as a present enactment of conflicts 
and phantasies.  Transference is one of the key places where Klein’s role as an innovator 
of psychoanalytic theory is most apparent.   
The Kleinian view of transference interpretations stresses the simultaneity of past 
and present in the relationship between patient and analyst; Kleinians work with the “here 
and now” of the patient’s present conflicts (rather than concentrating on “genetic 
interpretations” that refer to the patient’s history) (Malcolm, 1986/1988, p. 73).  Although 
Klein retains Freud’s belief that transference contains an historical dimension, for her that 
historicity is important primarily insofar as it is brought into play in the here and now (the 
present).  “The practice of Kleinian psychoanalysis has become an understanding of the 
transference as an expression of unconscious phantasy, active right here and now in the 
moment of the analysis.  The transference is, however, moulded upon the infantile 
mechanisms with which the patient managed his experiences long ago” (Hinshelwood, 
1989, p. 465).  Elsewhere Hinshelwood (1994) writes, 
 
Transference is generated from the present use of historical defenses: in other 
words, the adult personality’s unconscious phantasies (which underlie all these 
defense mechanisms) is transferred from the present unconscious into the analytic 
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relationship—although, to be sure, the unconscious phantasy of the adult has been 
progressively elaborated out of the infant’s relations with objects. (p. 234) 
 
The infantile past shapes the phantasies and defenses of the adult, but what matters is not 
so much the historical influence or historical dimension, but the way the phantasies and 
defenses, which are shaped within a developmental trajectory, manifest in the present-
day, something which is known via the transference. 
“Transference,” in Kleinian psychoanalysis, is understood to be “an expression of 
unconscious phantasy” (Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 465). Klein extends the definition of 
transference beyond direct references to the analyst in material presented by the patient, 
to include a much broader and all-encompassing understanding of transference as present 
in all unconscious content.  The analytic field “covers all that lies between the current 
situation and the earliest experiences,” and in order to access “the earliest emotions and 
object-relations,” the analytic work must “examine their vicissitudes in the light of later 
developments” (Klein, 1952/1975, Vol. 3, p. 56).  The past does not trump the present for 
Klein, and any exploration of the unconscious (unconscious phantasy) will include a 
transferential dimension.  Klein writes that transference comprises a “total situation,” 
which includes “emotions, defenses, and object-relations” transferred from the past onto 
the present (Vol. 3, p. 55).  But with this phrase, “total situation,” Klein also highlights 
the enactment of a core, unconscious phantasy in all the material of a given analytic 
session (Vol. 3, p. 55).  For Klein, the “whole material presented”—including “reports of 
patients about everyday life, relations, and activities”—provides transference material 
about the unconscious phantasy (Vol. 3, p. 55).     
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Klein, like Freud, was aware of the importance of negotiating and managing the 
transference in relation to the process of making clinical interpretations.  Segal (1988) 
writes, “the interpretation of mechanisms of defense is often ineffective” until there is a 
transference component, so that the interpretation is “meaningful to the patient in terms 
of what he actually feels that he does to the analyst in the transference…whilst using 
these mechanisms of defense” (p. 18).  In an unpublished paper from 1943, Klein writes: 
 
From my work with children I came to certain conclusions which have to some 
extent influenced my technique with adults.  Take transference first.  I found that 
with children the transference (positive or negative) is active from the beginning 
of analysis, since for instance even an attitude of indifference cloaks anxiety and 
hostility.  With adults too I found that the transference situation is present from 
the start in one way or another, and I have come, therefore, to make use of 
transference interpretations early in analysis. (cited in Hinschelwood, 1989, p. 15) 
 
The transference reflects the patient’s infantile anxieties and other conflicts as they are 
manifest in the moment and therefore provides material upon which to base 
interpretations.   
 Klein’s formulation of transference interpretations, like other aspects of her 
analytic theory and methodology, both revises and modifies Freud’s theories.  Freud’s 
own difficult experience with encountering and seeking to make sense of transference 
phenomena not only pushed him to provide ways to understand how the interpretive 
process might account for and work with transference, but it also prompted later 
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revisionist theorists, such as Klein, to push analytic understanding further on this 
important aspect of the treatment.  What for Freud was an important, though it seems also 
perplexing and sometimes dangerous, aspect of the psychoanalytic encounter was for 
Klein a key tool for guiding the treatment process.  Psychoanalytic interpretive practice, 
for both Freud and Klein, includes a content-based understanding of the unconscious 
(both structurally and as it operates on an individual level); but it also requires 
understanding, negotiating, and using the transference to guide the analytic process.     
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Chapter Three 
Lacan and Interpretation 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Lacan introduced a radical new way of conceptualizing the psychoanalytic project 
that has had a deep impact on psychoanalytic practice throughout much of the world.  
However, for many in the Anglophone psychoanalytic community, Lacan’s work either 
remains largely unknown or is mysteriously obscure.  His work does not fit neatly into 
the trajectory of developments that characterizes the two dominant forms of 
psychoanalysis in the United States: conventional Freudian psychoanalysis and Ego 
Psychology (Anna Freud’s contribution to the field).  Nevertheless, Lacan’s influence on 
Continental and South American psychoanalysis is undeniable.  As a revisionist, Lacan 
initiated an interdisciplinary approach to psychoanalysis that engages influential 
theoretical concepts developed in other fields, including linguistics, philosophy, 
mathematics, and literature.   In particular, Lacan takes Anna O. (via Freud) at her word 
when she described psychoanalysis as “the talking cure,” seeing the analytic project as 
thoroughly linguistic in nature.  
Lacan’s return to Freud is not just an effort to restore attention to Freud’s original 
texts, but is also a critique of the psychoanalytic movement which Lacan feels has 
deviated from Freud’s original purpose.  As a revisionist, Lacan’s “style of presentation” 
is “so original” that it seems to “belie his modest claims to be a mere commentator” 
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(Evans, 1996, p. 68).  Lacan’s “so-called ‘return to Freud’ [does] not consist in a mere 
repetition of the Freudian hypotheses” but instead provides “the opportunity for a further 
theoretical elaboration and foundation of psychoanalytical experience” (Geerardyn, 1997, 
p. 159).  Lacan believes that “a return to the use of symbolic effects” will lead to a 
“renewed technique of interpretation” in psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1966/2002b, p. 81, 294 
in the original).  Like Klein, Lacan presents a reading of Freud that extends beyond the 
original to present an innovative, new way of understanding the analytic project.  
“Lacanian psychoanalysis might therefore be described as a ‘post-Freudian’ form of 
psychoanalysis, along with ego-psychology, Kleinian psychoanalysis and object-relations 
theory” (Evans, 1996, p. 68).   
If the infant or child is Klein’s organizing metaphor or interpretive trope, then 
language could be said to be Lacan’s (at least by the 1950’s).  This difference is reflected 
in both the theory itself and the writing style of the two authors.  While Klein relies on 
clinical case examples and explicit (oftentimes blunt) language to provide an account of 
her theoretical concepts, Lacan’s writing is labyrinthine and contains few case examples.  
Lacan’s interest in and appreciation of language is apparent both in the theoretical or 
philosophical nature of his account of psychoanalysis and in his writing style: his texts 
are at times poetic, at times ambiguous and perplexing, but rarely unequivocal. The word 
play, verbosity, and obscure references characteristic of Lacan’s writing style make his 
theoretical concepts notoriously difficult to pinpoint.  Overall, despite their shared 
background in psychoanalysis, Klein and Lacan are extremely different in their approach 
to explicating psychoanalytic theory.  This difference creates a difficulty for a reading 
such as this one, where the goal is to provide an outline or overview of the theory that 
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opens the way for comparisons with other psychoanalytic schools of thought.  The 
challenge is to create a reading of Lacan’s work on interpretation that respects his 
polyvalent style, yet which also extracts enough of a synopsis that a space is opened 
where meaningful dialogue might occur despite such differences in style.  Rather than 
force or compel a transparent and univocal summary of what is presented as purposefully 
opaque, I will attempt to construct a reading of Lacan’s writings on interpretation that 
seeks to appreciate Lacan’s dialogic style while nevertheless communicating what I hope 
is a reasonable overview or account of his theory. My approach will not provide an 
historical account of the developments and modifications in Lacan’s thinking as it 
progressed throughout his writings, but will instead draw concurrently from various 
phases or periods of Lacan’s work. Although a more historical account allows more room 
for a detailed or nuanced juxtaposition of various concepts, my goal here is to synthesize 
and simplify enough to facilitate a general dialogue. See Nobus (2000), “Chapter 4: 
Tactics of interpretation” (pp. 153-183), for an excellent reading of the alterations in 
Lacan’s formulations of interpretation in various phases of his work. 
 
  
 
Section One 
Psychoanalytic Epistemology 
 
 
In the previous chapters of this dissertation I explored the hermeneutic 
epistemology that grounds psychoanalytic methodology.  In the writings of both Freud 
and Klein, I locate a critical interpretive practice at work in relation to the unconscious.  
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As Freud first formulated it, the unconscious has a metaphorical, or “as if,” quality: he 
describes this unknown, unconscious aspect of human ontology via various metaphors or 
tropes that shift and evolve throughout his writings.  Likewise, Klein’s formulation of the 
nature of the unconscious continues this process of developing psychoanalytic theory by 
exploring the unconscious through the trope of infantile and childhood experience.  Just 
as Freud, and later Klein, encountered certain clinical phenomena that motivated the 
construction of additional psychoanalytic theoretical concepts, Lacan too formulated 
additional theoretical models based both on his clinical experiences and on philosophic 
insights that were intended to further the psychoanalytic project of understanding the 
mind.  These theoretical constructions (that go beyond empirical observation) add to the 
psychoanalytic understanding of the mechanisms of the mind on a structural level, by 
introducing new concepts to the framework of (or system of tropes that is) 
psychoanalysis.  
As psychoanalytic epistemology has developed, the particular methods and 
methodological principles for accessing unconscious knowledge have also been revised 
and elaborated.  In reading both Freud and Klein as revisionist thinkers—Freud 
repeatedly revised his own theories, and Klein later added her own modifications to 
Freudian psychoanalysis—I chart an evolving epistemology that is an essential aspect or 
defining feature of psychoanalysis.  Lacan’s revisionist formulations can be placed 
alongside the metaphors or tropes articulated by both Freud and Klein as key aspects of 
this evolving epistemology.  Lacan’s most important contribution to this evolving 
psychoanalytic epistemology is the introduction of innovative explanations or 
descriptions of the nature of the unconscious.  In Lacan’s work, the unconscious is 
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explored through the metaphor of language.  Indeed, one of his core theoretical concepts 
is that “the unconscious is structured like a language” (Lacan 1973/1981, p. 20), and 
therefore psychoanalysis must be approached and understood in terms of linguistics.  The 
metaphorical structure of language—words refer to, or are defined through, other words 
in an endless stream of signifiers—is also “inherent in the unconscious” (Lacan, 
1973/1981, p. 247).  The unconscious is “primarily linguistic” according to Lacan 
(Evans, 1996, p. 218).  By defining the unconscious as the function or effects of the 
signifier (or symbolic) on the subject, Lacan points to the “exteriority” of the 
unconscious, locating the unconscious outside of the individual (p. 218).  In so doing, he 
presents a socially constructed unconscious that is quite different from the interior 
unconscious presented by Klein. Lacan writes, “the exteriority of the symbolic in relation 
to man is the very notion of the unconscious” (cited in Evans, 1996, p. 218).  The 
Kleinian unconscious develops as an internal response to the external world, whereas for 
Lacan the unconscious is in language and therefore predates—and even forms—the 
subject.  As a result, there is no preverbal unconscious (as there is in Klein’s work) in 
Lacanian theory.  This formulation of the unconscious has far reaching theoretical (and 
practical) consequences for understanding interpretive methodology in Lacanian theory.   
Lacan’s work is marked by “the linguistic turn” that shaped 20th century critical 
thought.  “The linguistic turn” refers to the influential philosophical premise that 
language constructs and reproduces reality, such that nothing can be known or 
experienced outside of language.  This assertion, which is rooted in the philosophical 
linguistics of Wittgenstein (1953/1999), Saussure (1916/1983), and Austin (1962), is a 
foundational concept in post-structuralism and has impacted all areas of the humanities 
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and social theory.  Working within this philosophical context, Lacan provides a 
linguistics-based description of psychoanalysis. He writes, “Bringing psychoanalytic 
experience back to speech and language as its foundations is of direct concern to its 
technique” (Lacan, 1966/2002b, p. 76, p. 289 in original).  To understand psychoanalytic 
technique, as formulated by Lacan, we must accept that psychoanalysis is a language-
based phenomenon. Burgoyne (1997), clarifying in plain terms the linguistic facet of the 
Lacanian position, explains: 
 
Words constitute the basic vehicle of the psychoanalytic situation: they are the 
means by which a symptom and its underlying structure are analyzed, and as a 
result they are the heart of the question of interpretation.  (p. 45) 
 
Likewise, Lacan (1966/2002b) writes, “psychoanalysis has but one medium: the patient’s 
speech” (p. 40, p. 247 in original).  Throughout his work, Lacan attempts to describe and 
account for the nature of this medium and the psychoanalyst’s role in relation to the 
patient’s speech. 
For Lacan, as for Freud and Klein, the unconscious is a key, governing force in 
the analysand’s life. In keeping with Freud’s psychoanalytic ontology, according to 
Lacan there is something radically unknown, alienating, or other, about being human. 
Lacan describes this unconscious component of ontology in terms of an otherness that is 
constituted in and through language.  This otherness can be understood to be both an 
effect of and a stance within language. “The subject’s unconscious,” writes Lacan, “is the 
Other’s discourse” (1966/2002b, p. 55, p. 265 in original) and the Other is “the locus in 
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which speech is constituted” (1981/1993, p. 274).21  In other words, “the unconscious 
consists of those words which come from some other place than ego talk” or conscious 
communication (Fink, 1995, p. 4).  Language (which includes speech) is beyond 
conscious control. Just as we must use the language into which we are born (we speak 
our mother tongue), so too does this language use us, communicating via speech 
unconscious desires not tied to the ego or self.  Such communications happen despite our 
conscious intentions.  This Other discourse speaks through us without our conscious 
assent, naming desires that inhabit us even though they are not experienced as being a 
part of us.  Psychoanalysis, according to Lacan, is fundamentally interested in this Other 
discourse; therefore, to encounter the unconscious we must pay close attention to 
language (both structurally and at the level of technique). 
Before addressing Lacanian interpretive technique or interpretive methodology, I 
want to explore what it means that Lacan places language at the center of psychoanalysis.  
To do this, we must be aware of how language is understood within linguistics.  Although 
this may seem to take us away from the topic, it is central to understanding the Lacanian 
formulation of psychoanalysis.   Within Saussurian linguistics, language is understood to 
be a formal system of organized differences (Saussure, 1916/1983). “Lacan takes up 
Saussure’s theory that language is a structure composed of differential elements” but 
modifies it by stressing that “the basic unit of language is not the sign but the signifier” 
(Evans, 1996, p. 97).  This modification marks a shift away from Saussure’s notion that 
                                                 
21 The capital “O” in “Other” is meant to designate the otherness “in the function of speech” (Lacan, 
1978/1988, p. 236) and can be distinguished from “the little other who is not really other, but a reflection 
and a projection of the ego” (Evans, 1996, p. 133).  The otherness designated by the capital letter (Other) 
has the characteristic of radical alterity or that which is completely beyond the self, whereas the other with 
a little “o” is the otherness of another person (which includes a projection of the self).    
116 
 
 
there is a fixed relationship or correspondence between the signified (for example, the 
object being named) and signifier (the word that represents the object), to the idea that 
signifiers produce the signified.  Lacan’s distinction is important because it highlights the 
primacy of the signifier over the signified (for example, any connection between an 
object and its name/label is determined by the word, not the object itself).  Signifiers are 
the basic unit of language, according to Lacan, and they operate according to certain 
laws.  The laws that govern the signifier are what provide the structure of language: 
language can be understood to be a structure of signifiers.   
This linguistic background is important for understanding the link Lacan makes 
between language and the unconscious.  Lacan “argues that the unconscious is, like 
language, a structure of signifiers” (Evans, 1996, p. 97).   Lacan’s notion that the 
unconscious is organized via certain structural characteristics (according to the same laws 
that govern language) is crucial.  Such laws include “the manner in which the various 
lexicological and grammatical elements are organized, the manner in which the 
significations refer to each other, the employment of usages” and so forth (Lacan, 
1978/1988b, p. 278); these abstract organizing features (as opposed to the specific laws 
that make up a particular language system, such as English, French, or Latin) constitute 
the structure of language. Because it is structured like a language, the unconscious uses 
the organizing characteristics of language--the laws that govern the nature and function of 
signifiers within a language--to give voice to those desires that the subject cannot know 
consciously.  Following Freud’s discovery that the unconscious operates via a process of 
distortion, Lacan suggests that such distortions follow the same rules that govern 
language.  A ciphering (or encryption) takes place in the unconscious, whereby desires 
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are hidden from conscious awareness. Manifest content (for example: the dream, the slip 
of the tongue, and other instances in which the unconscious speaks) can be understood to 
be latent content (unconscious desire) that has been ciphered.  Analysis, therefore, 
requires a deciphering process based on the laws (or encryption algorithms) of language.  
“Language in the unconscious, and as the unconscious, ciphers.  Analysis thus entails a 
significant deciphering process” (Fink, 1995, p. 21).  
We are now better equipped to understand the link between the linguistic 
principles explored above and Lacanian psychoanalytic interpretive technique.  Lacan 
calls for a “renewed technique of interpretation” through “a return to the use of symbolic 
effects” (1966/2002b, p. 81, p. 294 in original). By “technique” Lacan does not mean a 
code of conduct or rules for interpreting.  Lacan distinguishes between a practical 
formalization, which lays out “a [set of rules] regarding what is done and what is not 
done” (1966/2006b, p. 324 in the original) and theoretical formalization, which outlines 
the formal structures of linguistic practices. According to Lacan, interpretive technique 
requires the latter: an understanding of the formal structures of language.  Just as Freud 
denounced the symbolic and decoding methods of dream interpretation, Lacan rejects the 
notion that interpretation can be based on symbols or follow a fixed code, even if that 
code were to be based on Freud’s own analytic practices.  We are not meant to copy 
Freud’s interpretive content.  Lacan writes, 
 
The point here is not to imitate him [Freud].  In order to rediscover the effect of 
Freud’s speech, I won’t resort to its terms but rather to the principles that govern 
it. (1966/2002b, p. 78, p. 292 in original) 
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Deciphering the unconscious requires knowledge of the principles that govern the 
ciphering process, but such laws do not reveal meaning or content.  Instead, the 
associative chain (the speech-based phenomenon Freud discovered and termed “free 
association” as a method for accessing the unconscious), which functions through the 
slippage inherent in the signifier, provides the guide and material for the unfolding 
analytic encounter.  
Having explored the theoretical principles behind Lacan’s claim that “the 
unconscious is structured like a language” (1973/1981, p. 20), I would now like to 
address what this means for interpretive methodology in Lacanian analytic practice.  The 
theoretical formulations Lacan introduces to the psychoanalytic field, from his over-
arching connection of the unconscious to language to his various descriptions of 
particular facets of psychic life, all function as new tropes or metaphors for describing the 
nature of the mind.  Lacan draws from Freud’s categories (he directly addresses issues 
such as interpretive methodology, reconstruction, fantasy and transference), but he also 
introduces much new terminology and moves beyond Freudian categories and vocabulary 
by presenting novel ways of describing psychic life.  Concepts such as “the discourse of 
the analyst,” “the divided subject,” “object a,” “the real,” etc. require engaging with 
Lacan in terms unique to his discourse.   
Lacan most fully describes how the analyst positions him or herself in the 
discourse of the analytic encounter through his formulation of the analyst’s discourse. 
Lacan’s conception of the analyst’s discourse does not describe what an analyst should 
say; rather it theorizes a particular kind of  “social link, founded on language” and 
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elaborates how such discourse is related to truth and desire (Lacan, 1975/1998, p. 17). 
This concept provides a way to look at Lacan’s understanding of the relationship between 
knowledge and the analytic process. The analyst’s discourse, for Lacan, is not a 
prescriptive formula, but instead is one of several (Lacan explicitly theorized four: the 
discourse of the master, the discourse of the university, the discourse of the hysteric, and 
the analyst’s discourse) structural possibilities within language.  Lacan represents each of 
the discourses with an algorithm which includes the following algebraic symbols: S1 (the 
master signifier), S2 (knowledge), $ (the divided subject), and a (the cause of desire) 
(Evans, 1996, p. 44). The algorithm for the analyst’s discourse (Lacan, 1975/1998, p. 91): 
a  →   $ 
 S2  S1 
is meant to represent through a formula the way these four components relate to become 
the discourse of the analyst.  The a represents the cause of desire, in this case the analyst 
as the cause of desire (for example, the analyst must represent the desire for more 
analytic material, the desire that the analysand speak his or her associations aloud).  This 
desire “interrogates” the divided subject ($) (Lacan, 1975/1998, p. 91), which invariably 
causes the divided subject to produce more associations.  This does not mean that the 
analyst cross-examines everything the patient says, but instead questions the relationship 
between what is said and the unconscious (by listening for the ways the unconscious 
speaks despite conscious or intentional speech).  Lacan refers to the subject as “divided” 
because the subject is split between the conscious ego and the unconscious: this split 
means the subject is intrinsically alienated from his or her own being (Fink, 1995).   
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The result of the desire-driven interrogation that provokes or causes the patient’s 
free associations is the production of the master signifier (S1). The master signifier is “the 
nonsensical signifier, the signifier with no rhyme or reason” (Fink, 1995, p. 131).22  
Lacan (1991/2006) writes of the analytic process, the analysand “is asked to abandon all 
other reference than that of the four walls that surround him and to produce signifiers that 
constitute this free association that is, in a word, master of the field” (p. 37 in original).  
The associative chain leads to the “master signifier.”  We might also think of it as the 
place in the associative chain at which there is a failure to make meaning, where things 
only make “half-sense” (Lacan, 1975/1998, p. 80) and the associations come to a 
grinding halt (Fink, 1995, p. 135).  However, despite its “stupidity” (Lacan, 1975/1998, 
p. 13), the master signifier is significant because it is the signifier by which the divided 
subject’s “relation to truth” is “resolved” (Lacan, 1975/1998, p. 91).  The knowledge (S2) 
produced in analytic work “is unconscious knowledge” (Fink, 1995, p. 136). The S2 is the 
addition of a new signifier, a signifier unlike the S1’s that comprise the analysand’s 
associations.  Some symbolized bit of knowledge of the unconscious is revealed in 
arriving at the new signifier produced in analytic work, the S2 (Geerardyn, 1997, p. 163).  
This does not mean that the unconscious is slowly territorialized via naming or 
signification through the process of psychoanalysis; on the contrary, the knowledge 
produced via analytic discourse is an enigmatic encounter with the Other.  Lacan asks, 
“How can we know without knowing?” and replies, “it’s an enigma” (1991/2006, p. 39 in 
                                                 
22 The master signifier is a particularly insistent and consequential signifier that reappears (perhaps in 
multiple forms) in the signifiers the analysand produces in the treatment (in the free associations, 
symptoms, dreams, slips of the tongue, etc.).  
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the original).23  Unconscious knowledge is an enigma because it can only be “half-said” 
(p. 39 in the original), which means it is never fully known. 
The analyst’s discourse results in a “half-said” truth and Lacan defines such “half-
said” truth as an interpretation.  He writes: “knowledge as truth—this defines what the 
structure of what we call an interpretation must be” (Lacan, 1991/2006, p. 39 in the 
original).  “The value of an interpretation does not lie in its correspondence with reality, 
but simply in its power to produce certain effects; an interpretation may therefore be 
inexact, in the sense of not corresponding to ‘the facts,’ but nevertheless true, in the sense 
of having powerful symbolic effects” (Evans, 1996, p. 89).  Lacan is not interested in a 
kind of truth that can be empirically validated; instead, he argues for the kind of truth that 
makes narrative sense. However, the sense-making must be in the context of the patient’s 
particular associative material, not in the form of an understanding located in the analyst: 
that kind of understanding implies “a kind of listening that seeks only to fit the other’s 
speech into a preformed theory” (Evans, 1996, p. 89).  Lacan warns, “we always 
understand too much, especially in analysis” (1978/1988b, p. 103).  Explaining further, 
Lacan writes, “To interpret and to imagine one understands are not at all the same things.  
It is precisely the opposite. I would go so far as to say that it is on the basis of a kind of 
refusal of understanding that we push open the door to analytic understanding” 
(1975/1988a, p. 73).  Lacan does not suggest that the analyst need make logical sense or 
generate an account of the unconscious based on insight, but rather that an interpretation 
facilitates the analysand’s encounter with his or her own unconscious.  He writes, “The 
                                                 
23 Lacan, like Freud, describes psychoanalysis as a process of making the unconscious conscious, while at 
the same time theorizing the unknown unconscious as a fundamental feature of human ontology. 
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effect of interpretation is to isolate in the subject a kernel…of non-sense,” but this “does 
not mean that interpretation is in itself nonsense” (1973/1981, p. 250).  
Lacan’s version of analytic “stupidity” (Lacan, 1975/1998) might be read as a 
reformulation of Freud’s interpretive methodology.  Following Freud’s lead, Lacan 
presents analytic interpretation as a methodology rather than a sense-making production 
of a symbolic or coded meaning (Evans, 1996).  Freud pushes the analyst to find more 
meaning in the dream, the symptom, and the slip of the tongue, and Lacan takes this 
further, suggesting the analyst assume the position of a “dummy” (Fink, 2004).  Fink 
(2004) writes,  
 
According to Lacan, the kind of interpretations Freud made went well beyond 
what contemporary analysts offer up…for example, Freud went out on a limb and 
divined events in the Rat Man’s past that must have occurred, this divination 
having little to do originally with the hic et nunc (here and now) of the 
transferential situation, but being based, rather, on the larger symbolic frame of 
the Rat Man’s life.  Freud, Lacan argues, knew how to situate himself as Other 
and interpret from that place, foreshadowing Lacan’s own notion about how that 
place can be occupied by un mort, that is, a dead man or a dummy. (p. 9)  
 
In addressing the place in which the analyst should be positioned, Lacan explores the 
knowledge (or more rightly the lack thereof) upon which interpretations are based. The 
analyst does not create meanings, but instead upsets meanings, through the use of 
“linguistricks.”  “Linguistricks” is Lacan’s term for the ways the analyst makes use of the 
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signifier, via techniques such as punctuation and punning, thereby opening the space for 
the analysand to have his or her own encounter with more meaning (Lacan, 1975/1998; 
Fink, 2002). Lacan writes, “It is the subject’s refusal of this meaning that poses a problem 
for him.  This meaning must not be revealed to him: it must be assumed by him” 
(1975/1988a, p. 29).  The value of the interpretation is not found in the formulation itself; 
instead, the value is found in how an interpretation impacts the process by subverting and 
unfastening the ways the analysand already understands, so that something new can 
happen and a form of acceptance or incorporation might take place.24  This then can be 
understood to be the methodology behind Lacanian interpretation: it is a type of 
intervention that upsets understanding rather than offering a type of meaning that is 
achieved through understanding. 
The extent to which Lacan’s methodology differs from Freud’s methodology (as I 
understand it) is unclear.  In the first section of this dissertation I described Freudian 
psychoanalysis as an inherently interpretive discipline, in which narrative or descriptive 
truths and an interest in symbolic forms are favored over a search for causal truths; I 
described this as a hermeneutic methodology. According to Nobus (2000), however, “the 
theory of interpretation [Lacan] developed from the mid-1960s was radically anti-
hermeneuticist” (p. 175).  This assessment is based on Lacan’s stance that interpretation 
does not aim toward making meaning.  My sense of this distinction is that Lacan is 
attempting to highlight the unsettling nature of psychoanalytic interpretation and critique 
the claims of authority that might accompany interpretations focused on assigning 
meaning.  In this way, Lacan can be read as critiquing both Freud and Klein. 
                                                 
24 In Lacanian interpretation, the subject “assume[s],” owns, or takes upon him/herself the symbolic effects. 
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Elsewhere Lacan likens the interpretive process in psychoanalysis to the textual 
analysis characteristic of literary criticism.  Lacan writes, “Commenting on a text is like 
doing an analysis” (1975/1988a, p. 73).  In fact, Lacan proposes training in literature and 
language as a part of analytic training.  He writes, “To be taught and learned, this 
technique would require profound assimilation of the resources of a language [langue], 
especially those that are concretely realized in its poetic texts” (Lacan, 1966/2002b, p. 81, 
p. 295 in the original).  This, according to Lacan, is both in keeping with Freud’s own 
training and areas of expertise (Freud was well read, a “man of letters”) and is necessary 
to develop the skill required for analytic listening.  Lacan stresses that interpretations 
must be based on the analyst’s close attention to the wording of the associations, a 
process similar to the way the textual critic attends to the working of a text.  This 
metaphor of textual criticism highlights the importance of attending to language in 
Lacanian analytic practice, but it also addresses the issue of truth-value in relation to 
psychoanalytic interpretations.  The textual critic’s work relies on an inexhaustible 
interpretive process.  This interpretive process is very different from the controlled 
experimentation designed to uncover empirical truths that is characteristic of the 
scientific method. Texts remain open to additional interpretations even after a brilliant 
interpretation has been written.  There is never a definitive interpretation in the field of 
textual analysis.25  However, this does not mean that any and all interpretations are 
equally valuable.  “Not every random bit of language has the same value for the subject” 
(Lacan, 1978/1988b, p. 278).  In psychoanalysis, the value of an interpretation lies in the 
effect it has on the analysand as subject (in textual analysis the value is often judged in 
                                                 
25 Shakespearean literary critics, for example, continue to construct interpretations of the bard’s work 
despite hundreds of years of commentary pre-dating their intervention in the field.   
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terms of the effect it has on, or value it has for, the audience).  Analytic interpretations 
are intended to have an effect:  “In order for the analyst’s message to respond to the 
subject’s profound questioning, the subject must understand it as a response that concerns 
him alone” (Lacan, 1966/2002b, p.78).  
Interpretations must arrive at something real or genuine about the divided subject 
who, as a result of the unconscious, is alienated.  In Lacanian terms, interpretation “hits 
the real” (Fink, 1997, p. 47).  Interpretations articulate something that has not yet entered 
the symbolic realm; putting into words something real for the patient which had 
previously existed outside of language or that which might be said. “The Lacanian real, 
as manifested in the patient’s discourse, is that which makes the analysand come back to 
the same subject, event, or notion over and over, revolve around it endlessly, and feel 
unable to move on” (Fink, 1997, p. 48).  The analyst’s task is to listen for this real in the 
analysand’s discourse and when necessary intervene through interpretations that bring 
something of the real into the symbolic.  This means that the interpretation must be 
addressed directly to the subject’s individual being.  Interpretation proceeds from the 
ontological, structural fact that the unconscious results in alienation (on this level, the 
unconscious is a general truth), but is nevertheless particular (the unconscious discourse 
that concerns psychoanalytic technique is always focused on the individual, particular, 
personal associations of a given analysand). Lacan writes, “Analysis can have as its goal 
only the advent of true speech and the subject’s realization of his history in its relation to 
a future” (1966/2002b, p. 86).  In the following section, I will explore further Lacan’s 
formulation of the role of history and its impact on analytic interpretive methodology. 
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Section Two 
Constructing Meaning 
 
 
 Freud explored reconstruction in psychoanalysis as a way to address the issue of 
history in the form of forgotten, inaccessible memories. He proposed that an aspect of 
psychoanalytic interpretive methodology includes the construction of imagined 
(hypothetical), narrative truths regarding unconscious memories.  For Freud, such 
narrative truths extend beyond empirical “data” to fill in a piece of missing history.  
Lacan reformulates Freud’s work on reconstruction by understanding the process in terms 
of the linguistic structure of the unconscious. In this way, Lacan’s approach to 
construction, like Klein’s, is a revision of Freudian theory.  However, although both 
theorists consider themselves to be revising Freud’s work, Lacan’s approach to historical 
clinical material differs significantly from Klein’s.  Whereas Kleinian interpretive 
practice rests on a theoretical reconstruction of preverbal, infantile experience and a focus 
on the here and now based on the conviction that the past is perpetually present, Lacan’s 
approach to memory is tied to his theory of the function of language.  Lacan uses 
language, in particular his formulation of the symbolic order, as a theoretical construct 
that guides the level of practice or technique.  For him, the process of reconstructing the 
analysand’s past in the present requires both a theoretical understanding of the field of 
language and an aptitude for attending, in analytic practice, to the concrete, idiosyncratic, 
and personal use and function of the signifiers that constitute the analysand’s speech.  
Through language analytic work is able to access and narrate unconscious history.  
Memory, for Lacan, is a symbolic process that “involves the patient tracing the master 
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signifiers of his life” (Evans, 1996, p. 162).  Lacan criticizes Klein’s approach to 
reconstructing preverbal memories (both in her treatment practice, as recorded in her case 
examples, and in her formulations of theory), seeing Klein’s work as located in the 
imaginary (Lacan, 1975/1988a).  For Lacan, the imaginary order is a realm separate from 
the signifier, or symbolic order.  The imaginary is the realm of  images (whether visual, 
tactile, olfactory, or auditory) and of the signified, while the symbolic is the sphere of the 
signifier.  
In the previous section of this chapter, I explored Lacan’s understanding of the 
signified (for example, the object as what is named by the signifier) as an effect of (or as 
constituted by) the signifier.26  Although we imagine the preverbal existence of objects 
prior to their being named, Lacan theorizes this as a function of the imaginary realm, and 
argues that in truth, the signifier has “logical priority” (Evans, 1996, p. 186), such that the 
symbolic constitutes what is knowable in language (which includes anything we might 
articulate about subjectivity).   Therefore, for Lacan, the symbolic order must be the 
focus of psychoanalytic work.  He writes, 
 
Freud’s discovery was that of the field of the effects, in man’s nature, of his 
relations to the symbolic order and the fact that their meaning goes all the way 
back to the most radical instances of symbolization in being.  To ignore the 
symbolic order is to condemn Freud’s discovery to forgetting and analytic 
experience to ruin. (Lacan, 1966/2002b, p. 63) 
 
                                                 
26 Lacan’s explanation of the relationship between signified and signifier was a major reformulation of 
Sausserian linguistics and can be understood to be a part of the movement termed “the linguistic turn.” 
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Lacan criticizes psychoanalysis for losing sight of Freud’s most basic discovery.  “The 
Kleinian school,” writes Lacan, has “failed to even glimpse the category of the signifier” 
(1966/2002a, p. 260).  With her focus on preverbal, pre-Oedipal stages of development, 
and her associated approach to object-relations, Klein theorizes an unconscious infantile 
experience that exists prior to language but which can nevertheless be reconstructed via 
adult language.  Lacan has a radically different definition of the unconscious.  According 
to him, preverbal experience is imaginary, and predates the unconscious.  “For Lacan 
there are no pre-verbal areas of the unconscious, since the unconscious is a linguistic 
structure” (Evans, 1996, p. 93).  The unconscious is a linguistic structure consisting of 
repressed signifiers. 
Because, according Lacan, the only access we have to the unconscious is via 
language, the only understanding we have of past events is through recollection, which 
for Lacan is a symbolic process.  Lacan writes, “the remembering [ḿemoration] at stake 
in the unconscious—and I mean the Freudian unconscious—is not related to the register 
that is assumed to be that of memory, insofar as memory is taken to be a property of 
living being” (1966/2006a, p. 42 in the original).  The kind of remembering Lacan is 
interested in is distinguished from the evoking and reliving of past experiences and the 
habitual memory that is “a property of living being.”27  Instead of passively reminiscing 
and uncovering forgotten events, he is interested in memory that is actively reconstructed 
and subjectified.  He writes, 
 
                                                 
27 The memory that is assumed to be part of living being generally is the biological form of memory: for 
example, the memory referred to in discussion of grey matter or animal memory.  This is not the kind of 
memory Lacan is interested in. 
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the fact that the subject relives, comes to remember, in the intuitive sense of the 
word, the formative events of his existence, is not in itself so very important.  
What matters is what he reconstructs of it. (Lacan, 1975/1988a, p. 13) 
 
Lacan theorizes that the remembering and reconstruction that are part of psychoanalytic 
work must be understood in terms of the memory that is a structural part of the 
unconscious.  The laws or rules that structure the unconscious constitute “a type of 
memory [in which] the past is recorded in the chain itself” (Fink, 1995, p. 19).  The 
symbolic order ciphers reality according to syntactic laws that determine what is yet to 
come (what is possible) (Fink, 1995, p. 19).  In other words, the past is always operative 
in structuring the present and future because it exists in the laws that organize the 
symbolic. 
The distinction between recollection and reminiscence has practical implications 
for psychoanalytic interpretive technique.  Because psychoanalysis is concerned with 
accessing the unconscious, Lacan theorizes that recollection (which happens through 
tracing the signifiers that surface in the analysand’s free associations), as opposed to 
reminiscing about the past, is the process whereby an unconscious history is integrated by 
the subject.   Lacan writes “the dimension proper to analysis,” or the realm of 
psychoanalytic treatment, “is the reintegration by the subject of his history right up to the 
furthermost perceptible limits” (1975/1988a, p. 12).  He continues, 
 
The restitution of the subject’s wholeness appears in the guise of a restoration of 
the past.  But the stress is always placed more on the side of reconstruction than 
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on that of reliving….The precise reliving—that the subject remembers something 
as truly belonging to him, as having truly been lived through, with which he 
communicates, and which he adopts—we have the most explicit indication in 
Freud’s writing that that is not what is essential.  What is essential is 
reconstruction, the term he employs right up until the end. (Lacan, 1975/1988a, p. 
14)  
 
Lacan follows Freud in stressing the importance of reconstruction but formulates the 
process through terms that fit his innovations.  Within Lacanian terminology, the 
recollection of the past is a form of reconstruction.  At times such reconstructions are 
spoken by the analyst, in the form of an interpretation, but the reconstruction itself—
whether articulated by the analyst or the analysand—involves tracing the signifiers that 
surface in the analysand’s free associations.  In deciphering the master signifiers, 
something new is symbolized: knowledge based on a “half-said” truth (the S2 explored in 
the previous section of this chapter).  Because signifiers (and especially master signifiers) 
are ciphered according to historically derived laws, there is always a component of 
recollection in accessing the unconscious.  However, in seeking “the path of restitution of 
the subject’s history,” psychoanalysis seeks a “history [that] is not the past,” per se, but 
“is the past in so far as it is historicized in the present” (Lacan, 1975/1988a, p. 12).  This 
past historicized in the present involves “rewriting history” (Lacan, 1975/1988a, p. 14).  
There is a retroactive, meaning-making process at work in Lacan’s notion of history.  
“When all is said and done, it is less a matter of remembering than of rewriting history” 
(Lacan, 1975/1988a, p. 14).   
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Section Three 
Fantasy and Interpretation 
 
 
  
 Rewriting history includes a process of reconstructing the analysand’s 
unconscious “fundamental fantasy.”28  Following Freud’s lead, Lacan works from the 
basic psychoanalytic premise that unconscious fantasies dynamically organize psychical 
reality.  In the first chapter of this dissertation, I explored Freud’s formulation of an 
unconscious fantasy structure that functions as a master narrative, arranging psychical 
experience according to a highly personal and unique logic that defies the rules of 
rationality, to shape the analysand’s relationship to reality.   Lacan’s fundamental fantasy 
is the equivalent of Freud’s unconscious, narrative fantasy system.  According to Lacan, 
the fundamental fantasy—the definitive fantasy structure that organizes the many 
possible particular fantasy scenarios produced by the subject—becomes inflexible and 
constricting and therefore must be loosened or released through the signifying process 
that takes place in psychoanalysis.  Such freeing happens through a two-part process of 
traversing or passing through the preexisting fantasy, together with the “construction in 
the course of analysis of a new ‘fundamental fantasy’” (Fink, 1995, p. 62).  One way to 
think about this twofold process is in terms of a clarification, in which, through the 
analytic encounter, the fantasy structure that had dominated the analysand’s unconscious 
experience is both articulated and, as a result of this discursive clarification, modified via 
an associated reconstruction or working-through of the fantasy structure.  Such 
                                                 
28 This is a concept that Lacan begins to develop a few years after many of the texts I have been citing thus 
far, and emphasizes most in the 1960’s. 
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reconstruction includes an interpretive elaboration that profoundly alters the preexisting 
fantasy structure. 
Lacan’s formulation of fantasy goes beyond a description of fantasy as it appears 
in specific instances (for example, a particular fantasy or wish underlying a dream, a 
hallucinatory or day-dream fantasy, or a fantasy about relationships manifest in a 
transference response in the treatment) because it formulates the underlying structure that 
produces each fantasy manifestation.  Lacan theorizes the existence of a fundamental 
organizing configuration for fantasy that is based on his structuralist understanding of the 
unconscious.  For him, each particular fantasy is brought about or caused by a 
foundational fantasy about his or her relation to the Other that is unique to each subject. 
For Lacan, the fundamental fantasy is “the subject’s most profound relation to the Other’s 
desire” (Fink, 1995, p. 62).  In this conceptualization, fantasy is born of the subject’s 
relationship with the Other.   
Lacan provides a formula for fantasy: $ ◊ a, which can be translated into the 
narrative, “the divided or barred subject in relation to the object of desire” (Fink, 1995).  
The subject has a particular (unique to each individual and most often unconscious) 
relationship with her or his object of desire.  In fantasy, the subject is able to sustain an 
“illusion of wholeness,” “completeness, fulfillment, and well-being” that allows the 
subject to “ignore his or her division” (Fink, 1995, pp. 59-60).  The subject’s unconscious 
object of desire (a) is, according to Lacan, the Other’s desire.  In other words, 
unconsciously the subject clings to some residue of the Other’s desire in the form of 
object a.  
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Object a is a complex theoretical formalization in Lacan’s work, with various 
elaborations and revisions (see Fink, 1995, Chapter 7).  Object a functions in fantasy as 
the subject’s imagined representative of the Other’s desire and is part of how the subject 
would “like to be positioned with respect to the Other’s desire” (Fink, 1995, p. 60). Lacan 
theorizes a “vanishing desire” that drives fantasy formation.  He writes, “in its 
fundamental use, fantasy is the means by which the subject maintains himself at the level 
of his vanishing desire” (Lacan, 1966/2002a, p. 260, p. 637 in the original).  Fantasy 
relies on the subject’s individual psychic blueprint to create an imagined wholeness of 
being.    
A way to approach an understanding of object a is in terms of Lacan’s response to 
Klein’s formulation of object relations.  Lacan (1966/2002a) writes: 
 
The dialectic of fantasy objects promoted in practice by Melanie Klein tends to be 
translated in the theory in terms of identification.  For these objects, whether part-
objects or not, but certainly signifying objects—the breast, excrement, and the 
phallus—are no doubt won or lost by the subject; he is destroyed by them or 
preserves them, but above all he is these objects, according to the place where 
they function in his fundamental fantasy. (p. 240, p. 614 in the original) 
 
Lacan criticizes Klein’s emphasis on the object as an internalization of external others 
(which he terms a process of identification), shifting the emphasis instead to the 
signifying importance of the object in the constitution or being of the subject.  The 
divided subject’s relationship with the object is determined by the fundamental fantasy, 
134 
 
 
which is a part of a signifying structure. Lacan (1966/2002a) criticizes Klein for reducing 
“fantasy to imagination,” and therefore charges that she “failed to grasp the importance of 
the signifier” (p. 260, p. 637 in the original). Instead, Lacan (1966/2002a)  
defines the unconscious fantasy as “an image set to work in the signifying structure” (p. 
260, p. 637 in the original).  For Lacan (1966/2002a), the object in fantasy (object a) is a 
signification “which comes from the Other, insofar as it depends on the Other whether or 
not demand is met” (p. 261, p. 638 in the original).  In other words, there is a “circuit” (p. 
261, p. 638 in the original) in which the subject’s need or demand becomes bound up in 
fantasy with the Other’s desire, such that the object of desire (object a) is transformed 
from an imagined response to an internal demand (as is characteristic of Klein’s theory of 
the object) into an object that also incorporates the Other’s desire, which the subject 
encounters through the symbolic order, most notably through speech.29   
Previously in this chapter, I looked at how object a functions within Lacan’s 
formula for the analyst’s discourse.  There object a was understood to represent the 
analyst as cause of the analysand’s desire in the analytic encounter.  This is one of 
various associated ways of taking up this key Lacanian concept and can be related to the 
function of object a in Lacan’s formula for fantasy.   Just as the analyst’s task is to 
assume (in analytic discourse) the position of cause of the analysand’s desire, that 
position is already prescribed structurally in the analysand in terms of the fundamental 
fantasy. The fundamental fantasy is a predetermined positioning (it is a developmental 
                                                 
29 Desire, for Lacan, is essentially of language, unlike need.  Due to our being speaking beings, human 
desire is radically different from animal desire, and cannot be satisfied in the way that animal desire can be 
satisfied. 
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phenomenon30 from early childhood which therefore far pre-dates the analysis) of the 
subject’s relationship to the Other’s desire. The analyst’s work involves assuming the 
role of desirousness (a non-specific desirousness that simply asks for more: by eliciting 
more associations, by suggesting there is more than consciously intended meaning in 
what is said, by seeing complexity in the obvious and so forth) in a way that illuminates 
the fundamental fantasy structuring the subject’s psychical experience. Rather than 
function as a figure for identification (or idealization), the analyst’s task is to abandon his 
or her own specific, self-serving desires (e.g., the desire that the analysand come to 
think/behave in a certain way) in order to facilitate the analysand’s encounter with the 
highly personal, idiosyncratic residue of the Other’s desire (object a). The analyst’s 
capacity to assume the position of object a is based on the types of interpretations he or 
she makes in the analytic work, as I shall explain below. 
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, an interpretive exchange between analyst and 
analysand leads to an uncovering and reconstruction of the fundamental fantasy.  Žižek 
(1989) addresses the relationship between interpretation and fantasy in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis: 
 
We can also articulate two stages of the psychoanalytic process: interpretation of 
symptoms – going through fantasy [i.e., traversing fantasy]. When we are 
                                                 
30 Object a can be theorized in terms of infant development.  Nobus (1997) writes, “In Freudian terms, the 
father bars the child’s access to the mother as a sexual object and in this way deprives the child of a piece 
of jouissance [pleasure/desire].  The object a is the substitute object for this lost piece of jouissance.  In this 
way, it can temporarily restore the original experience of jouissance, but it can never reinstall the original 
object” (p. 117).  In other words, as the child grows it is cut off from the pleasure it shares with its mother 
(through breast feeding, for example), yet the child holds onto this lost pleasure both as it functions for the 
child and as the child experiences it as a desire from without (the mother’s desire), in the form of an object 
invested with pleasure.  This unconscious investment in object a determines the subject’s fundamental 
fantasy. 
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confronted with the patient’s symptoms, we must first interpret them and 
penetrate through them to the fundamental fantasy as the kernel of enjoyment 
which is blocking the further movement of the interpretation; then we must 
accomplish the crucial step of going through the fantasy, of obtaining distance 
from it, of experiencing how the fantasy-formation just masks, fills out a certain 
void, lack, empty place in the Other. (p. 74) 
 
By wanting to hear more and believing there is more to understand, the analyst opens a 
space for interpreting symptoms.  In the process of interpreting the symptoms, the analyst 
is led to the underlying fundamental fantasy operative in the symptoms, associations, 
dreams, and other analytic material. If the analysand is to traverse the fantasy, the 
analytic work must provide a reconstruction of the fantasy structure that recognizes its 
role in a larger psychical economy (the analysand encounters his/her own role in the 
fantasy formation and also recognizes something about the Other as it is present in the 
fantasy structure).  Fantasy functions as a construction, as an imaginary scenario filling 
out the void, the opening of the desire of the Other (Žižek, 1989, p. 114).  Because we 
can never know with certainty what the Other desires—we can only make suppositions 
about this desire—we are left with a void concerning our knowledge of the Other’s 
desire.  The fundamental fantasy is a supposition about that desire; it attempts to fill in 
this opening by finding a way to again encounter the lost object that represents the 
Other’s desire.  Traversing the fantasy involves constructing a different relationship to 
the Other’s desire.  It can be understood as that which determines the association or 
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relationship between the divided subject and the object of his/her desire (the ◊ in the 
formula $ ◊ a).   
  
 
 
 
Section Four 
Transference and Interpretation 
 
 
  
This section on the relationship between transference and interpretation in 
Lacan’s theory will be particularly brief because Lacan essentially separates these two 
key psychoanalytic concepts. He recommends that the analyst not interpret the 
transference, cautioning: “whenever analysts are inclined to interpret ‘the transference,’ 
they are likely to be interpreting the imaginary component alone and not the overall 
symbolic framework” (Fink, 2004, p.19). Insofar as the analyst does work with the 
transference in a Lacanian analysis, his or her task is to encourage the analysand to 
“reestablish the connections between the content (thoughts and feelings) and the persons, 
situations, and relationship that initially gave rise to it” by putting it into words, but not to 
point out the fact that such connections occur (Fink, 1997, p. 41). 
Whereas for Freud and Klein, transference denotes the special relationship that 
develops between patient and analyst during the course of treatment, a relationship 
marked by the transfer (or reassignment) of attributes and characteristics of other (often 
past) significant relationships in the patient’s life onto the relationship with the analyst, 
transference means something very different within Lacan’s theory.  The emphasis on 
working with the transference in analytic interpretations, especially in Kleinian theory, is 
criticized by Lacan. Whereas Klein relies heavily on transference interpretations, Lacan 
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is wary of transference interpretations.  He says that transference gives the analyst a 
certain “power” over the analysand that the analyst must not use (1966/2002a, p. 225, p. 
597 in the original).  This power is derived from the imaginary feelings that get attached 
to the analyst as “someone who sees or views the analysand in a certain way” (Fink, 
2004, p. 6).  Lacan suggests that rather than work on the imaginary or real facets of the 
transference, analytic work should be directed toward the symbolic level.  “In its 
symbolic aspect,” the transference “helps the treatment progress by revealing the 
signifiers of the subject’s history, while in its imaginary aspect (love and hate) it acts as a 
resistance” (Evans, 1996, p. 212).  Therefore, insofar as the transference is used in the 
analysis, the analyst focuses on the symbolic aspect of the transference.  
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Conclusion 
 
My goal, in the previous chapters of this dissertation, has been to describe how 
Freud, Klein, and Lacan each present the foundational psychoanalytic concept of clinical 
interpretation in their writings.  Because Klein and Lacan are both revisionist interpreters 
of Freud, my hope is that returning to their Freudian roots will provide a way to promote 
dialogue between these two schools.  Both theorists draw from, yet substantially rework 
and revise Freud’s work to present their own articulation of the psychoanalytic 
interpretive process.  By recognizing and presenting each as a Freudian revisionist, my 
aim has been to construct a way to explore an evolving psychoanalytic epistemology in 
which new theoretical formulations (as they have developed within various analytic 
schools) seek to contribute to the process—which was begun by Freud—of describing 
psychoanalytic knowledge.  So often, rather than a meaningful exchange of ideas, 
comparative approaches amongst differing branches of psychoanalysis have resulted in 
unsympathetic, caricatured critiques that are used to validate one theoretical approach 
over another.  This form of debate tends to leave different schools of psychoanalysis 
mystified by (and even scornful of) the beliefs and practices of other schools. My hope 
has been that the Freudian foundation of each theorist’s work could be a place for finding 
the kind of common ground needed for a true discussion or dialogue.   
In this final chapter I will review the existing literature that has tried to create a 
dialogue between Klein (or Kleinians) and Lacan (or Lacanians) around the subject of 
interpretation and add my own conclusions regarding some ways we might understand 
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their similarities and differences.  I will then explore the issue of debate and dialogue in 
psychoanalysis and address why such debate matters to me.  This last section will provide 
an opportunity for me to explore the research and writing process for me as I worked on 
this dissertation, and therefore create some space for a more personal consideration of the 
project. Such self-reflection will provide an opportunity for me to clarify my own 
engagement in the project, in particular by addressing the ways my understanding and 
experience of the project changed as I worked on it.  By ending with a more 
autobiographical description of my approach and my various reactions to the research 
process, I hope to articulate at least some of the connections between the content of my 
research, the approach I took toward exploring this topic, and my own interests and 
biases that drew me to pursue such a project.  Such personal reflection is considered to be 
an integral part of qualitative research because it makes explicit the connection(s) 
between the researcher and the results (Walsh, 1995). 
The most clear-cut attempt to create dialogue between Kleinians and Lacanians in 
the Anglophone world took place in a 1994-1995 seminar hosted by THERIP (The 
Higher Education Network for Research and Information in Psychoanalysis) in Britain.  
During the seminar a group of distinguished scholars from both schools gathered to 
debate and discuss the works of Klein and Lacan.  The panel discussions presented at 
those meetings were published in The Klein-Lacan dialogues (Burgoyne & Sullivan, 
1997). As might be imagined, the topic of interpretation came up in the context of several 
of the papers presented during the course of the seminar, but most explicitly so in a panel 
on technique and interpretation, in which Bronstein’s paper “Technique and 
interpretation in Klein” and Burgoyne’s paper “Interpretation” (in Lacan) were presented 
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alongside one another and discussed.  Bronstein’s paper focuses more on technique via 
case material (with a brief theoretical synopsis at the beginning of her paper), while 
Burgoyne’s paper remains more fully entrenched in theory.  This mode of presentation 
results in the two theories sitting side by side, but without as much exchange as one 
might hope for.  In the panel discussion following the papers, the respondents struggle to 
become interlocutors.  We see some minimal interchange generated as they try to locate 
points of difference, but more pronounced is a general difficulty the discussants seem to 
have in engaging with each other in dialogue.  Each side tries to present (defend?) its own 
theorist’s formulations but this comes at the expense of a more open, candid 
conversation.  Finally, the collection concludes with an essay entitled “Rethinking 
Kleinian interpretation: What difference does it make?” by Laurent (a Lacanian analyst), 
in which Laurent more explicitly links the two theorists around the topic of interpretation.  
Laurent works closely with Klein’s little Dick and Richard cases, weaving in Lacan’s 
critique and articulating the Lacanian approach as he explores Klein’s work.  This way of 
reading the two theorists is interesting, in that it provides a rich reading of Lacan’s 
critique of Klein’s work, but it also serves to silence the Kleinian formulations at work by 
overwriting them with Lacanian theory.  What we get in Laurent’s reading is not so much 
a picture of how each understands interpretation but a story about how Klein did not fully 
understand the analytic process, with the suggestion that a Lacanian reading might fill in 
those gaps.  Because Laurent’s paper was commissioned for the book, there was not a 
panel discussion of his work. 
Keylor (2003) presents another key dialogic reading of Klein and Lacan.  
Although her article “focuses primarily on the establishment of a sense of subjectivity 
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during an early Oedipal phase, sometimes referred to as the primitive Oedipus” (Keylor, 
2003, p. 215), and works for the most part with Lacan’s earlier writings, she does provide 
some more general points of comparison between the two theorists.  For example, she 
notes: 
 
Both [Klein and Lacan] retained Freud’s language of the life and death instincts, 
yet both redefined those instincts through new metaphors that rendered their 
meaning quite different from the metaphors of Newtonian physics and 
neurological science employed by Freud.  For Klein, the libidinal and death 
instincts are more synonymous with affects of love and hate arising initially out of 
the bodily experience of drives directed toward primary objects.  Lacan, by 
contrast, preferred the metaphors of linguistics and structural anthropology. 
(Keylor, 2003, p. 214) 
 
Likewise, she goes on to note that although both Klein and Lacan “violated the hallowed 
rules of technique,” they also both “strongly endorsed traditional aspects of technique, 
particularly that of interpretation and analytic neutrality” (Keylor, 2003, p. 214).31  And 
although her work concentrates first and foremost on the issue of infancy, Keylor does 
address the topic of interpretation briefly in a footnote: 
 
                                                 
31 Some might disagree with Keylor’s assessment here.  For example, prominent Lacanian theorist, J. A. 
Miller (who is also Lacan’s son-in-law), claims that Lacan heralded the end of interpretation, that 
“interpretation is dead.” See “Interpretation in Reverse” (Miller, 2001).  However, in this paper Miller also 
claims that this pronouncement was designed to surprise and have an effect on the reader. 
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Whereas Kleinian interpretation aims fundamentally at articulating the context of 
specific unconscious phantasies that may be presumed to underlie the associative 
content, Lacanian interpretation, particularly in its oracular and paradoxical form, 
aims to sustain and promote the contribution of the unconscious to the dialogue. 
(p. 223) 
 
Unfortunately, Keylor does not provide textual citations from Klein and/or Lacan for 
these more comprehensive or wide-ranging assessments.  Nevertheless, she offers cogent 
points of contrast, she provides an excellent history of the two thinkers that positions both 
within the history of psychoanalysis, and she goes on to explore how each developed 
her/his theoretical work as a response to the issue of infant development.  Keylor is able 
to create a true dialogue between Klein and Lacan by including throughout her text an 
analysis of ways they are either similar or different in how they think about particular 
analytic ideas and techniques.  In this way she accomplishes something that The Klein-
Lacan dialogues does not quite achieve.   
The difference in style between the dialogue structured in The Klein-Lacan 
dialogues (1997) and the dialogue structured by Keylor’s (2003) essay “Subjectivity, 
infantile Oedipus, and symbolization in Melanie Klein and Jacques Lacan” points to a 
difficulty in constructing debate in the psychoanalytic world.  What Keylor was able to 
do (that Bronstein, Burgoyne and Laurent weren’t) is something Bernardi calls creating 
“a shared argumentative field” (2002, p. 851).  Bernardi (2002) proposes that ideally a 
debate should construct a common ground for the discussion so that differences and 
similarities can be appreciated.  Bernardi, a South American psychoanalyst, explores the 
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nature of analytic debate and controversy (both in its ideal and in its most factional and 
divisive forms), focusing on the Kleinian and Lacanian Rio de la Plata debates of the 
1970’s.   This series of debates that took place in 1972 in The Rio de la Plata (a part of 
Buenos Aires and Montevideo) signaled a general shift during the 1970’s in the South 
American analytic community, which had been highly influenced by Klein, toward 
Lacanian ideas.  Bernardi looks at ways in which this debate centered more on defensive 
strategies than on content, charting various rhetorical strategies used by participants to 
defend their own ideas from attack and exploring the obstacles created by differing 
epistemologies (2002).  Bernardi’s interest is in the debate process itself, not so much the 
content of those debates.  Rather than competitive, defensive positioning, “aimed at 
keeping each theory’s premises safe from the opposing party’s arguments,” 
psychoanalytic debate would benefit from “a comparison of the way each position 
interweaves theoretical ideas with clinical practice” (Bernardi, 2002, p. 851 & 870).  
Bernardi believes—and I agree with him—that the interaction of various hypotheses is 
more important than reaching consensus and that the “intellectual and emotional effort” 
required for accepting other viewpoints is what will carry “us forward in the search for 
new ideas” (2002, p. 870).  And this, it seems to me, is ultimately in keeping with Freud’s 
position on and practice of interpretation. 
 Mindful of Bernardi’s critique of the debate process in psychoanalysis, I would 
like to review some of the points of comparison I encountered in my Freudian reading of 
Klein and Lacan.  This will certainly not be anything close to an exhaustive comparative 
assessment.  Instead, I would like to simply highlight some of places I believe a dialogue 
about similarities and differences between the two theorists might begin.   
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In Chapter One of this dissertation I described Freud as engaged in a hermeneutic 
process of presenting various metaphors (or using assorted tropes) as he describes 
psychoanalytic ontology and epistemology.  I identified this hermeneutic, interpretive 
process as a key factor in psychoanalytic epistemology and found it to be a fundamental, 
constituent facet of psychoanalytic methodology.  Freud repeatedly encountered clinical 
phenomena that motivated the construction of additional psychoanalytic metaphors and 
concepts.  As Freud’s psychoanalytic epistemology developed, the methodological 
principles behind and methods of analytic interpretation also developed.  In Chapters 
Two and Three I went on to look at how Klein and Lacan are also involved in a process 
of adding new metaphors or tropes to psychoanalytic theory. These new metaphors or 
tropes are intended to open new ways to interpret or elucidate Freudian theory.  For Klein 
childhood/infancy is the crucial interpretive trope that opens a new way to interpret or 
describe what it is to be human, whereas for Lacan it is language.  Klein’s attunement is 
toward an infantile unconscious wrought with internal conflict, aggression, and anxiety, 
whereas Lacan presents a linguistic, socially constructed unconscious.  Klein formulates 
the unconscious in terms of internal, preverbal processes in the infant, while Lacan 
moves the unconscious outside of the individual.  For Lacan, the unconscious is in the 
signifying chain, which comes to inhabit us as individual speaking beings but which is 
never reducible to the individual.  The unconscious Lacan presents is radically Other, 
whereas for Klein the unconscious is comprised of infantile phantasies. Klein’s 
innovative way of describing childhood (even infant, preverbal) experience allows for a 
new description of the subject of psychoanalysis.  Along with Klein’s new way of 
thinking about the subject of psychoanalysis come various innovations in analytic 
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interpretive theory and technique.   Likewise, Lacan’s linguistics based formulation of the 
subject of psychoanalysis also leads to innovations in analytic interpretive theory and 
technique.  For him the unconscious is present in the signifiers that comprise language 
and is subject to or structured by the rules of language.  Therefore, for Lacan there is no 
preverbal aspect to the unconscious as there is for Klein.  Their different metaphors or 
tropes also lead to different styles of theorizing.  Klein uses case examples, drawn from 
her clinical work with children, to explicate her theoretical concepts, while Lacan’s 
interest in language can be seen both in the theoretical or philosophical nature of his 
theory and in his labyrinthine writing style (in both content and form).  Both Klein and 
Lacan follow Freud’s lead in seeing interpretation of the unconscious as the central 
feature of the psychoanalytic methodology, but each introduces a new method for 
attending to the subject’s free associations: Klein’s new interpretive method analyzes 
children’s play, whereas Lacan’s deciphers the signifying chain.  
  In addition to formulating their theoretical revisions of Freud around different 
organizing metaphors that impact analytic methodology, I also noted some differences in 
the way Klein and Lacan understand the role of psychoanalytic reconstruction, fantasy, 
and transference.  Variations in their conceptualization of these concepts impact how 
each formulates interpretive technique.  These differences are key aspects of their 
revisionist readings of Freudian theory.  I will briefly review some of the points of 
comparison I noted in the previous chapters.  This summary is intended to highlight (and 
recap) the concepts that I believe a dialogue about the similarities and differences in 
interpretive technique might most fruitfully engage.  Of course, there is a great deal of 
room for a far richer and much more comprehensive analysis of similarities and 
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differences between these theorists, and others readers might discover very different 
points of comparison from the ones I chose to address, but my hope is that my analysis 
can be a small contribution to a larger project of striving to create a more meaningful 
debate and dialogue within the psychoanalytic community. 
 For Freud, reconstruction creates a hypothetical narrative about the forgotten past 
that is meant to supplement the patient’s associative material and further the analytic 
process.  Like the archeologist’s excavation (one of Freud’s favorite metaphors), the 
psychoanalyst’s reconstruction narrates an account of the patient’s missing history or 
memory through combining, and supplementing with theory, the remnants that linger.  
The analyst’s reconstruction is a conjecture that extends beyond both empirical data and 
general psychoanalytic theory, to provide a uniquely personal explanatory narrative.  
Klein, on the other hand, takes up reconstruction at the level of theory making as she 
presents her own interpretation of preverbal, infantile experience.  Klein’s reconstructions 
interpret experiences that would otherwise remain outside of language by producing 
fictitious memory narratives.  Although this generally fits with Freud’s formulation of 
construction in psychoanalysis, Klein’s specific approach to a patient’s personal history 
differs significantly from Freud.  Unlike Freud, she does not consider the past to be a 
relic that psychoanalysis might unearth, but instead focuses on the past as it is lived in the 
present in current object relations.  Although object relations are assumed to have an 
historical dimension, the interpretive emphasis remains focused on present day 
experience. For Klein, infancy is perpetually present and developmental conflicts are 
never fully relegated to the past.  Lacan, on the other hand, formulates reconstruction in 
terms of the symbolic order.  Through a process of recollection, which involves tracing 
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the (master) signifiers of a patient’s life, history is rewritten or reconstructed anew.  The 
goal of tracing the history recorded in the signifying chain is that the analysand 
reintegrates that history, not at the level of egoistic self-knowledge (which would be a 
form of reminiscing, or reliving that which is already incorporated) but instead in the 
form of an encounter with a new, unconventional account of the past.  According to 
Lacan, through attending to the historical dimension of the analysand’s master signifiers, 
something new is symbolized; history is rewritten.   This is very different from the type 
of reconstruction Freud presented.  Like Freud, Lacan shifts the focus of reconstruction 
away from remembering and instead emphasizes rewriting a new account, but unlike 
Freud, he does not suggest this happens at the level of understanding; rather, in Lacan’s 
account it occurs via the symbolic order. 
In seeking to explore the ways Klein and Lacan approach fantasy, I first explored 
Freud’s work on psychical reality (as opposed to empirical reality), as the realm in which 
fantasies shaped by wish-fulfilling desires predominate over external or empirical reality.  
Neurotic suffering, according to Freud, is caused by unconscious (primary process) 
fantasies that organize psychical experience.  Such fantasies often take the form of master 
stories which seem to reiterate a basic (unconscious) plot line in constitutive ways.  Freud 
sought to help the patient bring these unconscious fantasies into consciousness and 
thereby loosen the grip of the master story.  Klein and Lacan both follow Freud’s lead in 
seeing that which is termed reality as fundamentally formed by fantasy.  Klein speculated 
that as the infant comes to experience external reality, a very complicated psychical 
world begins to develop internally that is dominated by phantasies about objects 
encountered in the external world.  These phantasies form and govern the unconscious 
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object relations that are so central to Kleinian psychoanalysis.  Klein believed that 
interpreting such phantasies is vital so that the patient might experience a shift from 
infantile, archaic phantasies (which appear throughout life) into the shared world of 
external reality. Klein’s emphasis on the shift into external reality as a goal of 
psychoanalysis is akin, but not identical to, Freud’s goal of making the unconscious 
conscious. Likewise, Lacan’s notion of traversing the fundamental fantasy seems to be 
related to making the unconscious conscious but in addition to releasing the analysand 
from the constrictive fantasy structure, this notion of traversing the fantasy also involves 
a process of constructing a new fantasy structure in the face of the unbearable nature of 
the old one.  The interpretive elaboration involved in reconstructing the fundamental 
fantasy radically alters the fantasy structure.  For Lacan, fantasy involves more than the 
internal object relations Klein theorized; it also involves the Other, which the subject 
encounters in the symbolic order.  For Lacan, however, the role the analyst assumes in 
relation to fantasy is very different from the analytic role or technique proposed by Klein, 
or even Freud.  Both Freud and Klein seem to present interpretation in terms of 
explanation and adaptation to external reality (which includes a reduction of symptoms), 
whereas Lacan’s interpretive method shifts the focus away from insight and calls into 
question the very notion of external reality as something that is knowable.   
Finally, at the end of each chapter I included a brief description of the relationship 
between transference and interpretation.  Transference is one of the most important and 
most basic of all Freudian concepts and the relationship between transference and 
interpretation is far more complicated than the brief, cursory gloss I added to each 
chapter would suggest.  This is certainly one of the chief limitations of this dissertation (a 
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limitation that is the result of needing to create some parameters on the project as a way 
to contain the scope) and one of the places that could most easily benefit from additional 
study.  Nevertheless, I included this brief account of transference because it is one 
important element within psychoanalytic interpretation.   
 The brevity of the transference sections in each chapter was something I struggled 
with.  I found it difficult to boil down such a thorny and controversial aspect of 
psychoanalytic theory into a brief overview restricted to the link between transference 
and interpretation (and therefore not engage in a more comprehensive overview of 
transference as conceptualized by each theorist).  The complexity of the construct itself 
either threatened to take over—I could easily imagine a second dissertation looking at 
transference in Freud, Klein, and Lacan—or felt emptied out, as my overview became 
cursory glosses rather than more substantial explorations. However, it also seems 
plausible to me that part of what was challenging about writing these sections extends to 
something more personal, beyond wanting to limit the span of the study. The extent to 
which this struggle can be understood to be a more individual reaction to the topic—a 
transference to transference, if you will—or is characteristic of some inherent difficulty 
in the theory itself is unclear to me at this time.  Of course, it also seems reasonable to 
wonder if perhaps some combination of the two (the complications of the theory itself on 
the one hand, and a more personal reaction stirred by the material on the other) accounts 
for a more general problem within the psychoanalytic field regarding how best to account 
for and work with transference.  Ultimately I decided to live with this tension, accepting 
rather superficial overviews of transference for each theorist as one of the limitations of 
this study. 
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 Such tensions are, I believe, an expected part of entering the field of intellectual 
debate and dialogue.  By looking beyond ideas that are comfortable and safe, we enter a 
realm characterized by possible confusion, misunderstanding, half-formulated truths, 
differences of opinion, and even argument.  Yet through the exchange of ideas it is 
possible to have an encounter with difference (in particular, a different way of thinking) 
that is both intellectually productive and emotionally worth the frustration that it can 
provoke.  Indeed, part of the appeal of the topic of interpretation for me stems from my 
interest in intellectual debate, dialogue, exchange of ideas, and disagreement. I find 
Bernardi’s (2002) call for “a shared argumentative field” (p. 851) in psychoanalytic 
debate particularly appealing because it addresses the importance of finding enough of a 
common ground that a true intellectual meeting between various psychoanalytic schools 
might take place.  For me, as I formulated and worked on this project, this meant trying to 
contextualize Klein and Lacan as revisionists working in a mutual theoretical language 
that was prescribed by Freud. Within the context of such a shared domain, areas of 
convergence and divergence can be explored and considered without being 
overshadowed by issues of competition, authority, and legitimacy.  Each responds to, 
comments on, and assesses critically different aspects of Freud’s thought by working 
within different tropes, tropes that are intended to further elucidate key psychoanalytic 
concepts.  I find encouraging such “a shared argumentative field” (Bernardi, 2002, p. 
851) to be particularly appealing as a model for intellectual exchange because it allows 
for the possibility that different theories, organized around diverse metaphors, might add 
to our clinical understanding and further the process of seeking to articulate 
psychoanalytic knowledge.  Theory then becomes a tool for furthering reflection rather 
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than an articulation of truth, and the issue of rightness gives way to an evaluation of 
usefulness. 
However, as I reflect on writing this dissertation and my desire to find a space for 
dialogue, I would also like to address an experience I had as I worked with each of the 
theorists.  Much to my surprise, I found that, as I grew more immersed in working with 
each individual theorist I became so wrapped up in what each was communicating that I 
felt myself become more drawn into issues of legitimacy.  “Freud got it right—No, it was 
Klein who was right—No, it was Lacan who really figured it out!”  Despite my own 
intentions I felt myself pulled into a search for Truth, Authority, and Legitimacy.  At 
times it was hard to set aside the matter of rightness as I worked, even though I had set 
out explicitly to strive for a different form of assessment. As an interpreter, I certainly 
brought my own judgments and way of thinking to how I approached the material I was 
working with in this project, resulting in interpretations of each theorist that are shaped 
by my own biases and assumptions. 
Alongside my own inconsistent attitude about truth-value, I also noted that a 
certain thrill or pleasure developed as I came to more fully understand the technical 
language and metaphors used by each theorist.  One way to describe this pleasure is in 
terms of obtaining insider or emic knowledge.32  Technical language that had previously 
felt rather obscure and alienating came to have meaning for me as I began to better 
understand each theorist’s work.  What had previously felt frustrating was transformed 
                                                 
32 “Emic” is a term that is used in various ways in the social sciences.  I am using the word here to describe 
the way a system or cultural is articulated and understood based on its own terms, rather than on the basis 
of external structures or systems (Jahoda, 1995).  In using the term this way I am describing various 
analytic schools as having their own culture and I am suggesting that understanding the terms and internal 
systems used in the culture (and which are definitive of that culture) allows one a place within that 
community. 
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into a collective language and understanding that increased my capacity for dialogue with 
those within a particular tradition.  While learning and writing about Klein for my Klein 
chapter, I was able to engage with Kleinian ideas in a new way; and the same was true of 
Lacan.  There is a certain gratification in both the process of interpretation and in the 
outcome, or interpretation itself.  
It is unclear to me the extent to which this knowledge—specifically the new 
technical language and theoretical insights I have acquired—has impacted my clinical 
practices.  For example, at least at this point in my work I have not found that I explicitly 
switch around between wearing Freudian, Kleinian or Lacanian hats in clinical practice 
(one might imagine offering a “Freudian interpretation” one moment, followed by a 
“Kleinian interpretation” or a “Lacanian interpretation” the next, but I have not found this 
to be case).  However, I can see that I am now in a different position to engage in 
dialogue about clinical work with colleagues from various backgrounds.  For example, in 
case consultations I feel better able to describe, wonder about, and listen to 
conceptualizations of clinical work (my own and others) in ways that encourage dialogue, 
rather than leading to battles for legitimacy or power.  It is precisely this capacity to 
engage in and encounter different ways of thinking that appeals to me as I seek to 
promote increased dialogue within the psychoanalytic field. 
Ironically, although theoretical specialization provides the intellectual tools and 
vocabulary with which to conceptualize and speak about clinical phenomenon, and in that 
way creates a space in which dialogue might occur, it also runs the risk of creating a 
canonic, authoritative discourse.  I raise this issue of specialization because I believe it 
can account for some of the isolation that has developed between various analytic groups. 
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As specialization grows (which does allow for a deeper level of analysis), it also alienates 
those unfamiliar with the fine distinctions in concepts and nuanced terminology 
characteristic of such specialization.  This issue of specialization also provides a valuable 
reminder concerning resistance toward engaging other theories.  Such resistance is 
particularly evident with Lacan, whose highly theoretical writings seem to so often 
provoke an alienated refusal to engage by those who are unfamiliar with his work, but 
can also be seen in those who encounter but are unfamiliar with either Freud or Klein.33  
The daunting task of entering a highly specialized discourse can drive people away.  For 
some, such a filter on the discursive field might seem appropriate (the logic behind such a 
sentiment might be: after all, if a reader is not willing to invest in understanding the texts, 
maybe she/he should remain outside the debate), but a counter-argument might posit that 
some form of preliminary entry must be made available to outsiders or the uninitiated if a 
conversation is to be sustained. There must be some openness to that which feels outside 
of the self or foreign for an engagement or encounter to take place.  In other words, a 
good faith effort by all parties to make their premises accessible is called for if a true 
dialogue is to occur. This is not to say that forging ahead in search of such dialogue is 
easy.  S. A. Mitchell and Black (1995) note, 
 
At present it is very difficult to find any psychoanalyst who is really deeply 
conversant with more than one approach (e.g., Kleinian, Lacanian, ego 
psychology, self psychology).  The literature of each school is extensive and each 
                                                 
33 This notion is based on personal experience, anecdotal experience and my own impressions of other’s 
encounters with psychoanalytic theory.  It is a personal reflection and therefore expresses a bias or 
preconceived idea that I have carried with me as I have approached this project. 
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clinical sensibility finely honed, presenting a challenging prospect to any single 
analyst attempting to digest it all. (p. 207) 
 
Perhaps this struggle—between the attempt to assimilate or appropriate more knowledge 
into one’s own discursive and conceptual system on the one hand, and the simultaneous 
effort to release discourse from authoritative, alienating specialization, on the other—is 
an inherent aspect of the human condition and the best we can do is seek some form of 
balance between the two by working to encounter and comprehend as much as possible, 
while also attaining the keen acumen made possible via a more concentrated focus. 
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